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Nostalgia is the longing for a lost, and often substantially reimagined, time or 
place. Commonly regarded as a conservative impulse available for exploitation by 
hegemonic forces, nostalgia can also be a source of social questioning and creative 
inspiration. This dissertation examines the ways in which nostalgic longing imports 
images and ideas from memory into present discourse and infuses works of art with 
complication, contradiction, and ambiguity. 
In the early 1960s, emboldened by Nikita Khrushchev’s cultural Thaw, many 
Soviet filmmakers engaged both personal and social memory to craft challenging 
reflections of and responses to their times. These filmmakers reengaged the sundered 
spirit of the 1920s avant-garde and reimagined the nation’s artistic and spiritual heritage; 
they captured the passing moments of contemporary history in a way that animated the 
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permanent, productive, and sometimes stormy dialogue between the present and the 
persistent past. 
Mikhail Kalatozov’s I Am Cuba (1964), Andrei Tarkovsky’s Andrei Rublev 
(1966, released 1971), and Marlen Khutsiev’s Ilich’s Gate (1961, released with changes 
in 1965 as I Am Twenty) were planned in the anxious years surrounding Khrushchev’s 
fall, and the films mark a high point of Thaw-era cinematic audacity. Each film is epic in 
scope; each deploys temporal longing to generate narrative ambiguity and dialogue 
between historical epochs. The films are haunted by ghosts; they challenge the hegemony 
of the “now” by insisting on the phantom presence of a thousand “thens”; they refurbish 
old dreams and question contemporary assumptions. The Thaw permitted the intrusion of 
private memory into public history, and the past became a zone for exploration rather 
than justification. Easy answers became harder to come by, but the profusion of questions 
and suggestions created a brief silver age for Soviet cinema. For us, these films offer an 
extraordinary glimpse into creative life during one of the great, unsung social transitions 
of the 20th century and reveal the crucial contribution of individual memory in the artistic 
quest for formal diversity, spiritual inspiration, and ethical living. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This was real life, meaningful experience, the actual goal of all quests, this was what art 
aimed at—homecoming, return to one's family, to oneself, to true existence. 
 —Boris Pasternak (1958, p. 164), Doctor Zhivago 
My nostalgia was for all the silly disappearing Soviet things—for the relationships, plain 
and simple: for the kitchen conversations; for the smell of reel-to-reel audiotape mixed 
with cigarette smoke and booze; for being young and having a clear and comprehensible 
future; for my parents, young and happy; for the heady spirit of household dissidence and 
its blend of romanticism, danger and hope; for rules of life that are known to all—or, if 
you will, games that have become entangled with life. 
 —Andrei Bilzho (2008), “Little Contradictions”1 
 
Then it’s not the past I yearn for, but the idea of a time when everything important has 
not yet happened. 
 —Lawrence Raab (1994), “The Uses of Nostalgia”  
 
In the summer of 1993, when I was in my early 20s and already besotted with 
Russian culture, I had the good fortune to land a job at Mosfilm Studios in Moscow. The 
history of the studio had captured my imagination from afar, and each day that summer I 
felt that ghostly feeling one sometimes gets when inhabiting the present of a place whose 
past one has dreamed about. Whenever there was time, I liked to roam the studio 
grounds, or rather hover among them, convincing myself I could hear the talking stones. 
                                                
1 A note on translation and transliteration: Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Russian sources are 
my own. For all Russian bibliographic information, I have used the Library of Congress transliteration 
system. In the body of the text, I have used spellings more customary for the English-speaking reader. I 
have also omitted hard- and soft-signs for transliterated terms in the body of the text. 
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Here was a heavy building of beige brick, neoclassical, built to Stalin’s tastes, its 
authority softened by volunteer shrubs sprouting from the rooftop balustrade. Alongside 
it, a graveyard of rusted out baby-blue studio buses, each grill aged to uniqueness, 
destroyed in its own special way. There was a traffic light in an alley between 
soundstages; the lights had been removed; you could look right through it and see the 
sky. The studio had once been one of the world’s great centers of filmmaking. Now on 
certain days I could walk from one end of the vast grounds to the other without bumping 
into anything resembling a shoot. For me, a kid from Las Vegas, there was a strangely 
familiar air to the place—it felt like the hollowed downtown of an American city after the 
construction of a suburban mall. And the feeling was apt: Russian film fans had gotten 
their mall—the miles of roadside kiosks hawking cheap pirated copies of Hollywood 
films, many of them straight-to-video jobs of which I had never seen or heard. Without 
its once lavish state support, the studio had no way to compete with such masterworks.  
My job was to translate, coach dialogue, and occasionally dig holes on the set of 
what was at the time Mosfilm’s marquis project—a Russian-Italian-American joint 
venture. We were making a Western. Starring an Italian. Filmed chiefly on a military 
base an hour outside Moscow. Each morning we all came to the studio, boarded one of 
the less distressed of the picturesque blue buses, and headed for the set. On my first day 
of work I had taken the Metro to Kiev Station, caught Trolley 34 to the gates of Mosfilm, 
and showed my documents to the guard. I’d arrived early. I didn’t know who to look for, 
where to find them, or quite how to explain my presence. I knew the history of the studio, 
but its present, and my present, were something of a mystery. The guard waved me 
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through. I wandered onto the grounds. And there I did what one does on a film shoot. I 
waited.  
I could have kept waiting all day. There, just inside the gate, was a long row of 
displays encased in scratched and fogged Lucite—posters of the majestic movies of 
Mosfilm’s past.  Here was Grigorii Chukhrai’s 1959 classic Ballad of a Soldier. Over 
there—Mikhail Kalatozov’s 1957 masterpiece The Cranes Are Flying. Eight-thousand 
miles and eleven time zones from home, I found myself longing for a lost time and place, 
but it was not a time or place in which I or any of my ancestors had ever lived. In the 
third year of the bewildering Muscovite 90s, in the heart of the world’s first attempt at a 
post-Socialist society, I found myself missing a Russia where the chocolate came not 
from M & M Mars but from the Red October Chocolate Factory, where the soundtrack of 
the times emitted from the voice box of Vladimir Vysotsky rather than the synthesizers of 
a Scandinavian globo-pop outfit called Ace of Base, and where the Shock Worker movie 
theatre on the embankment of the Moscow River was showing The Cranes Are Flying. 
This fantastic daydream made no sense: I had studied the Soviet century, its deprivations, 
its brutalities both grandiose and audaciously petty. I could not possibly “miss” the Soviet 
Union. And yet, on that day, in that peculiar way, what could I say but that I missed the 
place?  
In the years since that summer in Moscow, my career as a journalist and scholar 
has shuttled me between Moscow and Las Vegas several times. I watched as Moscow, for 
a time, began to resemble Las Vegas in its hurly-burly oligarchic-capitalist growth; I 
watched with both hope and frustration as Moscow tried to find the elusive golden mean 
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between private freedom and public spirit. I had no illusions that my beloved Soviet 
moviemakers of the late 1950s and and early ’60s—the years of the post-Stalin Thaw—
had the answers to the problems of post-Soviet Moscow, 21st-century Las Vegas, or 
anyplace else for that matter. But the beautiful questions they posed tore through the 
surface of my present just as they had breached the surface of mid-century Soviet society; 
the filmmakers’ creative engagement with their world invited me to perceive mine from 
countless odd angles. And and as the years passed, I remained nostalgic for the world of 
the cinematic Thaw—for its air of openness and youthful risk, for the filmmakers’ 
aesthetic search and their ethical quest, for their open-ended lyricism and their 
willingness to ask questions without answers.  
When I began work on this dissertation, 15 years after I had first set foot on that 
pirozhki western film set, I decided to interrogate my own nostalgia for an age I had 
never directly experienced: How, and why, did I generate an imaginary vision of that lost 
world? How does my nostalgia shape my perception, engagement, and creative activity in 
the present? What is the artistic process of my own memory construction, and how does it 
build upon the creative processes of the filmmakers who inspired me? I was not looking 
to generate a grand theory of the era, or to give a comprehensive history. My interest was 
in the emotional dynamics of authorship in a given place and time, the relationship 
between creativity, context, and memory. Because of this, I chose to focus not on the 
whole of the industry’s production during the Thaw—there were plenty of films “made-
to-order” for commercial or ideological purposes—but on what we might call auteur 
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cinema, films that, even given the collaborative nature of the medium, reflect the personal 
visions of their directors, screenwriters, and directors of photography. 
In the process of examining the landmark films of the era and the lives of the 
artists who made them, I began to see that my nostalgia was built upon the nostalgia of 
the filmmakers themselves. Directors such as Mikhail Kalatozov, Andrei Tarkovsky, and 
Marlen Khutsiev seemed to have encoded their work with ineffable temporal longing. 
Moreover, it was precisely through this longing that they had created their vibrant, 
haunting visions of the nexus of private consciousness and public time. What had begun 
as an investigation of my nostalgia for the worlds created by Kalatozov, Tarkovsky and 
Khutsiev became instead an investigation of the nostalgia that had created those worlds. 
* * * 
Nostalgia is the longing for a lost, and often substantially reimagined, time or 
place. It connects personal recollection with communal memory. In an age of rapid 
change across a swiftly shrinking planet, individuals and communities are increasingly 
turning to memory to retain some sense of local identity and cultural integrity, reaching 
across time to ameliorate the contraction of space. We can expect nostalgia to be an 
enduring and politically salient feature of the globalized landscape for many years to 
come. The yearning backward glance may seem—and indeed often is—a conservative 
impulse, a desire to impose a sanitized memoryscape on messy reality. But in these pages 
I hope to contribute to our understanding of how nostalgia—temporal longing—can also 
empower creativity and challenge convention. 
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To understand the function of temporal longing in shaping personal and cultural 
identities, we need to examine the ways in which it can be a catalyst for creative 
reflection on bygone days that, in their essential difference, present a provocative 
counterpoint to the present. In this dissertation, I explore how yearning immersion in rich 
memories, sundered pasts, and disappearing moments helped Thaw-era Soviet 
filmmakers create images that challenged the unambiguous, instrumental, and hegemonic 
narratives operating in the broader culture. My study builds upon Svetlana Boym’s 
(2001) brilliant division of the usually unitary notion of nostalgia into “reflective 
nostalgia”—creative engagement with the ambiguous and admittedly unreachable past—
and “restorative nostalgia”—desire for a wholesale importation of the forms, concepts, 
and mores of an idealized past. 
The globalizing, digitizing 1990s were not the first time national and local 
cultures had to cope with totalizing transnational narratives that thumbed their nose at 
cherished tradition, devalued intimate personal and community memory, and left 
bewilderment and alienation in their wake. Soviet citizens, in fact, were quite familiar 
with such narratives. Russia spent the entire 20th century in the midst of one sort of 
transition or another—fraught moments when one world seemed to be disappearing, 
another was yet unformed, and ghosts of earlier ages hovered in the cultural ether, ever 
prepared to haunt or inspire. These pages focus on one of the most hopeful of the 
century’s transitions, the era of cultural and political readjustment that followed the death 
of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and came to be known as the Thaw. This period, which ended 
with the authoritarian retrenchment of the late 1960s, is a crucial fulcrum in modern 
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Russian history, an epoch in which both the Soviet regime and the nation’s intelligentsia 
attempted to re-brand Soviet Communism and revive the utopian promise of the October 
Revolution of 1917. 
After years of Stalinist terror, during which fearful idolatry had displaced personal 
ideological faith as the motivating force behind socialist construction, the Communist 
Party sought to rekindle the old secular religion. Under Nikita Khrushchev, enthusiasm 
was to replace coercion; the nation would be built through a divine synthesis of personal 
inspiration and Party leadership. Khrushchev’s program, such as it was, turned out to be 
piecemeal, conflicted, and inconsistent in its methods, but it irrevocably broadened the 
range of permissible expression in the Soviet Union. It also shaped a generation of 
leaders who would, in the late 1980s, put to the test its central unrealized humanistic 
notion—that socialist progress could be achieved through individual enthusiasm.  
From my perspective in early 1990s Moscow, with its vague hopes and concrete 
pains, its shimmering opportunities and its palpable ethos of every-man-for-himself, the 
cinema of the Soviet 1950s and 60s seemed not only relevant, but magical: It captivated 
me with its air of anxious renewal, its fraught meditation on individuality within the 
public sphere. The landmark films of the era attempt to locate freedom at the intersection 
of private integrity and public responsibility. This emphasis is in part the result of 
historical circumstance: The post-Stalin era was fueled by nostalgia for what one might 
call “imaginary Leninism”, for an idealized vision of the 1920s atmosphere of political 
enthusiasm and creative ferment. (The Khrushchev regime’s vision of the Leninist spirit 
favored heartfelt socialist consciousness, and the artists’ vision favored creative 
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spontaneity. These visions did not always coexist in harmony.) The focus on private 
embrace of the public good had even deeper roots in the Russian Orthodox principle of 
sobornost, or conjunctivity, which holds that individual uniqueness is desirable precisely 
for the selfless contribution it makes to the social whole.2 Long before the Revolution, 
Russian artists had seen themselves not simply as the nation’s mirror, but its conscience.  
The Stalin regime had defied this tradition by denying artists their place as moral 
ombudsmen; it had anointed them “engineers of human souls” and then proceeded to tell 
them how those souls were to be engineered. In the late 1950 and early 60s, the artists of 
the Thaw greeted their expanded freedom as an opportunity to embrace their traditional 
social role. Aware that Soviet society had fallen far short of its utopian promises, they 
reacted not with cynicism or resignation but with an energetic quest for the artistic, 
ethical, and even spiritual, integrity that would help the society fulfill its humane 
potential. It was a naïve dream, and by the end of the 1960s, with the Soviet authorities 
long since having demonstrated their strident disinterest in the artists’ private visions of 
public life, a vague sense of Quixotic absurdity hung over the whole project.  Perhaps it 
was this absurdity that I found so endearing, this almost willful capacity to envision 
oneself as free, and to project that freedom onto the public square. 
In an important way, the Thaw was a return home for the Russian arts after a long 
twilight journey into Stalinist terror. The thematic and narrative conventions of socialist 
realism did not disappear entirely; nor did the often-arbitrary administrative management 
                                                
2 The classic metaphor of sobornost comes from the 19th-century Slavophile Konstantin Aksakov’s 
description of the peasant commune as a choir in which every individual sings with his or her utterly 
unique voice, and the voices merge harmoniously in a unified social choir (Riazanovsky, 1965, p. 135). 
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of the culture industry and the careers of the men and women who worked in it. But the 
change in degree of domination was so significant that it amounted to a fundamental 
qualitative change in the lives of artists. In the Stalin years, rigid aesthetic discipline was 
enforced by total bureaucratic coercion: the “cast-iron” screenplay, which, once 
approved, was not to be changed; the threat of the camps for the ideologically and 
aesthetically disobedient; the hypnotic thrall of Stalin’s cult of personality; the ever-
shifting campaigns against Trotskyism, formalism, cosmopolitanism—all of these kept 
artists forever off-balance, insecure, far from self, far from “home”.  
While Stalin’s aesthetic preferences leaned toward grandiose neoclassicism and 
traditional Aristotelian narrative, the culture he built was utterly dependent on one 
moment in one place. The secret to life and livelihood was encoded in the very latest 
vibrations emitting from the old fortress in central Moscow. Authoritative 
communication began with the radio sign-on Govorit Moskva: This is Moscow speaking. 
Personal memory and idiosyncratic, polyphonic dialogue between eras had no place in 
this model; how could one long for what was missing when the strictly enforced social 
teleology of the nation held that nothing could possibly be missing?  
The transition from this state of affairs toward one where terror and the cult of 
personality had been renounced created an opening to memory, a reentry into the 
polyphonic eddies of Russian cultural history, with all its aesthetic and ethical debates. In 
the 1960s, the Soviet intelligentsia engaged in energetic polemics around three dualities: 
fathers and sons, physicists and lyricists, and town and country. The first debate—
ostensibly between the dreamy ’60s youth and their hardheaded war-generation fathers—
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was a role-reversal reprise of the discourse, immortalized by Ivan Turgenev, between the 
hardheaded proto-revolutionary sons of the 1860s and the dreamy liberal fathers of the 
1840s. The second discussion—which posed the parlor-game question of whether the 
poet or the particle researcher was more important to the national future—had associative 
links to the vibrant 1920s discourse on the interwoven roles of science and art in Soviet 
life. The third polemic was an echo of the 19th century debate between Slavophiles, who 
sought to build Russia’s future through a revival of the spiritual traditions of Russian 
Orthodoxy and the social traditions of the peasant commune, and Westernizers, who 
believed that the future wellbeing of the country depended on its absorption of Western 
culture and science. In both the earlier times and the 1960s, each of the pairings 
constituted not a strict dualistic choice, but a sliding scale of adaptations, a field of 
conversation across space and time.  
The Thaw, then, for all its enthusiasm for modernization and the glittering future, 
represented a return from a culture of the determinate instant, in which regularly updated 
answers from the center illuminated the artist’s path (the answers were often arbitrary, 
and the path was tortuous, but it was illuminated all the same), to one in which the past, 
and individual longing for shards of that past, once again had meaning. Looser 
bureaucratic management of culture in the Khrushchev years made room for open and 
fierce debate, from the ideological warfare between Alexander Tvardovsky’s liberal 
journal, Novy Mir (New World) and Vsevolod Kochetov’s conservative Oktiabr 
(October) to the scene at the Manezh exhibition of modern art just outside the Kremlin 
gates on December 1, 1962, when Khrushchev raged at the young sculptor Ernst 
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Neizvestny, and Neizvestny raged right back at him and lived to tell the tale (and to 
continue creating modern art, including Khruschchev’s tombstone).3 Paternalistic advice 
in studio meetings, administrative harrumphing at higher levels, and a situational system 
of carrots and sticks that included everything from project approval to living space 
ensured that artists continued to live anxious lives and lead careers subject to 
administrative whim. But the end of terror, the revival of debate, and the cultural 
uncertainty as to what exactly art should look like allowed them to continue their always 
invigorating, sometimes shocking, reentry into Russian history.  
* * * 
This study is a meditation on the power of temporal longing to inspire creativity. 
Temporal longing shapes our perception; it pierces the accepted present with splinters of 
discarded pasts; it can stir convention and transform the texture of the moment, 
generating complication, contradiction, and ambiguity. Temporal longing calls upon 
memory, engages idiosyncratic associations, and forges shifting sets of images in the 
mind’s eye. It imports diversity into every moment in time. It layers all that has been lost, 
learned, and longed for upon the time-space of the present. It constantly redefines that 
present.  
                                                
3 The Russian cinema historian Naum Kleiman, a contemporary of Neizvestny’s, writes that when 
Khrushchev thundered his rage at the exhibition, “it was understood that the problem was not ‘antisocial 
abstractionism’ but the predictable attempt to tighten the screws in a society newly emboldened after the 
22nd Party Congress” at which Khrushchev had continued the de-Stalinizing theme he had introduced at 
the 20th Party Congress in 1956 (Fomin, 1998, p. 303). The fragility of Khrushchev’s position, weakened 
by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the disappointing results of his agricultural policies, required him to 
constantly toggle back and forth between anti-Stalinist tolerance and blustery conservative posturing. This 
toggling had been seen earlier, as when, during the heady early days of the Thaw, Khrushchev had 
forbidden the publication of Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago and, after its publication abroad, had forced 
Pasternak to refuse his Nobel Prize. Many years later, Khrushchev wrote in his posthumously published 
memoirs that he regretted his rough treatment of Pasternak. 
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In the early 1960s, Soviet filmmakers, emboldened by Khrushchev’s cultural 
Thaw, engaged both personal and social memory to craft challenging reflections of and 
responses to their times. They reengaged the sundered spirit of the 1920s avant-garde, 
reimagined the roots of the nation’s artistic and spiritual heritage, and captured the 
passing moments of contemporary history in a way that made it clear that today is in 
permanent, productive, sometimes stormy dialogue with an ever-present yesterday.  
Mikhail Kalatozov’s I Am Cuba (1964), Andrei Tarkovsky’s Andrei Rublev 
(1966/71), and Marlen Khutsiev’s Ilich’s Gate (1961, released with changes as I Am 
Twenty in 1965) were planned in the anxious years surrounding Khrushchev’s fall, and 
they mark a high point of Thaw-era cinematic audacity. Each of these films is epic in 
scope; each deploys temporal longing to generate narrative ambiguity and dialogue 
between historical epochs. The films are haunted by ghosts; they challenge the hegemony 
of the now by insisting on the phantom presence of a thousand thens; they refurbish old 
dreams and question contemporary assumptions. They enable the unpredictable 
intercourse between disparate images, days, decades, centuries; they replace continuity 
with contiguity, causality with poetic association. The Thaw permitted the intrusion of 
private memory into public history, and the past became a zone for exploration rather 
than justification. Easy answers became harder to come by, but the profusion of questions 
and suggestions created a brief silver age for Soviet cinema. For us, these films offer an 
extraordinary glimpse into creative life during one of the great unsung social transitions 
of the 20th century, and reveal the crucial contribution of individual memory in the 
artistic quest for aesthetic impact, spiritual depth, and ethical engagement. 
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I begin this dissertation with an in-depth account of the historical context of the 
Soviet Thaw, beginning with a description of the cinematic ferment of the 1920s—the 
object of the immediate post-Stalin nostalgia—continuing with a discussion of the 
solemn “grand style” of high Stalinism, and concluding with an account of the Thaw 
intelligentsia’s challenge to the Stalinist synthesis. Next, I discuss my theory of nostalgia 
and the relevant literature that undergirds it. In chapter four, I offer a case-study analysis 
of Kalatozov’s I Am Cuba (1964), a striking example of nostalgia for an imaginary 
Leninism that engages both political consciousness and the thirst for formal spontaneity. 
The film sheds light on the socially crucial symbiotic relationship between idealistic 
Leninist nostalgia the Khrushchev-era enthusiasm for socialist modernization. The fifth 
chapter offers an analysis of the intertwining relations between spirituality, materiality, 
and reflective nostalgia in one of the acknowledged masterpieces of the Thaw, Andrei 
Tarkovsky’s Andrei Rublev (1966/71). In chapter six I analyze Marlen Khutsiev’s Ilich’s 
Gate (1961/65) and delve into his polyphonic layering of history upon the public and 
private spaces of 1960s Moscow. 
* * * 
In I Am Cuba, Andrei Rublev and Ilich’s Gate we encounter images that both 
communicate the reflective nostalgia of their producers and enable the reflective 
nostalgia of their consumers. We are invited to contemplate the filmmakers’ longings, 
and to feel our own. Images in these films are in constant conversation with neighboring 
images, with history, and with us. What makes the conversation unique—even in the 
ostensibly propagandistic I Am Cuba—is that the longing it enables has no prescribed 
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object. It is ineffable, inchoate, a sentence with an open-ended predicate. Longing itself is 
the point. These images present us with neither the commercially and ideologically viable 
directive Believe in THIS nor the ostensibly open but empty inspirational canard Don’t 
stop believing; instead they send us back to our memories—to our sensations of lived 
time and lived-in space—with three implicit questions:  
How shall I express myself in the world? 
What does the material world mean to me?  
How am I to live among others? 
Reflective nostalgia does not only reopen ancient questions, though. By importing 
an open-ended past into an unresolved present, it also opens creative approaches to 
answering them: formal diversity, spiritual connection, and ethical quest. 
The films place their emphases differently, but they are united by their insistent 
raising of these challenging questions, gentle sequels to the accursed questions of the late 
19th century, “What is to be done?” and “Who is to blame?” These questions were hardly 
new to the Soviet 1960s, but they were a revival of the lost art of open-ended asking. I am 
arguing here that they were precisely the fruit of a productive and creative reflective-
nostalgic sense of the world. We often think of nostalgia as meaning that we miss 
something, but it is worth turning the thought inside out: something is missing. 
Kalatozov, Khutsiev and Tarkovsky knew that something was missing, and they were 
humble in their admission that they did not know what that something was.  
The three filmmakers brought different longings to their art, and different 
attitudes toward the Soviet inheritance. Kalatozov was born in 1903; his aesthetics and 
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enthusiams were forged in the crucible of the 1920s. Kalatozov’s films retain an aesthetic 
and ideological connection with the heroic mythos of early Soviet avant-garde culture, 
where individual spontaneity, personal bravery, and aesthetic risk went hand-in-hand 
with earnest support for the Leninist project. For Khutsiev, born in 1925, and Tarkovsky, 
born in 1932, the ethic of the pre-revolutionary Silver Age and the stormy, vibrant 1920s 
were mediated by culture, elders, and hearsay; their relationship with the Soviet and 
Russian past was more nuanced, their longings more distant from mythologies of politics 
and progress. They had different angles of reentry into Russian memory, and the images 
they created brought different shocks to the Soviet 60s.4  
Alexander Prokhorov compellingly argues that Soviet Thaw cinema was built 
upon the Stalinist trope of the positive hero, and sees Pasternak’s Yuri Zhivago as the 
avatar of the new Thaw positive hero (Prokhorov, 2002). But the Zhivago model of 
positive heroism is not simply an adaptation but a transformation: Here we have a 
searcher who does not know what he is searching for, whose destination cannot be 
pointed out by any learned elder, whose values lack a fixed social roadmap. And we as 
consumers are not put in the position of readers of a cut-rate whodunit, watching the 
protagonist grope toward an answer that we already know. Instead we share in the 
uncertainty, the mystery of stumbling through life. Pasternak’s vision is reflective 
nostalgic, as opposed to the restorative nostalgia that characterized Stalinist popular 
culture from the late 1930s onward, during the aesthetic ascendancy of what the brilliant 
architectural and cultural critic Vladimir Paperny (2002) calls “Culture Two”—a 
                                                
4 Kalatozov died in Moscow in 1973. Tarkovsky died in Paris in 1986. In 2010, Khutsiev lives and works 
in Moscow, where he is seeking funds to complete Nevechernee, his film on Chekhov and Tolstoy.   
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hierarchical, vertical culture in which the answers to all secrets are known completely, 
but are available only at the summit of the step pyramid where Stalin resides. In the 
Zhivago vision, man has no complete answers: The wisdom to ask is shared by all and 
the power to answer is held by none. The structure of moral hierarchy favors those who 
remember well, live creatively, appreciate space and time, and do not impose their will.  
Prokhorov reminds us that the international Zhivago phenomenon of the late 
1950s and early 60s was as much a response to the political context of the book’s creation 
and publication as it was to its literary merit. But Zhivago’s reflective nostalgic vision 
was and remains an bracing response to modernity, one that does not reject the motion of 
time but finds that what is gone is not truly gone if one can use it for the creative and 
spiritual sustenance of self and the ethical framing of one’s relations with community. In 
a bewildering new world, Pasternak’s hero forges a personal and creative vision from the 
stuff of a lost one. The self he creates is both old and new; it does not countenance the 
difference between the two—ethical and spiritual existence does not unfold in categories 
of old and new.  
As Anatoly Zubok details in his magisterial Zhivago’s Children, Pasternak, one of 
the last great torchbearers of the pre-revolutionary and 1920s intelligentsia, passed his 
ethic along to the young cultural intelligentsia of the Khrushchev era, and, far from 
greeting it as antiquated, they built their worldview around it. I argue that what was most 
energetically alive in this worldview was its creative, reflective nostalgia, its longing 
search for the ghostly continuation of roads long since cut off. And I believe this 
contribution is relevant beyond Pasternak’s era and the borders of his homeland. We in 
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the West have made a religion of obsolescence. This church even has a name for its 
enemies: Luddites. The longing backward glance is in disrepute among both corporate 
technocrats and political progressives. By all means, we’ll get out of the way if we can’t 
lend a hand—but has anyone checked where we’re going? And is it possible that the 
things we miss—the things that are missing—might help us find our way? 
In his famous meditation on Paul Klee’s painting “Angelus Novus,” Walter 
Benjamin (2007b) sees in the posture of Klee’s angel a metaphor for the tragedy of man 
within history.  
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his 
feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with 
such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress (pp. 257-
258).  
 
The image of blind travel through oncoming time is chilling, particularly if we consider 
that the stuff at the angel’s feet—at our feet—is truly debris. But while it can never be 
made whole, it can be made valuable. After all, the geography of Benjamin’s meditation 
has the winds of progress blowing not from the future—which would, of course, blow the 
angel backward—but precisely from the past. In other words, this debris is all we have 
from which to construct tomorrow, or even today. As we fly through time, backward and 
blind toward what’s next, each of us has no choice but to perceive the world through the 
debris—through a lens we forge from the crushed crystalline fragments of our 
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remembered (or re-membered) past. To look through this composite substance, fashioned 
from lost yesterdays and dim remembrances, is to penetrate the terrifying blankness of 
the oncoming day. The backward glance gives the hollow present form and value and 
resonance in time. But because of the vagaries of memory and longing and the percussive 
collision with the now, the past-present we glimpse is always new, and always surprising. 
We are dazzled, disturbed, and renewed by it. This feeling, generated at the impact point 
of past and present—of longing, hope, and fear—is essential to creativity, individuality, 
and progress. It is our reentry shock upon return to a dimly known, perhaps even loved, 
but suddenly unfamiliar world. 
Kalatozov, Tarkovsky, and Khutsiev continued Pasternak’s legacy of 
idiosyncratic memory, of forging a perceptive lens from the shards of a shattered past. 
They created works that transcend the political and cultural epoch in which they were 
produced. They interrogated their own longings and generated bracing image-questions 
about aesthetic selfhood, spiritual connection with the material world, and ethical 
existence among others. They asked answerless questions in a language beyond 
knowledge. They invite us to do so, too. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEXT: 
THE ROOTS AND REALITIES OF THE SOVIET CINEMATIC THAW 
 
1. Longing and Leninism 
In On Longing, Susan Stewart (1993, p. 4) argues that nostalgia is always utopian, 
narrative, intolerant of history, and “prelapsarian”; this is a reasonable criticism of 
restorative nostalgia, but it dispenses entirely with reflective nostalgia, which resists the 
narrative yoke, meditates upon the inchoate richness of the sad past, and invites old 
visions to spur new thinking. It is true, though, that both types of nostalgia deal 
selectively with history, and that sometimes they revise it with fantastic visions conjured 
up by longing. The ahistorical tendencies of nostalgia are often troubling; the fixed 
mythologies of restorative nostalgia in particular, with their attachment to narratives of 
lost purity, can short-circuit not only healthy social change, but also sincere individual 
feeling about the world and one’s place in it. Selectively historical nostalgia, however, 
can also be a boon to creative thought, individual liberation, and community progress. As 
a case in point, the first and perhaps most formidable tool in the Thaw intelligentsia’s 
efforts to leave Stalinist thinking behind was a nostalgia for a demonstrably imaginary 
Leninism. 
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The ironic generation of the Soviet 1970s would later mock, the Thaw 
intelligentsia’s idealistic neo-Leninism—its longing to reconnect with the energy, relative 
openness, and lost promise of pre-Stalinist communism—for its naiveté, its conviction 
that Soviet socialist utopia had been scuttled by Stalin alone, and could still be 
constructed on Leninist principles (Genis & Vail, 1996). The dissident intellectual 
Liudmila Alexeyeva (1990) writes movingly of how her early Thaw awakening was 
buttressed by intensive reading of the Leninist classics—and how, after she had read 
enough, she came to the sad realization that the Source of All Answers did not have a 
satisfactory answer for her. But the childlike, principled idealism of the 1960s was a 
uniquely productive kind of self-delusion: not self-delusion to avoid the inconvenience of 
an honest and principled life, but precisely self-delusion to inspire an honest and 
principled life on the terms available within the culture. The fairy-tale framing of Leninist 
idealism was actually a clever and inspired choice for the Thaw generation, which had 
few other viable inspirational wellsprings to look toward. In practice, the Thaw 
intellectuals cleverly used Leninist idealism as an umbrella with which to import 
European social-democratic ideals into their lives, along with the aesthetic ideals of the 
global intelligentsia in film (glimpsed in Italian neorealism and the early films of the 
French New Wave), literature (Hemingway became an icon5), and architecture (the Thaw 
                                                
5 Vladislav Zubok (2009, pp. 174-175) writes that Thaw intellectuals went so far as to adopt Hemingway’s 
fashion sense—the rough-knit turtleneck, the beard, the pipe. Hemingway had been popular in the Soviet 
1930s, but the onset of high-Stalinist solemnity left no place for his prickly bohemian independence, and 
after 1945 his works were removed from libraries and bookstores. A new translation of Hemingway’s 
novels had hit Soviet bookstores in 1959, and both his work and his biography—his independent nature, his 
leftist idealism, his anti-Stalinism—had resonated with the Thaw’s young romantics. For the writer Vasili 
Aksyonov, whose mother Yevgenya Ginzburg had spent 18 years in the camps (1937-1955), Hemingway 
and American jazz provided an inspirational path away from Stalinism and toward the independent 
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brought a renewed interest in both homegrown 1920s modernism and the Western 
European high modernism of Le Corbusier). 
In the pages that follow I will trace the development of Soviet cinema from its 
origins in the stormy and creatively vibrant 1920s through the emergence of the solemn 
“grand style” under Stalin to the birth, maturity, and conclusion of the Thaw. Along the 
way I will pay particular attention to the ground-breaking contributions of Mikhail 
Kalatozov, the early biographies of Marlen Khutsiev and Andrei Tarkovsky, and the 
culture of individuality and creativity fostered at the All-Union State Cinema Institute 
(VGIK) by the old master Mikhail Romm. In the history of Soviet Cinema, with its 
tantalizingly blocked pathways, its fits and starts and long periods of intense social 
control, we find many of the roots of the temporal longing that fueled Thaw filmmakers. 
2. The Leninist Inheritance 
It will be a free literature, because the idea of socialism and sympathy with the working 
people, and not greed and careerism, will bring ever-new forces to its ranks. It will be a 
free literature because it will serve not some satiated heroine, not the bored ‘upper ten 
thousand’ suffering from fatty degeneration, but the millions and tens of millions of 
working people—the flower of the country, its strength and its future. 
 —V.I. Lenin, “Party Organization and Party Literature,” 1905 (Lenin, 1975b) 
 
These musings on the proper literature for the Bolshevik Party were to become far 
more relevant when twelve years later there rose a Bolshevik state. Could Lenin’s hopes 
                                                                                                                                            
thinking that had cost his mother so dearly. With his Ticket to the Stars (Zvezdnyi bilet, 1961), Aksyonov 
became a pioneer of Thaw-era “youth prose,” which was a kind of cousin to the screenwriting of Genadii 
Shpalikov, Khutsiev’s co-writer on Ilich’s Gate. Shpalikov, in turn, was a great admirer of Vladimir 
Mayakovsky, the poet-hero of the Soviet 1920s who had committed suicide in 1930. During the Thaw there 
was tight inspirational interlinking between the Silver Age inheritance of Blok and Akhmatova (which had 
bridged the pre-Revolutionary era with the Lenin years), the 1920s revolutionary spontaneity of 
Mayakovsky, and the independent and improvisational nature of Western jazz and literature. The great tug-
of-war of the Soviet 1920s was between revolutionary spontaneity and disciplined Party consciousness; the 
Western modernism that made its way into Thaw culture was a sort of associative gateway to the stomped-
out spontaneity of the Soviet 20s—the martyred heroes Mayakovsky and Hemingway became posthumous 
brothers in arms. 
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for the literature of his party be realized in the literature of his nation? What form was the 
literature for the millions to take? What sort of writings would both educate and entertain 
such a vast number of people? And how was the new literature to reach the three-quarters 
of the population who remained illiterate? 
The answer was simple. The literature for the millions was cinema.  
But Soviet cinema would have to go through years of financial, ideological, and 
artistic strife before it would settle on how it was to take up this mantle. For the Soviet 
film industry, the 1920s—full of vibrancy and brilliance though they were—were a 
decade of aimlessness and quarreling. Profitable, nonideological films and inaccessible, 
unprofitable radical avant-garde films vied for supremacy, but neither fulfilled the needs 
of the regime. Not until the end of the decade did a resolution of this problem begin to 
take shape. 
How are we to explain the mess Soviet cinema got itself into? Lenin left the 
artists of his nation with a straightforward mission: create art featuring revolutionary 
content, but in a form that could be understood by the millions. Cinema had a special 
place in this formula. Because it was a silent, visual medium, it could cross all the ethnic 
and educational boundaries and bring the Communist message to the multicultural, three-
fourths illiterate Soviet populace. For this reason, Lenin once told Anatoly Lunacharsky, 
the Commissar of Enlightenment, “Of all the arts, for us cinema is the most important” 
(Taylor, 1979a, p. 44).  
Other Soviet oligarchs were similarly bullish on film. Trotsky said it was “the best 
instrument for propaganda,” and Stalin declared that it was “the greatest means of mass 
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agitation.” For the leaders of the new revolutionary state, the beauty of film lay in its vast 
potential as a tool of propaganda, defined by Richard Taylor as “the attempt to influence 
the public opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values” (Taylor, 
pp. 28-29). The ideal Soviet cinema would convey the Bolshevik message so clearly that 
workers and peasants from Kamchatka to Kiev would leave the movie theatre convinced 
the Communists were correct.  
In a non-ideal world, however, ideology and clarity were joined by a third 
necessary element of Soviet film: profitability. Starting in 1921, the industry was to be 
self-supporting, which led it to import a good number of popular, politically incorrect 
foreign films, as well as to devote a good portion of domestic production to what came to 
be known as “bourgeois” (non-ideological) films (Thompson, 1992, p. 19). Lenin himself 
gave this program a blessing in a January 1922 directive to the Commissariat of 
Enlightenment indicating that there should be two types of cinema: 
(a) entertainment films, especially for publicity purposes 
and their receipts (without, of course, any obscene or 
counterrevolutionary content), 
(b)under the heading ‘From the Life of the Peoples of the 
World’, films of a particularly propagandist content, such 
as the colonial policy of the British in India, the work of the 
League of Nations, the starving in Berlin, etc., etc. (Taylor, 
1979a).6 
 
So there were to be propaganda films and  foreign and domestic entertainment 
films for profit, which would not necessarily be ideological (but which would go under 
                                                
6 In the same document, Lenin distinguished between documentary and feature films. Later, the legend of 
the “Leninist proportion” arose, with documentarists arguing that Lenin wanted 75 percent of films to be 
documentaries and 25 percent to be features—feature films being divided into the “entertainment” and 
"propaganda" categories listed above. Taylor states that there is no evidence that Lenin ever stated such a 
proportion between documentary and feature films (Taylor, 1979a). 
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the scissors of Glavrepertkom, the state censorship office, to remove 
“counterrevolutionary” material). This was a departure from Lenin’s shrill cry of 1905, 
“Down with non-partisan writers!” but he spoke then merely to a Party and now to a 
whole nation and a new industry which, unlike literature, could not function without great 
sums of money (Lenin, 1975b). 
Nonetheless, the revolutionary times precluded the passive acceptance of such a 
compromising policy as the one Lenin mapped out in 1922. Both radical artists and left-
wing Party members objected to the distribution of “bourgeois” and foreign films. The 
radical artists took revolutionary art policy one step further than Lenin at his most 
audacious ever had: not only should old ideas be abolished in film, but so should old 
forms. Indeed, the cinema attracted radical young artists because it was a comparatively 
new form of expression, a revolutionary mechanical form. In postrevolutionary Russia, 
where progress was inextricably linked with technology, it seemed to the artists that the 
cinema—which, after all, owed its existence to technology—would be most useful if 
mechanical principles were utilized in filmmaking. Film form should be efficient, precise, 
and functional—that is, aided by its efficiency and precision, the new cinema would serve 
the function of preparing the Soviet public for the coming age of socialism and 
industrialism. Thus was the current artistic trend of Constructivism (an ethos holding that 
art should reflect the practicality and efficiency of the machine age) particularly 
applicable Soviet film (Kepley, 1992). The cinema should not merely be photographed 
plays. In form as well as content, it must be new, revolutionary.  
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In the view of radical young avant-garde artists like Sergei Eisenstein, Lev 
Kuleshov, and Dziga Vertov, this new form was to be attained through the use of 
montage—quick editing of film sequences, creating a juxtaposition of images that would 
have the most powerful effect on the viewer. The meaning of a shot came entirely from 
its relations to the sequences surrounding it. The problem was that such avant-garde 
methods, adopted for their functionality, did not serve their function. Rather than leaving 
common viewers with indelible ideological lessons, avant-garde films tended to confuse 
them. In later years, the radicals’ overreliance on montage would be denounced as 
“formalism”—emphasizing experimental form over proper socialist content—and, more 
dramatically, as “the dictatorship of the scissors” (Youngblood, 1991, p. 139). 
The young radicals had different conceptions of montage and how it should be 
utilized, and they would battle amongst themselves throughout the 1920s over whose 
theory of filmmaking was to be the model for Soviet film. Combativeness and intellectual 
intolerance were endemic to the makeup of these artistic radicals. They had come of age 
in revolutionary times and enlisted on the side of Marxism-Leninism, an ideology that 
claimed to have all the answers. For the young filmmakers, this meant enlisting in the 
thrilling struggle for a utopian tomorrow, casting aside the staleness of yesterday, the 
world of their parents. The artists were not students of Communist ideology—it was 
enough for them simply to imbibe the spirit of times in which militancy denoted 
progressiveness. And on the terra incognita of Soviet cinema, each radical hoped to 
define himself as the high priest of celluloid progress, the filmic Lenin. Thus, in their 
artistic philosophies, the radicals tended to reflect the omniscient pretensions and polemic 
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vigor of Marxism-Leninism. Like Lenin in politics and Mayakovsky in poetry, a young 
filmmaker-theorist (a uniquely Russian phenomenon) would often claim that his way of 
doing things was the only way of doing things. Nevertheless, the young radicals had 
much in common—most importantly, their general outlook on life and art: out with the 
old, in with the new.  
In the first years of the Soviet regime, the cultural life of the old Empire was in a 
state of upheaval. In order to gain some sort of control over the nation’s independent 
cultural organizations, many of which had sprung up in the wake of the revolution, the 
Government had in April 1918, formed under the umbrella of the Commissariat of 
Enlightenment a “section of independent cultural organizations,” to be called Proletcult 
(Leyda, 1983, p. 125). Peopled as it was by some of the most hyperactive minds of a 
hyperactive era, Proletcult was a tumultuous and troublesome—if wholesomely 
revolutionary—grouping, and in 1920, as Proletcult held its conference in Moscow, 
Lenin sought to offer some firm guidance. The message of his October 8, 1920, Draft 
Resolution for the Proletcult was unequivocal: 
1) All educational work in the Soviet Republic of workers 
and peasants, in the field of political education in general 
and in the field of art in particular, should be imbued with 
the spirit of the class struggle being waged by the 
proletariat for the successful achievement of the aims of its 
dictatorship, i.e., the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the 
abolition of classes, and the elimination of all forms of 
exploitation of man by man. 
2) Hence, the proletariat, both through its vanguard—the 
Communist Party—and through the many types of 
proletarian organizations in general, should display the 
utmost activity and play the leading part in all the work of 
public education. 
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3) All the experience of modern history and, particularly, 
the more than half-century-old revolutionary struggle of the 
proletariat of all countries since the appearance of the 
Communist Manifesto has unquestionably demonstrated 
that the Marxist world outlook is the only true expression 
of the interests, the viewpoint, and the culture of the 
revolutionary proletariat. 
4) Marxism has won its historic significance as the 
ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from 
rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois 
epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned 
everything of value in the more than two thousand years of 
the development of human thought and culture. Only 
further work on this basis and in this direction, inspired by 
the practical experience of the proletarian dictatorship as 
the final stage in the struggle against every form of 
exploitation, can be recognized as the development of a 
genuine proletarian culture. 
5) Adhering unswervingly to this stand of principle, the 
All-Russia Proletcult Congress rejects in the most resolute 
manner, as theoretically unsound and practically harmful, 
all attempts to invent one’s own particular brand of culture, 
to remain isolated in self-contained organization, to draw a 
line dividing the field of work of the People’s commissariat 
of Education and the Proletcult, or to set up a Proletcult 
“autonomy” within establishments under the People’s 
Commissariat of Education and so forth. On the contrary, 
the Congress enjoins all Proletcult organizations to fully 
consider themselves in duty bound to act as auxiliary 
bodies of the network of establishments under the People’s 
Commissariat of Education, and to accomplish their tasks 
under the general guidance of the Soviet authorities 
(specifically, of the People’s Commissariat of Education) 
and of the Russian Communist Party, as part of the tasks of 
the proletarian dictatorship (Lenin, 1975a, pp. 424-425). 
 
The resolution was a good illustation of Lenin’s outlook on culture in general, not just on 
the Proletcult. The culture of Communist Russia was to be revolutionary in content, but 
not in form, and was to operate within the general confines of Soviet authority.  
* * * 
 
 
28 
The cinema of the 1920s didn’t shape up in accordance with Lenin’s tastes. First, 
there was the stubborn persistence of bourgeois-type films and bourgeois views on film. 
A 1922 issue of Cinema Life demonstrates this problem. In one column the magazine 
proclaims that cinema should be a propaganda vehicle; in the next it sings the praise of 
prerevolutionary starlet Vera Kholodnaya, star of The Woman who Invented Love 
(Youngblood, 1991, pp. 2-3). 
At the same time, artistic movements blossomed which advocated the complete 
liquidation of traditional art. For example, the constructivist, ultra-leftist journal Cinema-
Foto argued furiously against NEP, against “bourgeois cinema,” against art: 
Be firm and courageous, believe, for not all have enough 
courage, not all have enough faith, under the temptations of 
NEP, many leave. But of those who remain, from those 
who enter, comes a real cinema-army, an army of iron will 
and great knowledge. Let the army forge ahead, let the 
army believe in itself, in its work, and in the idea of precise 
cinematography and victory. The army will conquer 
(Youngblood, 1991, p. 5). 
 
The radical filmmakers used similar rhetoric. Dziga Vertov was the founder of a 
film “collective” the members of which called themselves Kinoki, or Kino-eyes. The 
Kino-eyes believed that the future of Soviet cinema lay exclusively in documentary, non-
acted film. Vertov and his comrades proselytized passionately for this point of view. The 
1919 Kinok manifesto proclaims: 
WE proclaim the old films, based on the romance, theatrical films 
and the like, to be leprous. 
• Keep away from them! 
• Keep your eyes off them! 
• They’re mortally dangerous! 
• Contagious! 
WE affirm the future of cinema by denying its present. 
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“Cinematography” must die so that the art of cinema may live. 
WE call for its death to be hastened (Michaelson, 1984, p. 7).7 
 
The Kinoki hadn’t seen much progress by 1923. In their “Resolution” dated April 10, 
they declared, “As was to be expected, the first new Russian productions shown recall the 
old ‘artistic’ models just as Nepmen recall the old bourgeoisie.” Shortly after this 
resolution, Vertov published a series of statements, including the following: 
The death sentence passed in 1919 by the kinoki on all 
films, with no exceptions, holds for the present as well. The 
most scrupulous examination does not reveal a single film, 
a single artistic experiment, properly directed to the 
emancipation of the camera, which is reduced to a state of 
pitiable slavery, of subordination to the imperfections and 
the shortsightedness of the human eye. 
We do not object to cinema’s undermining of literature 
and the theatre; we wholly approve of the use of cinema in 
every branch of knowledge, but we define these functions 
as accessory, as necessary offshoots of cinema. 
The main and essential thing is: 
The sensory exploration of the world through film. 
We therefore take as the point of departure the use of the 
camera as a kino-eye, more perfect than the human eye, for 
the exploration of the chaos of visual phenomena that fills 
space (Michaelson, 1984, pp. 13-14).  
 
Another radical film “collective” of the 1920s consisted of nineteen-year-old 
Leonid Trauberg, seventeen-year-old Sergei Yutkevich, and sixteen-year-old Grigorii 
Kozintsev. This group flush with the confidence of youth, proclaimed that for their 
“Workshop of the Eccentric Actor” (FEKS), “art” was the circus, the advertising poster, 
and Charlie Chaplin’s backside. The future of Russia’s cinema for the masses lay in the 
Russification of American “vulgarity” (Youngblood, 1991, p. 11)  
                                                
7These lines are from Vertov’s "We: Variant of a Manifesto”. Vertov's real name was Denis Kaufman. On 
the eve of the revolution, he took his new name. "Dziga" was on onomatopoeic representation of the sound 
of a camera crank turning. "Vertov" was derived from the verb “vertet”—to rotate (Michaelson, 1984, p. 
xviii). 
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Operating on a slightly more sophisticated level, but likewise preaching their 
ideas to the exclusion of all others, were Lev Kuleshov and Sergei Eisenstein. Kuleshov, 
upon returning from the Civil War, had established an experimental studio in Moscow 
where he and his “collective” (which included Vsevolod Pudovkin, who went on to 
become another of the great directors) acted out “films without film,” due to the lack of 
supplies. In the course of his experiments, Kuleshov—also drawing from American film 
forms8—developed a unique concept of montage, often called “The Kuleshov Effect.” A 
frame, which should be kept simple and direct, derives its whole meaning from the 
frames that surround it. If this context is changed, the meaning of the frame to the viewer 
changes. “The content of the frames themselves,” he wrote, “is not as important as the 
joining of two frames of differing content and the manner of their joining and 
interchange” (Taylor, 1979b, pp. 135-136).9 Kuleshov was slightly less bombastic than 
Vertov in promoting his theory, but his words nevertheless bear the mark of the 
revolutionary. Cinema should have no attachments to stage drama; it should be an art of 
its own, based on montage: 
                                                
8The American film had the greatest affect on the Soviet avant-gardists was D.W. Griffith's Intolerance. 
There is a legend that Lenin saw the film and hoped to hire Griffith to run the Soviet film industry (Leyda, 
1983, pp. 142-143, 150); Kuleshov not only learned the rudiments montage from American films, but also 
gained some ideas on film content. Kuleshov believed the hero of a film should be “brave, quick, and 
strong,” as in American Westerns, that the Soviet Union should have adventure films in which “the strong 
people overcome all obstacles and enemies,” and that the film should have a happy end, so that the 
audience is rewarded for its sympathy for the hero (Taylor, 1979b, p. 136). In its bare rudiments, this looks 
ironically like Socialist Realism, but, of course, the latter was defined not only by its basic plot elements 
but also by its strict adherence to the Party line of the moment and, therefore, by the totalitarian times in 
which it was practiced. 
 
9 Kuleshov also developed the concept of the naturshchik, a performer who, rather than using false, 
theatrical gestures, would use his natural movements to perform, and therefore “had to know the 
significance if his own movements in their particular context” (Taylor, 1979b, p. 137). 
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Actors, directors, designers, write on your banners in clear 
letters the most important commandment of the cinema: the 
inspiration of the cinema should be cinematographic 
inspiration.... In the cinema such a means of artistic thought 
is the rhythmic alternation between separate immobile 
frames or short sequences with an expression of movement, 
i.e., what is technically known as montage. Montage in the 
cinema is the same as the composition of colours in 
painting or a harmonic sequence of notes in music (Taylor, 
1979b, p. 135). 
 
Meanwhile, Eisenstein, working in theater at the time, devised his “montage of 
attractions,” which was later applied to his films: 
An attraction ... is any aggressive moment in theatre, i.e. 
any element of it that subjects the audience to emotional or 
psychological influence, verified by experience and 
mathematically calculated to produce specific emotional 
shocks in the spectator.... These shocks provide the only 
opportunity of perceiving the ideological aspect of what is 
being shown, the final ideological conclusion (Eisenstein, 
1988, p. 34). 
 
When one considers that Eisenstein was later attacked as a “formalist,” one whose fetish 
for form overshadows his dedication to conveying an ideological message, it is 
enlightening to see that, for Eisenstein, the very purpose of innovative form was to 
convey ideology. 
While the artistic radicals competed with each other to be the father of the new 
Soviet cinema, moderates, as typified by the editorial board of the journal Cinema 
Gazette, set aside arcane questions of “revolutionary” form. They were concerned with 
the ideological propriety, comprehensibility, and profitability of films. They sought a new 
cinema, non-bourgeois, even revolutionary, yet viewer-friendly and profitable. In the 
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early- and mid-1920s, they must have had real doubts as to whether such a cinema would 
ever rise from the ashes of the revolution (Youngblood, 1991, p. 12). 
By the late 1920s, there was in the film world a veritable war between two 
clashing legacies of Lenin. One legacy was symbolized by War Communism on the 
political front and by the remarks of “Party Organization and Party Literature” on the 
cultural front. The other legacy was embodied by NEP in politics and by the 1922 
directive on culture. Both legacies had gone farther in the Soviet cinema than Lenin 
would have hoped: First imported, then domestic “bourgeois” films dominated the Soviet 
market, while radical films took on such recondite forms that few Soviet workers and 
peasants bothered to see them. In Hegelian parlance, Soviet cinema had a thesis 
(comprehensible, profitable “bourgeois” films) and an antithesis (inaccessible, 
unprofitable radical films). All that remained was to find a synthesis. This synthesis was 
gradually hammered out between 1928-35. With a shove from the state, both bourgeois 
and radical avant-garde film fell onto the ash-heap of history. In their place rose simple 
scripts, positive heroes, and clear-cut Party messages. Socialist realism, ideologically 
correct and accessible to the millions, was the synthesis. 
* * * 
What is striking, and instructive for a student of Soviet memory, is the electric 
excitement with which those who were young filmmakers during the 1920s would later 
look back at the factional, conflict-ridden world of their youth. The era, for all its missed 
opportunities and infighting—perhaps because of its missed opportunities and 
infighting—emerges as a magical period of experimentation, energized debate, and 
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youthful competition. It was a world in which people barely past their teens could 
presume to be inventing “new” culture, in which they could regularly dream up wildly 
playful ideas with some reasonable hope that the ideas could actually entering into the 
discourse of the new national culture. Whatever socialist slogans might have been in 
circulation at the time, the real watchwords of the young revolutionary artists were “Let’s 
put on a show” and “Let’s see what sticks.” The old film industry had abandoned ship, 
and for a time the kids were free to frolic and fight without adult supervision.  
It was an environment in which the teenage Lev Kuleshov could become a sort of 
rabbi of cinema for other young filmmakers hoping to master and transform the art. And 
even when young artists worked with older authorities, it was in a spirit of co-discovery. 
Sergei Yutkevich, a standout actor of the 1920s who later became a renowned director, 
recalls how he and Eisenstein became friends as teenagers studying under the theatrical 
visionary Vsevolod Meyerhold, whose slogan called for “a theatrical October”. 
Eisenstein and Yutkevich met with Meyerhold in a small hall in a newly communal 
mansion on Novinsky Boulevard in Moscow, where Meyerhold and his family lived. “A 
minute and creaking wooden lift led to a classroom in which were lines of plain school 
desks,” writes Yutkevich. “This classroom and a small hall were the entire premises of 
[Meyerhold’s State Theatrical Studios].” Yutkevich and Eisenstein felt that Meyerhold’s 
scientific approach to theatrical mis-en-scene, and his devotion to body mechanics, went 
against the naturally spontaneous nature of his character. 
It was fascinating to watch this born improviser trying to 
inculcate in us a system which, according to his 
propositions, would leave no place for anything unplanned. 
After a few lessons, Eisenstein confided to me that he had 
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had enough of drawing circles and squares and that he 
intended to wake Meyerhold up a bit and force him to 
unveil the true cuisine of his creation. When the bell 
announced the end of the lesson, we asked Meyerhold if he 
would stay behind a bit to answer some additional 
questions… He was in no hurry to leave and willingly 
stayed behind…Our curiosity excited Meyerhold. He 
warmed to it and started to tell us earnestly and in great 
detail a host of astonishing things. Thus it was that bit by 
bit we managed to divert our teacher from his taste for 
schemas. His classes were fed by an irresistible fantasy 
(Marce, et al., 1973, pp. 23-24). 
 
Equally evocative of the era—and revealing about the nostalgia the era could 
inspire—are director Grigorii Kozintsev’s memories of revolutionary Kiev in 1919, when 
he was 15 years old: 
Men wearing the red star on their caps and their fur hats 
liberated Kiev. These men had chased out the occupiers and 
the bandits; they stopped the pogroms and the summary 
executions; they established the People’s Government. And 
immediately, in the revolutionary town, every kind of art 
began to flourish. Men full of go and jollity took over the 
tables and the chairs of the officers of the Ukrainian 
Department of Arts. Innumerable committees, sections and 
subsections discussed projects for producing all the great 
classic plays of the world, for organizing popular festivals 
and for decorating the squares in honour of the first of May. 
Theatre studies and art studios proliferated. Everyone took 
to art with passion, and with passion people taught it. What 
was not taught? There were lectures on the troubadours and 
minstrels, on the Baroque art of the Ukraine, and on the 
Japanese theatre… 
 
Kozintsev went to high school by day and to painting classes with Alexandra Exter by 
night. Later he joined up with an agit-train, creating plays to inspire the Red soldiers at 
the revolutionary front. 
I tried for the first time to mount an agit-sketch, a short 
propaganda play. It was performed in a goods wagon, with 
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the open doors providing the stage. The soldiers (our 
audience) sat on the ground in front. That was real 
happiness! After the narrow formulas of school, these 
words which spoke of the majesty of labour, of social 
justice, of the final and decisive struggle seemed to come 
from some marvelous story-book. And the thing that was 
most amazing in this new life was that I, a mere lad, could 
take part in it, work for it (Marce, et al., 1973, p. 92). 
 
In the light of memory, the rivalries that had complicated the emergence of Soviet cinema 
become for Kozintsev the summit of competitive comradeship, and the diversity of 
approach that had once seemed problematic is revealed instead as creative fecundity. 
Reflecting on the near-miracle that his generation of dreamy and stubborn young artists 
had built the Soviet cinema from the ground up, Kozintsev writes,    
What is good is that each one of us participated in this 
construction in his own fashion, and followed his own path. 
What is still better is that we all of us felt the community of 
the effort undertaken. No one worked in isolation; each 
could hear the pickaxe of his neighbor. Blow after blow, in 
the most diverse areas, the land ceased to be fallow and 
barren (Marce, et al., 1973, p. 108). 
 
3. Before the Thaw 
By a Party Central Committee decree of April 23, 1932, a single, centralized 
Union of Soviet Writers was formed. Membership in the Union was officially voluntary, 
but, as Gleb Struve writes, membership “was too closely bound up with all sorts of 
material and other advantages” to be seriously regarded as voluntary. The decree 
indicated that members of the Union were to accept the general policy of the Party and 
the Soviet Government, support socialist construction of society, and, most significant, 
adhere to the literary method of socialist realism. The aim of this method was defined in 
the Union statute as “the creation of works of high artistic significance, saturated with the 
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heroic struggle of the world proletariat and with the grandeur of the victory of Socialism, 
and reflecting the great wisdom and heroism of the Communist Party ..., the creation of 
artistic works worthy of the great age of Socialism” (Struve, 1971, pp. 253-256). 
Katerina Clark (1985) argues that socialist realism was based on a cannon of 
socialist favorites including Gorky’s Mother, Ostrovsky’s How the Steel Was Tempered, 
Gladkov’s Cement, and Furmanov’s Chapayev. These exemplars were trumpeted by 
voices in high places, financial inducements were held out to writers who wrote in the 
tradition of these works, and a literary institute was founded in the early 1930s to train 
young writers to emulate the canonical works (Clark, 1985, p. 4). These and new 
exemplary works continued to be cited at congresses of the Writers Union, sometimes by 
title, sometimes by author, and sometimes by the name of a positive hero whose type 
should be reproduced in future works (Clark, 1985, p. 261). Clark argues that in any type 
of socialist-realist work, be it about a great leader, a general, or a worker, there is a 
positive hero who overcomes all obstacles to perform a task for the public good, in the 
process developing “consciousness”—an awareness of his or her place in the great plan 
of societal progress. Really, “consciousness,” as opposed to its anarchic opposite, 
“spontaneity,” amounts to selfless support for “actions or political activities that are 
controlled, disciplined, and guided by politically aware bodies” (i.e., the Party) (Clark, 
1985, p. 255). Through inexorable effort on behalf of a consciously mapped out plan, 
society would blossom into Utopia. Struve argues that, whereas bourgeois realism had a 
“more or less negative attitude to reality”, socialist realism was “fundamentally 
optimistic” (Struve, 1971, p. 257). Thus, socialist realism, both in its plot restrictions and 
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in its fundamental nature, imposed severe restrictions on what the artist could express and 
how he could express it. 
Through the 1930s and 40s, creative exuberance ebbed and flowed in Soviet 
cinema. Even as the avant-garde was in the final stages of its destruction, the end of the 
First Five Year Plan in 1933 brought the Soviet Jazz Age, a brief outpouring of popular 
song and cinema that was largely over by the end of the dark year of 1937, the high point 
of Stalin’s terror. Stalin had used the December 1, 1934 murder of the popular Leningrad 
Party Secretary Sergei Kirov as a pretext to launch his purges, and as the bloody decade 
progressed in the camps of the Far East and the basements of Moscow’s Liubianka 
Prison, Soviet culture shored up the superstructure of coercion and discipline through the 
creation of Stalin’s personality cult. The high modernism of the avant-garde and the 
highjinks of the Jazz Age were replaced in music, cinema, and architecture with high 
solemnity (Stites, 1992) (Paperny, 2002). Stalinist architecture was neoclassical, Stalinist 
music was sanitized folk and canonical Russian classical composition. Stalinist theatre 
and film had rigidly traditional dramaturgy—positive heroes, comprehensible plots with 
clear beginnings, middles, and ends, unambiguous antagonists—and a studied, solemn 
attitude of socialist consciousness and Soviet patriotism. This did not mean that the 
quality of the work was necessarily low—many of the Stalinist principles were the flip 
side of Hollywood precepts, and Stalinist cinema had its blockbusters, from Peter I to 
Volga Volga, that are beloved to this day. But it did preclude formal experimentation and, 
just as important, it rejected outright any indeterminacy in plot, atmosphere, or ideology. 
The world of these films was clear and heroic and ostentatiously self-assured. 
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After a period of liberation during the Great Patriotic War, when cinema 
operations were displaced to Alma-Ata and a certain benign neglect reigned in the film 
industry, the Stalinist synthesis reached its most intense and limiting phase in the postwar 
years. During these years, which became known as “the period of few pictures,” studios 
were expected to produce only masterpieces; only proven masters were to make these 
films. In the broader culture, Stalin’s lieutenant Andrei Zhdanov was waging a withering 
attack on “rootless cosmopolitans”—that is, Jewish intellectuals—and a grandiose 
restorative-nostalgic nationalism was adopted as state policy. The generally liberating 
Russian nationalism of wartime—a breath of organic culture after the canned Soviet 
statism of late-1930s Stalinism—was replaced with a crippling xenophobia, and the 1946 
Zhdanov’s edict had as their goal precisely to wipe out the supposed Western influences 
that had seeped into the Soviet Union during the war. During the period of few pictures, 
young filmmakers waited on the sidelines, doing secondary tasks, brimming with 
experiences of childhood in the ’20s and ’30s, of participation in the Great Patriotic War, 
fearing that their tales would never be told.  
Irina Izvolova (1996) has written brilliantly on the prevailing discourse of the 
period of few pictures.  
At the start of the 1950s, Soviet cinema was a sort of 
monolith, achieved in the formation of the so-called “grand 
style.” “Grand” here means “[all-inclusive], unified style”, 
excluding the existence of small and, in general, any other 
styles. The development of cinema as a “terrain of ideas” 
had ended. Soviet cinema never did find [everyday] reality 
very interesting; it was attracted to the ideal. Within this 
ideal existed cinema itself… Everyday and cinematic 
reality changed places. Cinematic reality became the truer 
of the two. Whatever had just been put on film took on the 
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status of a historical fact. In this cinema, the image and the 
fact become unified and impossible to sever from one 
another. . . What remains outside the frame should not 
exist, and this means that it does not exist. There are no 
invalids, no ration cards, no lines, no dark stairwells and 
basements. (p. 77). 
 
This was not, Izvolova argues, varnishing reality. The cinematic reality had a logic of its 
own, and in late Stalinist society that logic superceded the logic of the naked eye’s 
perception of the unmediated world. Seeing in this way was a reasonable adaptation to 
postwar Soviet life. One learned to embrace solemnity as the highest register of social 
affect. The greatness and purity of the hero was the cinematic residue of the Soviet 
dream. “Man on the screen is great and monumental,” writes Izvolova. “He is already not 
a man, but a demigod. Within ‘the grand style’ he is first and foremost an embodiment of 
the sacred Word” (p. 78).  
In such a style, as Yevgeny Margolit (2001) writes, nature and atmosphere could 
not exert force on their own; they could not spontaneously challenge and perhaps even 
defeat the demigod; they could not enter into an equal dialogue with him. Monumental 
man had a handle on his environment, and in the socialist grand style his mastery was not 
to be challenged. This mastery was at the very root of Soviet ideology. “Soviet 
philosophy is a philosophy of social titanism,” write Nicholas Berdiaev (1960) in The 
Origins of Russian Communism. “The titan in it is not the individual but the social whole. 
For it even the laws of nature are not binding.” In the Soviet philosophy, writes Berdiaev, 
these laws can be changed by will, and the notion that they cannot be changed, and that 
man can be subject to them “is regarded as an idea which belongs only to bourgeois 
science and philosophy…  
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Soviet philosophy is in opposition to the enlightened 
materialism of the eighteenth century. For it everything is 
controlled not by enlightenment of thought, not by the light 
of reason, but by the exaltation of the will, the 
revolutionary titanic will. Philosophy should not only take 
cognizance of the world but it should re-make the world; it 
should create a new world (p. 150). 
 
The cinematic masterworks of the Thaw would break with the grand style by challenging 
man’s mastery of both nature and atmosphere, from the assault of the unforgiving 
wilderness on the geologists in Kalatozov’s The Unsent Letter (1959) to the quiet way in 
which the flow of street life seems to possess Khutsiev’s characters—and the films 
themselves—in  Spring on Zarechnaya Street (1956), Ilich’s Gate (1961/65),and July 
Rain (1966). 
In the years of the grand style, though, the ethic of social titanism reigned 
supreme, and was applied to Russian history and national memory. A superficial Russian 
patriotism was encouraged in the art of the late 1940s and early 1950s. There were 
biographical books and films about forgotten 19th century scientists, designed to show 
that history’s great innovations do not come from the West, but from Russia (and Soviet 
Communism, by implication, is another in this great line of innovations). Meanwhile, 
anti-American spy films began appearing. The point of the works of this era was not to 
put people in touch with the true meaning of their national identity, but rather to expunge 
any positive feelings they might have toward the liberal-capitalist West (Treadgold, 1981, 
pp. 424-426). 
This art was as far from the anti-rational, anti-materialist beliefs of the 19th 
century Slavophiles as imaginable. The historical works were about the matter, not the 
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spirit, of history. And works about contemporary Russia picked up where they had left 
off before the slight wartime liberalization: This art was to serve the five-year-plan; it 
was to depict the New Soviet Man and Woman, whose purpose in life was to march 
without hesitation toward material progress and the Communist future—man as a piston 
in the great materialist engine. The complexities and weaknesses, the private joys and 
sufferings of the human heart had no place in this equation.  
But such art, it became clear, was no art. On April 7, 1952 Pravda published an 
article attacking the current sad state of the film industry. The lack of three-dimensional 
characters was lamented, the lack of correspondence between the mediated and 
unmediated worlds (Cohen, 1974, pp. 226-227). With Stalin’s death in 1953, the roiling 
substrata of Soviet culture began to shake the surface. The horrific trampling that took 
place as bewildered mourners rushed to see the Great Man as he lay in state seemed to 
signify a psychological turning point for Russia. Things could not go on as they had when 
the tyrant lived. Ironically, it was the bloody MVD director Lavrenti Beria who emptied 
many Siberian prisons at that time (releasing not only the wrongly persecuted, but also 
many a hardened criminal—this is depicted in Alexander Proshkin’s The Cold Summer of 
’53, a Gorbachev-era film). Beria likely had his own reasons for this act—but the image 
of people leaving prison instead of just going there had to have had an effect on the 
Soviet people. The arrest of Beria in late summer added to the air of change. 
Around that time, young audience members at a reading asked the poet Olga 
Bergholz to read them some contemporary lyric poetry. She searched her mind, but she 
couldn’t think of any. She decided to look through the Soviet literary magazines in search 
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of poems that dealt with the human heart. She couldn’t find any. She described the state 
of Soviet poetry: 
In a great many of our lyrical works the most important 
thing is lacking: humanity, the human being.  I don’t mean 
there are no human beings in any of these poems. Indeed, 
there are operators of bulldozers and steam shovels; there 
are horticulturalists all carefully described, sometimes well 
and even brilliantly described.  But they are described from 
the outside, and the most important thing is lacking in all 
these poems—a lyric hero  with his own individual 
relationship to events and the landscape (Crankshaw, 1959, 
p. 101). 
 
At this time, Grigorii Malenkov, part of the scrum of high officials struggling for the 
mantel Stalin had left behind, was departing from the Stalinist tradition by putting an 
influence on the production of consumer goods. It was a material policy change with 
spiritual implications: People, to put it grandly, were starting to matter again. In addition, 
he made some cautious negative statements about the personality cult that had taken 
shape around Stalin. Meanwhile, the confused post-Stalin “collective leadership” of 
Malenkov, Beria, Nikolai Bulganin, Khrushchev, et al. created throughout the 
Communist world the impression of weakness at the top. Revolts began in Eastern 
Europe, most notably in East Berlin. There was an uprising at the Vorkuta prison camp in 
Siberia. Meanwhile, Soviet artists continued to grow bolder (Treadgold, 1981, pp. 436-
463). 
Alexander Tvardovsky, the editor of Novy Mir, published his poem proclaiming 
that Soviet artists had failed to uphold their responsibility to truth and humanity. Vera 
Inberg of Leningrad said frankly that nobody read Soviet poetry and nobody ever would 
so long as it told only of “the same old dam, the same old steam shovel.” At the October, 
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1953 congress of the dramatists’ section of the Writers’ Union, playwright Sergei 
Mikhalkov—Andrei Konchalovsky’s father—said Soviet audiences had been “taught to 
see on the stage that which departs from the truth of life, from the real difficulties, 
misfortunes, joys and sorrows of living Soviet people.” He added, “The divergence of 
dramatic literature and reality is almost compulsory” (Crankshaw, p. 104). 
In the October edition of Znamya, Ilya Ehrenburg published an article that merits 
quotation at length: 
An author is not a piece of machinery, registering events. 
An author writes a book, not because he knows how to 
write, not because he is a member of the Union of Soviet 
Writers and may be asked why he has published nothing for 
so long. An author does not write a book because he has to 
earn a living. An author writes a book because he finds it 
necessary to tell people something of himself, because he is 
pregnant with his book, because he has seen people, things, 
and emotions that he cannot help describing...that is why I 
cannot understand some critics when they blame such-and-
such a writer: he has not written a novel about the Volga-
Don Canal, about the textile industry, or about the struggle 
for peace. But would it not be better to reproach another 
author, who has written a book, although he felt no spiritual 
compulsion to do so and could have quietly left it 
unwritten?... 
In pre-revolutionary times an author’s life was not 
an easy one, and in Chekhov’s letters there is mention of 
how the editors of a newspaper or magazine would order a 
story from him. But even the most impudent of editors 
refrained from suggesting to Chekhov the subject of his 
story. Can one imagine Tolstoy being given an instruction 
to write Anna Karenina or Gorki being ordered to write 
Mother? (Crankshaw, 1959, p. 105). 
 
In late 1953,  composers Aram Khachaturian and Dmitry Shostakovich spoke out 
for the right of the artist to “independence, boldness and originality” (Treadgold, p. 442). 
In December, writer Vladimir Pomerantsev wrote an article for Novy Mir titled “Sincerity 
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in Literature.” Here he frankly advised writers: “Don’t think about prosecution … Be 
independent” (Crankshaw, p. 106; Treadgold, p. 442; Zubok, 2009). 
In January, the organ of the Writer’s Union, Literaturnaya Gazeta, responded. 
Pomerantsev, the paper argued, 
claims that the degree of sincerity—that is, the directness of 
things, must be the first test. No, the first test for the 
Marxist has been and will continue to be the evaluation of 
the ideological-artistic quality of the work. Thus, under 
close scrutiny, the basis of the article is seen to be false 
(Crankshaw, p. 107). 
 
This statement, wrote the contemporary American observer Edward Crankshaw, was not 
a rejection per se of the trend toward humanism in Soviet literature. “It told the artists of 
the Soviet Union that they could be as human and personal as they liked, even that 
preoccupation with ordinary human values and conflicts would be encouraged—provided 
only that in the last resort the validity of the Leninist exegesis was not questioned.” This, 
Crankshaw quipped, was like telling Copernicus he could make “as many fascinating 
discoveries as he liked … provided only that he did not demonstrate that the earth was 
not the centre of the universe” (p. 107). 
But the Soviet artist still had far more breathing room than before, even as the 
liberalization slowed somewhat in 1954. In that year the novel that gave the era its name, 
Ilya Ehrenburg’s The Thaw, was printed—not without difficulty—in a small edition. 
Floodgates were not exactly opening. But the melting ice was allowing a trickle of “new 
thinking,” to use a Gorbachevian phrase, into public life. 
Meanwhile, the authorities, who wanted a flourishing literature and had realized 
that literature without the personal element was lifeless, attempted to harness the Thaw to 
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help expose corruption and other “survivals of the past” and “relics of the capitalist 
mentality.” Writers would be allowed to show the seamy side of life. Satire, thus, would 
be encouraged to an extent. Khrushchev (p. 185) would later specifically praise Sergei 
Mikhalkov (father of the future filmmaker Andrei Konchalovsky) for his satires. Several 
writers, such as the dramatists Gorodetsky, Marienkhof, and Zorin, depicted problems not 
simply as tangential to Soviet society, but rather as closely related to its very nature. This 
was more than the leadership had bargained for, and all three were vigorously attacked in 
articles and speeches (Crankshaw, pp. 108-109). Even faced with such opposition, the 
artists did not give up hope. Many somehow had faith that a real, Stalin-style crackdown 
was not forthcoming. Exile and death did not await the man who spoke out of line, even 
if censure did.  
4. The Thaw 
(a) Beginnings 
The dates assigned to the Thaw vary. An argument could be made that it began 
percolating in the months after Stalin’s death; indeed, a case could be made that the 
cinematic Thaw had its roots in a decision made while Stalin was still alive to increase 
film production, thus creating opportunities for young filmmakers who had had few 
opportunities to work during the period of few pictures. But the consensus beginning of 
the Thaw proper is February 25, 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev made his “Secret 
Speech” to the 20th Party Congress and enumerated some of Stalin’s crimes.  In the years 
that followed, the dismantling of Stalin’s “cult of personality” was an avowed, if 
erratically executed, official policy goal. The liberalization of early 1956 was followed by 
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a chill after the Soviet Union’s crushing of the Hungarian Revolution in November, but 
subsequent waves of Thaw and chill arrived each year of Khrushchev’s leadership, 
ebbing and flowing with historical events.  
The Moscow International Youth Festival in summer 1957, the launch of Sputnik 
the same year, and Yuri Gagarin’s ascent into orbit in 1961 were all attended by relative 
cultural liberalization; the Cuban Missile Crisis and the collapse of Khrushchev’s Virgin 
Lands agricultural policy were followed by tighter cultural policy and bluster from on 
high. The wavering approach had much to do with Khrushchev’s need to maintain his 
power within the Politburo. In times of good national news relative liberals such as 
culture minister Ekaterina Furtseva had substantial power (she was Marlen Khutsiev’s 
booster during the making of Ilich’s Gate); during times of policy failure, conservatives 
such as Leodid Ilichev and Mikhail Suslov held sway (they are generally assumed to have 
influenced Khrushchev’s attack on Ilich’s Gate at his meeting with intelligentsia at the 
Kremlin on March 8, 1963, when Khruschev was still reeling from the previous autumn’s 
Cuban Missile Crisis). 
In the years after the Secret Speech, films broke new ground with their 
“humanism”. Lev Kulidzhanov and Yakov Segel presented an unvarnished depiction of 
daily life in The House Where I Live  (1957). In The Cranes Are Flying (1957), director 
Mikhail Kalatozov painted a deeply emotional, nonjudgmental portrait of a woman 
manipulated into marrying another man while her sweetheart is off at war. In Ballad of a 
Soldier (1958), director Grigorii Chukhrai portrayed a soldier as a boy with a boy’s 
concerns—love for his mother, interest in a pretty young girl he meets—rather than as a 
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politically conscious fighting machine. His heroism is almost accidental—and it is not 
that heroism, but his simple kindness that is his most important trait. In 1961 
Khrushchev, speaking at the 22nd Party Congress, reiterated his desire to de-Stalinize the 
Soviet Union. That same year, Chukhrai brought out a new film, Clear Sky, which dealt 
with the touchy issue of a Soviet pilot who had been a prisoner of war to the Nazis 
returning home only to face Stalinist persecution.  
(b) The decline and after 
These advances notwithstanding, Khrushchev had no intention of allowing an 
overall liberalization in the arts; there was only to be a partial, cautious liberalization, and 
its purpose was to aid his policies. Now and again during his years in office he harshly 
warned artists who acted as if they were “free”; this included a direct attack on Romm in 
a June 21, 1963 speech to a plenary meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee 
(Khrushchev, 1964, p. 219). Having renounced Stalinist terror, Khrushchev envisioned a 
society sustained by the heartfelt Communist enthusiasm of its citizens. A cultural scene 
dominated by blatant falseness and lifeless stereotypes would have little chance of 
generating such enthusiasm. Thus Khrushchev wanted more frankness and humanity in 
art. He did not want a general cultural freedom in which artists functioned outside Party 
authority and could work as easily against his needs as for them.  And he was not 
unwilling to oppose those who failed to espouse the kind of enthusiasm he wanted.10 This 
                                                
10 In the cultural sphere, this opposition tended to be limited to menacing verbiage. Of course, state 
censorship continued—the boundaries of the permissible were broader than under Stalin, but culture was 
far from free. And in some instances, harsher methods were used. Boris Pasternak was given a choice when 
he recieved the 1958 Nobel Prize for literature: Turn the award down or leave the Soviet Union. Pasternak 
turned the award down. The Thaw years also saw Joseph Brodsky exiled and writers Valery Tarsis and 
Alexander Esenin-Volpin confined in mental hospitals. But harsh penalties were the exception rather than 
 
 
48 
was clear from Khrushchev’s reaction to the abstract art on display the Moscow 
exhibition “Thirty Years of Pictorial Art,” which he and other Soviet leaders visited on 
December 1, 1962. “We won’t spend a kopeck on your art,” Khrushchev raged. 
Just give me a list of those who want to go abroad, to the 
so-called “free word.” We’ll give you foreign passports 
tomorrow and you can get out. Your prospects here are nil. 
What is hung here is simply anti-Soviet. It’s amoral.... 
History can be our judge. For the time being, history has 
put us at the head of this state and we have to answer for 
everything that goes on in it. Therefore we are going to 
maintain a strict policy on art.... Gentlemen, we are 
declaring war on you (Liehm & Liehm, 1977, p. 213).  
 
The leadership’s conservatism was also instrumental, as we shall see, in the rejection of 
Marlen Khutsiev’s Ilich’s Gate in 1963.  
* * * 
In October 1964, Khrushchev fell from power. He had often talked tough, but 
generally acted gently in dealing with his country’s artists. At first it appeared that the 
new regime of Leonid Brezhnev would continue with a policy of liberalization in 
culture.11* It was not to be. In September, 1965, a literary critic named Andrei Siniavsky 
was arrested. In February, 1966 he and writer Yuli Daniel were tried and sentenced to 
                                                                                                                                            
the rule in the cultural world of the Thaw (Treadgold, 1981, p. 458). They had been the rule in Stalin's day, 
not just for dissidents, but for anyone who stepped, seemed to step, or was rumored to have stepped outside 
the bounds of Stalinist discipline.  A harsh penalty in Stalin's era meant death or internment in the camps—
which also usually meant death. The point is not that the Soviet Union suddenly became relaxed and free 
under Khrushchev. It did not. But it was a markedly different place than it had been under Stalin; the artists 
sensed this and time and again tried to go beyond what Khrushchev was willing to accept. 
 
11 Several events led to this impression. Poet Anna Akhmatova, who had had long difficulties with the 
Communist regime, was honored on her 75th birthday in 1964. Sergei Esenin, whose works had been 
suppressed for decades, was posthumously rehabilitated in 1965 to commemorate what would have been 
his 70th birthday. A book of Boris Pasternak's poems was published in June, 1965, with a complimentary 
introduction, ironically enough, by Andrei Siniavsky (Treadgold, 1981, p. 473). 
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seven and five years hard labor, respectively, for publishing abroad works critical of the 
USSR. It was, writes historian Donald Treadgold, “the first significant instance of penal 
action against intellectuals since the death of Stalin” (p. 474). More trials, more arrests, 
more repression followed in the ensuing months and years. Full-scale Stalinist terror was 
not reborn, but there were, in any case, hard times ahead for many Soviet artists and 
intellectuals. The Thaw was coming to an end.  
Some have argued that the end had come with Khrushchev’s ouster. The editors 
of Kinomatograf Ottepeli (The Cinema of the Thaw)—a post-Soviet three-volume set of 
essays, memoirs, and documents—designate the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 as the end of the Thaw. Others make the case that in cinema the Thaw 
lingered on into the early 1970s. But any attempt to assign hard dates to the Thaw are 
inevitably excercises in convenience. The Thaw was less an era than the dream of an era, 
endangered from the start but enduring all the same. By the mid-1960s, the dream was 
already slipping away, but in the absence of a renewal of Stalinist terror, its residue 
endured right up to the final days of the Soviet Union. Many artists continued trying to 
shape their lives and careers according to the Thaw virtues of sincerity and creative 
integrity. The transformative years of the late 1950s and early 1960s had set the stage for 
young filmmakers to engage their own idiosyncratic memories and pursue more 
unconventional visions in cinema and in life; the authoritarian backlash of the Brezhnev 
years could hinder this pursuit, but it could not prevent it. 
* * * 
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From the mid-1960s onward, cultural conservatism was a central tenet of Soviet 
film administration. Tarkovsky’s Andrei Rublev was suppressed in 1967 not only for 
“religiosity” but also for violence (“naturalism” in Soviet parlance). But perhaps more 
important than attacks on such traditional censorship targets as violence and sexuality 
was the leadership’s fear of “difficult,” hard-to-understand form. In some cases, this 
question of form was, perhaps, more important than content in censorship decisions. In 
1975, for instance, the authorities nervously discussed ad nauseum Tarkovsky’s 
autobiographical film, The Mirror, but allowed nearly immediate (though posthumous) 
publication of one of writer-actor-filmmaker Vasily Shukshin’s last short stories, Before 
the Cock Crows Thrice. Tarkovsky’s film had very little direct reference to politics at all, 
while Shukshin’s story was an openly brutal lampoon of the Soviet system in which a 
three-headed snake represents either the hypocritical “collective leadership” of the day or 
else a censorship office (it criticizes Ivan-the-Fool’s song, asking him to take out the 
“sexuality” and “cruelty”) and in which a band of devils talk bureaucrat-speak and try to 
break into a monastery so they can defile it.  
But Tarkovsky’s Mirror is singularly complex in its form and deliberately 
ambiguous in its associations—we are to relate to the images in our own, emotional and 
spiritual way. It was not so politically threatening in any direct sense, but it was 
intellectually embarrassing for a top brass that could not understand it. Shukshin’s tale, 
however, is written in clear, folksy Russian. If the satirical elements are missed—which 
would require considerable naiveté—it is an innocuous fairy tale. And even if the satire is 
understood, at least it doesn’t shame the intellect of an insecure, old-fashioned leadership. 
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Lenin hadn’t thought much of innovative form either, but he was tactful enough 
not to enforce his tastes.12 Stalin, however, was insecure before the strange machinations 
he saw coming off the cutting benches of avant-garde filmmakers such as Sergei 
Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov, and led a crackdown on “formalism”—the supposed 
domination of form over content—starting from around 1928. Montage was practically 
eradicated by 1931. While the Thaw signalled the gradual return of innovative form (an 
early example can be seen in Sergei Urusevsky’s photography for Kalatozov’s The 
Cranes are Flying) the authorities’ fear of it persisted and later flourished through the 
reigns of Alexei Romanov (1964-72) and Phillip Yermash (1972-86) as bosses of 
Goskino, the State Cinema Committee.  
Like their 1930s predecessor Boris Shumiatsky, Eisenstein’s great rival, these 
post-Thaw industry leaders reasoned that a hard-to-understand film was not conducive to 
the image of cinema as a people’s art form, an art for the masses. Box-office receipts—
which were to maintain the film industry and feed state coffers—were a concern as well. 
For Romanov, they were a grudging concern—he had no great affection for 
commercialism in film and was most concerned with a film’s morality and its Party 
orientation (Golovskoy & Rimberg, 1986, p. 13).  But Shumiatsky in the 1930s and 
Yermash in the ’70s and ’80s enthusiastically embraced audience attraction as a central 
tenet of film-industry management. Traditional narrative forms would draw an audience, 
                                                
12 Lenin wrote to a German revolutionary named Klara Zetkin: “I have the courage to appear a barbarian. I 
cannot appraise the works of expressionism, futurism, cubism, and other 'isms' as the highest expressions of 
artistic genius. I do not understand them. I take no joy in them” (Macdonald, 1954, p. 34). While Lenin's 
ideal concept of truly Soviet art was art that was traditional in form and revolutionary in content, he was, at 
least during the NEP era of "strategic retreat" that began in 1921, willing to tolerate a wide spectrum of 
artistic styles. In cinema this ranged from apolitical “bourgeois” films which were conventional in form to 
avant garde films which were revolutionary in both form and content. 
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they judged; complex, “incomprehensible” form would drive it away. Both Shumiatsky 
and Yermash looked to Hollywood for inspiration. They wanted to screen films they 
believed would be popular and they marginalized those films they believed would fail to 
draw crowds. This is one reason Shumiatsky had little use for Eisenstein, and Yermash 
was no great supporter of Tarkovsky. Shumiatsky, however, had more empirical evidence 
for his stance than did Yermash. Eisenstein’s The Battleship Potemkin had received top 
billing in the 1920s and hadn’t fared well with the audience (Taylor, 1979b, p. 95). By 
contrast, of Tarkovsky’s films, only Solaris was not restricted to small-scale release.13 
We don’t really know how Yermash-era films such as The Mirror or Stalker might have 
done with the audience—the Goskino chief simply assumed they would do poorly.  
Thus, in deciding the fate of a film, the authorities looked for ideologically 
acceptable content, moral conservatism, and formal simplicity. They also tried to 
anticipate its appeal to the audience. Among these criteria, different items were deemed 
more important in different eras. But a film’s failure to satisfy the authorities on any of 
these counts could land it on the shelf, on the cutting room floor, or on a single screen on 
the outskirts of town. This was true before, during, and after the Thaw. 
5. The Dreamers 
Despite these consistencies in Soviet arts policy, the relative liberalization of the 
Thaw was an important—and in many ways irreversible—turning point for artists. The 
                                                
13 It was classified as “first category”—meaning wide distribution—while the remainder of Tarkovsky's 
films were “second category”—limited distribution (Tarkovsky, 1993, p. 99). The authorities could also 
deny a film the opportunity to win a broad audience by refusing to advertise widely or print reviews of the 
film. These actions could be taken for ideological reasons or simply out of the conviction that the film 
could not attract an audience, and that it would therefore be a waste to promote it. 
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authorities’ post-Stalin renunciation of terror alone could not help but bring artists an 
enormous sense of relief. Artists could create without the constant threat of death hanging 
over their heads. Repression persisted in the days of the Thaw, and intensified in the days 
that followed. The post-Thaw era saw some artists jailed, some sent to mental asylums, 
some kicked out of the country, and many denied the right to produce or showcase their 
work—at least not in the form they wanted to.14 In addition, those who pleased the 
leadership were often showered with honors and material enticements, while those who 
didn’t sometimes struggled to make ends meet. But the all-pervasive, bone-chilling terror 
that had characterized Stalin’s reign never returned.  
The disappearance of terror and the newfound right to explore the personal made 
the Thaw a time of personal renaissance for many artists. When a man has lived all his 
life in an outhouse, the move to a one-room apartment seems grand indeed. The 
importance of the Thaw, in many ways, lies less in what the government agreed to allow 
than in the changing expectations and psychology of the artists. Writers, filmmakers, 
painters and sculptors permitted themselves to dream of artistic freedom, and even began 
to act on those dreams. New psychological horizons opened for the artists, and these 
horizons could never be completely closed. Young people just starting out in the arts 
during the Thaw built the foundations of their artistic identities in an atmosphere filled 
with possibilities and pervaded by the sense artists must never return to the Stalin-era 
habits of fearful submission.  
                                                
14 Dissident writer Valery Tarsis, who was confined to a mental hospital while Khrushchev was still in 
power, was permitted by the Brezhnev regime to leave the Soviet Union in February 1966—an apparent 
attempt by the authorities to deal with dissidence by ridding the nation of dissidents. This form of 
dispensing with internal opposition was attempted in modified form with writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 
February, 1974—he was forcibly exiled (Treadgold, pp. 458, 474-475). 
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(a) Romm’s kids 
The young filmmakers who arrived at the All-Union State Cinema Institute 
(VGIK) during the Thaw had an opportunity to study at the Soviet Union’s most 
opportune moment for artistic exploration since the late 1920s. They were also fortunate, 
at that moment, to be studying under masters who understood what had been lost when 
previous golden age had passed. The goals of sincerity and lyricism, set during the 
Thaw’s gestation by Pomerantsev and Bergholz, seemed within reach; artists came to 
believe that good citizenship and individuality were not mutually nullifying notions. In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, many the filmmakers who would define late-Soviet 
cinema were studying at VGIK—Tarkovsky, Konchalovsky, Vasily Shukshin, Elem 
Klimov, Larissa Shepitko, Nikita Mikhalkov, Georgi Danelia, Gleb Panfilov. Many of 
these filmmakers had works shelved in the post-Thaw era. Several of them were active in 
the glasnost-era reorganization of the cinema industry. What else unites them? They all 
studied at VGIK under Mikhail Romm. 
* * * 
In the years following Khrushchev’s address to the 20th Party Congress, different 
arts blossomed with the help of courageous leading figures. In literature, this figure was 
Alexander Tvardovsky, editor of Novy Mir, in which Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life 
of Ivan Denisovich was first printed. In cinema, it was Romm, of whom Konchalovsky 
has said, “The 20th Party Congress was sacred to him. It was his inner guiding light and 
criterion” (Le Fanu, 1987, p. 4). Romm had been one of Soviet cinema’s privileged few. 
During the 30s he had made his reputation with the authorities with his films Lenin in 
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October and Lenin in 1918, both of which portrayed Stalin as much more important in 
those days than he really was. In the period of few pictures, Romm made two anti-
American cold war films as well as a two-part epic on Admiral Ushakov. In the mid 
1950s, he made Murder on Dante Street, set in France. Artistically, says Sergei Linkov, a 
former student of Romm and an assistant director on Romm’s late masterpiece Ordinary 
Fascism (Obyknovennyi Fashizm, 1965), this was the breaking point for the old master. It 
dawned on Romm that he had just made a film about subject matter of which he knew 
little and felt even less. His students criticized him harshly, and he took the criticism to 
heart. This episode, along with the political and attitudinal changes sweeping the land at 
the time, changed Romm forever (Miller, 1993, 1994). 
For six years he did not make a film. He was waiting, learning from his students 
(among whom during these years were both Tarkovsky and Konchalovsky), and 
encouraging their native creativity while trying to regain his own.  As he writes in 
Conversations on Film Directing: 
It is important to recognize what there is of your own in yourself 
and that which is someone else’s. First I must shed the skin of 
habit before making another film. With years, a person becomes 
more clever, but, in the selection of his impressions—what he sees, 
what he hears—there is the influence of his profession and of 
convention. This is bad (Galichenko, 1991, p. 16).  
 
Romm returned to the screen in 1962 with Nine Days of One Year, a deeply heartfelt film 
about a dying nuclear physicist struggling to balance the demands of work, morality, and 
love. The film is generally regarded as one of the landmarks of the Thaw. 
Romm was nothing if not flexible, a survivor, a man capable of keeping up with 
the times. After training as a sculptor and then trying his hand as a writer in the 1920s, he 
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found his way into the most modern of arts, the cinema. Soon enough, he was rubbing 
elbows with Eisenstein. Romm’s first film, Pyshka (1934), was the last Soviet silent. His 
last major film, Ordinary Fascism (1967), was a complex meditation on cruelty to which 
the people themselves give consent. It was a brutally graphic study of Fascism—and, 
quite likely, Stalinism too—so brutal that Romm begged an actress friend, already an old 
woman, not to go see it, for fear it would upset her ("Every frame and every minute," 
1981, p. 40). This film was thoroughly modern and unblushing in the face of the 
century’s depravity; bloody documentary footage is used in a way reminiscent of 
documentary sequences in Tarkovsky’s 1962 film, Ivan’s Childhood, sequences which 
even the young Konchalovsky called “disgusting,” railing at his friend and future rival. 
Later on Konchalovsky would admit that the scenes were brilliant, groundbreaking 
(Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky, 1990, p. 188). Romm had seen this right away—the teacher 
learned from the student. 
According to Linkov, Romm had always longed to express himself sincerely, but 
had instead opted not to buck the brutal tenor of the times during the Stalin era. Romm’s 
admiration for Lenin was real, so even his Lenin biopics, though politically dutiful, can’t 
be seen as entirely cynical works. (In 1956 he removed the portions depicting Stalin 
(Liehm & Liehm, 1977, p. 212)). As evidence of Romm’s internal urge to sincerity, 
Linkov points to Romm’s wartime film The Dream (Mechta, 1943). Shot at a time when, 
due to the government’s other considerable worries, film production was more loosely 
controlled than in the 1930s, The Dream takes neither great historical deeds nor the war 
itself as its subject. Instead, like 1920s “slice-of-life” films and NEP-era novels of city 
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life such as Ilya Ehrenburg’s On Protochnyi Lane (Na Protochnom Pereulke, 1927), The 
Dream focuses on people’s internal desires, their small-scale relationships, and their 
longing to transcend a dreary reality. 
Even as Romm returned to shooting government-preferred films in the postwar 
era, he was advocating the acceptance of iconoclasts into VGIK.  For instance, when 
Shukshin came to his interview looking like the proverbial country bumpkin, the board 
decided to challenge him.  
“Have you ever heard of Nikolai Nekrasov?” they 
asked Shukshin. 
He exploded angrily at the question about the 19th 
century poet who wrote on peasant themes. 
“I had a few drinks with him,” he said. “He was a 
personal acquaintance.” 
Romm convinced the committee to take Shukshin 
because he was impressed with the man’s nerve 
(Galichenko, 1991, p. 12). 
 
When Tarkovsky walked into the room to greet his VGIK interviewers, they 
noted his air of intellectual superiority and took a quick dislike to him. Romm, however, 
saw something special in the young man, and convinced them to let him in. Tarkovsky 
and Shukshin had these experiences with Romm in 1954—before the Secret Speech, 
before the Murder on Dante Street fiasco. 
Romm encouraged his young iconoclasts to find their own path in art. He did not 
tell them what sort of work to create, but only stressed general humanist principles. 
Shukshin relates that he was deeply affected by Romm’s teaching that “the main theme of 
art is the necessity of goodness and knowledge among people” (Shukshin, 1993, p. 419). 
In Romm’s view, kindness was the key to the regeneration of man. His students were 
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receptive to this view. It is worth noting that Shukshin’s first feature film, There Lives 
This Lad (1965), concludes with a scene strikingly similar to the concluding scene of 
Nine Days of One Year: the hospitalized hero, having had his faith sorely tried, reaffirms 
his belief in life and love and goodness. 
Looking back on his film school years, Tarkovsky said that Romm “taught me to 
be myself” (Tarkovsky, 1992, p. 120). Tarkovsky and Konchalovsky both admired 
Romm’s ability to let his students explore freely in life and art, to make their own 
mistakes, enjoy their own successes, and, most importantly, draw their own conclusions. 
“He would listen; and if he was convinced he’d say, ‘Do it!’” Konchalovsky said. Romm, 
he added, “loved passionate people,” and he wanted these people to realize their full 
potential, to become more than just master craftsmen: “His gift was the emphasis he 
placed on the student’s spiritual development. He was interested in teaching us not only 
to become filmmakers but to become men” (Le Fanu, p. 4). 
(b) Mikhail Kalatozov 
Irina Izvolova writes that, in the minds of the young film students of mid-1950s, 
the first great cinematic blow of the Thaw was struck by Grigorii Chukhrai’s The Forty-
First (1956), a remake of Iakov Protazanov’s 1927 silent Civil War melodrama. “They 
say that when Chukhrai first brough his film The Forty-First to VGIK, the walls of the 
institute shook from general wonderment,” writes Izvolova. “After the screening, they 
carried Chukhrai from the hall in their arms” (p. 78)  The film’s pictorial splendor, the 
way in which it put tone and texture on equal footing with plot, and the attractive 
portrayal of the White officer with whom the beautiful Red assassin falls in love all 
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hinted that indeterminate lyricism was catching up with determinate ideology in Soviet 
cinema. And it was somehow fitting that the film was based on a 1920s classic, because it 
seemed to represent the revival of that decade’s spirit of plastic innovation. But Izvolova 
argues that the truly groundbreaking films of the Thaw were yet to come, that Chukhrai’s 
film was not the beginning of a new wave, but a brilliant end to the old heroic mythology. 
It was left to Mikhail Kalatozov and his cameraman Sergei Urusevsky to break 
the glass of the new era. And, as Izvolova brilliantly points out, he discovered his path 
forward by reaching back:  
Kaltozov, whose film The Cranes Are Flying became the 
standard-bearer of Thaw cinema, did not suspect any 
crumbling [of the old order]. In the most natural way, 
without any hint at struggle or challenge, he returned to 
himself. The change in the societal climate gave him the 
opportunity to return to his own path, which had been 
artificially interrupted after Salt for Svanetia (1930). The 
Cranes Are Flying restored the missing link in his work. 
People did not immediately realize how revolutionary the 
flight of these cranes really was ... With its appearance on 
the screen, The Cranes Are Flying, it seems, created an 
uncrossable gulf between the systems of imagery of Thaw 
cinema and of the cinema of the pre-Thaw period. In 
reality, the aesthetic of the film was not new; it was rooted 
in the 1920s (expressive montage, dizzying angles, black-
and-white color scheme), but with this system it presented a 
new heroine (pp. 79-80). 
 
What impresses Izvolova most about The Cranes Are Flying is the integrity of the image 
of the heroine, Veronika, played by Tatiana Samoilova. Veronika is not a prop for the 
plot, existing in harmony with the standard requirements of war-storytelling convention. 
She an independent image, keeping the audience forever on its toes: Rather than 
supporting the plot convention, her image exists in productive dialogue with it. Her own 
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idiosyncratic longings cannot be contained within the boundaries of what one should 
expect from a person in her position. The story in The Cranes Are Flying, after all, is 
unique but not entirely unconventional: Veronika is seduced after her sweetheart, Boris, 
leaves for the war. She extricates herself from her seducer, but Boris dies at the front. 
Veronika commits herself to helping the war effort at home, and at war’s end she takes in 
an orphan and commits herself to raising him in Boris’s memory. Izvolova writes that the 
likes of Veronika had never been seen in Soviet cinema.  
What turned out the most staggering of all the novelties in 
The Cranes Are Flying was not the plot (though the theme 
of faithfulness was resolved in a new way), but the way in 
which the heroine’s character did not correspond to the 
represented progress of events. From the first frames of the 
film, Samoilova’s Veronika strikes us with her lack of 
resemblance to the usual cinematic image of the positive 
heroine. Even in the film’s frames that radiate happiness 
and love, when neither Veronika nor Boris knows the 
misfortunes that lie ahead, there is something strange, 
unusual, indeterminate in the very movement of the 
heroine, in her careful walk, so different from the grounded 
and confident stride of even the most tender and romantic 
heroines of the early 1950s. There is nothing sealed and 
completed about Veronika (pp. 79-80). 
 
Veronika, writes Izvolova, “is the first heroine…who cannot be copied.” Kalatozov, 
Urusevsky, and Samoilova had shattered the poetic-political unities of Soviet cinema, 
where each image fit in its appropriate and harmonious place within the structure of 
mythological socialist life. Veronika entered a story and through her subtle reactions to it 
told a counterstory. “She is the first private person in Soviet cinema,” writes Izvolova. 
“And she represents nobody but herself. She fell out of the unified choir, and this is what 
interests the filmmakers” (p. 81). 
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The emerging worldview of Thaw artists depended on complicating—though not 
necessarily violating—the sacred Word of unified Soviet mythology. What the creative 
intelligentsia of the early Thaw years really wanted was to carve out more space within 
the Soviet mythos for play and meditation and productive enthusiasm. They were not 
looking to tear down socialist society but to reenergize it and make it their own. The old 
unities had become foreign to them, and they took the changes that began with Stalin’s 
death and continued with the 20th Party Congress as permission to craft a new and more 
open approach to Soviet art and Soviet life. Thaw artists could not move forward without 
confronting the inheritance of man-as-demigod, the full weight of the grand style and its 
sacred Word. “Directors of the Thaw tried first of all to free themselves from the burden 
of this Word,” writes Izvolova. “The appearance of man in a new, non-sacred way, 
unavoidably led to conflict, breaking the earlier logic of development” (p. 78). 
(c) Marlen Khutsiev and Andrei Tarkovsky 
Kalatozov broke with the logic of the grand style with his inimitable mixture of 
formal vibrancy, idiosyncratic characterization, and longing for the unharnessed energies 
of a lost age. He remained, Izvolova writes, without heirs in Soviet cinema.15 Meanwhile, 
                                                
15 Izvolova’s assertion is generally well founded. In The Cranes Are Flying, the Kalatozov-Urusevsky team 
had set off a combination of visual fireworks and emotional depth-charges that even the filmmakers 
themselves found hard to match in their subsequent joint works, The Unsent Letter (Neotpravlennoe 
pis’mo, 1959), a striking depiction of nature’s implacability in the face of human ambitions, and I Am Cuba 
(Ia Kuba, 1964), a modern formalist masterpiece in which the filmmakers tacitly challenge the agit-prop 
conventions of their plotting with a visual treatment rich in complex chronotopic longing. (I will discuss I 
Am Cuba and its context in more detail in chapter four.) When the team parted ways after I Am Cuba, it 
seemed as if their very own subgenre of Soviet Cinema had ended. Nevertheless, the complex 
characterization of Veronika in The Cranes Are Flying did have worthy heirs. We see unmistakable echoes 
of Samoilova’s complex characterization in Inna Gulaya’s portrayal of a village girl willing herself to 
believe that a con-man is her father in Lev Kulidzhanov’s When the Trees Were Tall (Kogda derev'ia byli 
bol'shimi, 1961) and Galina Polskikh's extraordinary performance as a dreamy schoolgirl coming of age in 
the Russian Far East in Yuli Karasik's Wild Dog Dingo (Dikaia Sobaka Dingo, 1962). Polskikh, like 
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Marlen Khutsiev was busy with his own assault on the grand style. Upon the release of 
their film Spring on Zarechnoi Street (Vesna na zarechnoi ulitse, 1956), Khutsiev and his 
co-director, Feliks Mironer, wrote, “For a long time they force-fed us billboard images of 
parade reality, but today cinema is leaving the boulevards for the lanes and back alleys, 
where we find garbage and bric-a-brac and a man without a suit ” (Peremyshlev, 2009). 
What was new in Khutsiev's approach, though, was not merely the renewal of the lost 
1920s tradition of the slice of life film, most famously embodied in Abram Room's Bed 
and Sofa (1927). In his tale of a cultured urban schoolteacher who arrives in the province 
and falls in love with a rough-hewn factory worker and night-school student, Khutsiev 
did not merely exchange a set of Grand-Style decorations for “realistic” ones; he didn’t 
simply appoint conventional stories with everyday realia. Instead, he made the everyday 
atmosphere the central figure in his cinematic world, as central as the people moving in 
its midst. “In Khutsiev,” write Izvolova, “everything is stereoscopic. Everyday life itself 
becomes a plot in his films. The description of everyday life turns into lyrical 
storytelling” (p. 86).  
Khutsiev would continue in his subsequent Thaw films, The Two Fyodors (Dva 
Fedora, 1958), Ilich’s Gate (Zastava Il’icha, 1961, released as I Am Twenty [Mne 
dvadtsat’ let] in 1965), and July Rain (Iul’skii dozhd’, 1966) to give space an 
                                                                                                                                            
Samoilova before her, takes her character into a terrain of pure subjectivity, dominating the film with her 
eyes, searching wondering, longing, remembering,reassembling, fully taking in the moment before it 
passes. Like Samoilova's Veronika, Polskikh's Tanya is not shaped by conventional demands of the plot—
which hinges on the return of Tanya's long-absent father—but by her own perceptions of a world that feels 
increasingly mysterious to her. Nothing in the film—not the young love triangle, not Tanya's relationship 
with her father, not even her relationship with the town that had once felt like home—unfolds quite like one 
might expect, but more importantly, nothing feels quite the way one expects it to feel, because Tanya's 
mercurial moods, often depicted with little more than a glance, shape the film more than the plot itself does.  
 
 
63 
extraordinary role in his films. He refuses to subordinate spaces to plot; instead he makes 
them the embodiment of time. And one can argue that his subject in these films was 
time—indeed, the crucial opening scene of July Rain shows previously bustling 
Muscovites taking shelter from a downpour in front of a large billboard featuring two 
watches; film, like unexpected weather, can arrest and elongate the moment, allowing us 
to look closer and see what is ordinarily missed. In the latter two films, Khutsiev’s makes 
manifest his love affair with Moscow, his determination to capture the unrepeatable 
intersection of time and place, to look so intently upon the flow of the urban moment that 
the moment itself appears to have elongated and done away with the conventional 
perception of time. Khutsiev is known as a neorealist, working in the still-young tradition 
of his Italian contemporaries such as de Sica, but his brand of realism shades into the 
territory of the uncanny, creating unexpected intersections between his aesthetic and that 
of Tarkovsky, who also trains his gaze upon matter with such intensity that it is 
transformed into time and memory. Both men grew up in periods of crisis and breakneck 
change, times of industrialization and war. The constant destruction, renovation, 
scorching, and reconstruction of the Soviet world of the 1930s and 40s was for Khutsiev 
and Tarkovsky a special challenge to memory, as if the world itself were saying, “Catch 
me if you can!”  
Marlen Khutsiev was born in Tbilisi on October 5, 1925, but his family moved to 
Moscow when he was young. His mother was a daughter of the disappearing gentry. His 
father was what came to be known as an Old Bolshevik—by the mid-1930s, this, too, was 
a disappearing breed. As a child, Khutsiev fell in love with Moscow’s streets; he lived on 
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Nikolskaya Street, near Red Square; he walked on the sidewalks of Smolensk Boulevard, 
which would later be subsumed into the massive Garden Ring road (Sadovoe Kol’tso) 
expansion that Stalin had proposed in his 1935 master plan for the capital. When 
Khutsiev was 12 years old, his father was killed in Stalin’s purges, and the boy had to 
return to Georgia. The image of those childhood streets remained with him. He returned 
to them in 1945 as a student at VGIK, where he studied under the great veteran director 
Igor Savchenko.16  (He also worked with the great 1920s director Boris Barnet and would 
later serve as Barnet’s assistant director on Liana (1955).) Khutsiev and Mironer shot 
their diploma film, City Builders (Gradostroiteli, 1950), in Moscow. The film has been 
lost (Maliukova, 2005), but its subject matter appears to be a testament to Khutsiev's 
enduring love for the living urban space. More than 50 years later he would still 
remember his feelings for Moscow at the time: 
It would seem that it’s time to stop remembering, but every 
time I pass the Garden Ring, no matter who I’m driving 
with, I say, “Did you know that there a lovely, mighty 
boulevard here? … Big, beautiful Smolensk Boulevard.” 
When I came back from Tbilisi to start at VGIK, I easily 
remembered the places I lived in childhood… I remember 
that old Moscow very well, with Kitai Gorod17, with a 
center that had still not been rebuilt. And, of course, with 
Smolensk Boulevard (Iamshchikov, 2004). 
 
In Ilich's Gate, the young hero Sergei's return to Moscow after military service is 
punctuated by a similar delight in the places and memory-spaces of his youth. The 
                                                
16 Khutsiev had been unable to serve in the war due to severe and debilitating asthma. 
 
17 The name appears to mean “Chinatown” in modern Russian, but it has nothing to do with China—the 
roots of the name are still debated among historians and linguists. Kitai-gorod was since the 1500s a walled 
trading enclave at the center of Moscow. In the 1930s many of its last towers were destroyed, and only 
parts of the wall remained by the 1950s when Khutsiev returned to Moscow. 
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uncanny time-sense embedded in such chronotopic longing is most brilliantly 
demonstrated in the scene where Sergei wakes in the middle of the night, as if summoned 
by the city itself18. He walks down the wet and deserted streets, past blinking traffic 
lights, the words of Mayakovsky's “Past One O’Clock” in his head: “I’m in no hurry, and 
I’ve no reason to wake you and trouble you with lightning telegrams . . . At hours like 
this you wake and speak to the centuries, to history, to creation ” The poem is 
melancholy, about a love affair at an end, but at this moment, as Sergei reaches Red 
Square and his beloved Anya walks toward him—also summoned by the city, the same 
half-conscious, or superconscious, look in her eyes—it seems the centuries are speaking 
to them in the same voice. 
* * * 
Like Khutsiev, Tarkovsky had lost and found multiple childhood homes, and 
tracked the losses with sharp and longing eyes. He was born on April 4, 1932, in 
Zavrazhie in the Ivanovo Region north of Moscow and spent his childhood in both 
nearby Yurievets and in Moscow's Zamoskvaretsky District, an old area near the city 
center, close to the Red October Chocolate Factory and, more importantly for Tarkovsky, 
the Tretyakovsky Gallery, home of Andrei Rublev's Trinity icon. Tarkovsky's mother, 
Maria, had studied poetry and had become an editor; his father, Arseny, was a brilliant 
poet, but one who remained unpublished well into Tarkovsky's adulthood. When Andrei 
was three years old, Arseny left the family, and in 1941 he volunteered and left for the 
front. By that time, Andrei had been in school in Moscow for two years, but during the 
                                                
18 In Ilich’s Gate, when Sergei sits up in bed, he hears the absent Anya whisper his name, “Seriozha.” In the 
film’s re-edited version, I Am Twenty, the whisper is gone, it seems as one of the many corrections 
Khutsiev made for his own purposes, and the silent summons is more subtle, with the two lovers brought 
together by a force greater than them. 
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war the family was evacuated and returned to Yurievets, only to return to Moscow at 
war's end. The dual departure of his father—who survived the war and outlived his son—
and the comings and goings from city to countryside and back, left their mark in 
Tarkovsky's films, most directly in Mirror (Zerkalo, 1974).  
As a young man, Tarkovsky was a stiliaga—one of Moscow's young hipsters of 
the early 1950s, who dressed in colorful handmade zoot suits and thin ties and delighted 
in Western jazz (Rezhabek, 2007; Zubok, 2009). After secondary school, Tarkovsky 
attended the Institute for Oriental Languages but decided to leave. His mother, concerned 
for her son and not thrilled with his Moscow acquaintances,  signed him up for a 
geological expedition as a sample collector. In this capacity, 20-year-old Andrei 
wandered, often alone, for a year across the Siberian taiga. Years later, Tarkovsky said 
his mother had “saved” him; what was more, he said, the journey “turned out to be the 
best memory of my life” (Tarkovsky, 1992, p. 119). He returned to Moscow in 1954; that 
year he became a student at the All-Union Film School (Le Fanu, 1987, pp. 16-17). 
In the course of peripatetic childhood and adolescence, both Tarkovsky and 
Khutsiev seemed to learn how to arrest time with their eyes and store it in their dreams. 
They learned that the world around them was unreliable and soon to disappear; they 
learned to long for the passing image, for its deeper sense. And, in time, they learned how 
to use this talent in their art.  
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CHAPTER III  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY:  
MEMORY, LONGING, AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE IMAGE 
 
1. Opening the Code: Sincerity, Scripting, and the Soviet Thaw 
In December 1953, just six months after Stalin’s death, the Moscow-based literary 
journal Novy Mir published a series of essays by Vladimir Pomerantsev titled “On 
Sincerity in Literature”. Pomerantsev criticized the “varnishing” of reality; literature, he 
wrote, could no longer avoid reflecting and contending with “the vulgarities of life” 
(Zubok, 2009). Pomerantsev’s watchword, sincerity, was taken up by a generation of 
Soviet artists. In cinema, its great champion was the filmmaker Mikhail Romm, who as a 
professor at the State Cinema Institute (VGIK) openly encouraged his students to be 
themselves—to process and portray the world according to their own perceptions and in 
tune with their own sense of artistic integrity. The ethic of sincerity required not simply 
that one be oneself, but—a far more difficult thing—trust oneself. 
One’s experience of the world now mattered, even if that experience contradicted 
the world-narrative passed down from on high. If sticking to a closed cultural code meant 
creating works out of joint with what one saw and felt and believed, the code had to be 
opened. If what one saw and felt was stirringly, disturbingly complex, it would be 
insincere to ignore that complexity. If the drama of personal life intersected awkwardly—
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or did not intersect at all—with the drama of public life, it would be insincere to portray a 
world in which the two were harmoniously intertwined. The closed “dominant code” of 
postwar Stalinism was inadequate to the artist who felt a duty (both private and public) to 
be sincere. Sincerity required a closer look at both the internal and external world; it 
required the ability to see beyond imposed codes—to create a subjective response to the 
disorder of the objective terrain.  
Stuart Hall (1974) proposed that cultural products are “encoded” according to the 
producer’s value-set and subsequently “decoded” by consumers. These consumers might 
decode the product using the same “dominant” code as the producer, creating a direct 
match between how the producer wants the work to be received and how it is received. 
On the other hand, an empowered consumer might use a different code to decipher the 
work, one that negotiates with the work, questioning it in some ways and accepting it in 
others. Consumers might even deploy an “oppositional” code that willfully reads signs 
against the intentions of the producer: If you write stop, I’ll read it as go. Nikita 
Khrushchev’s extraordinary revelation, in his February 1956 address to the 20th Party 
Congress, of some of Stalin’s crimes (namely those committed against the Party faithful) 
no doubt emboldened a subset of Soviet citizens to read highly varnished socialist-realist 
depictions of Stalin-era life with an ironic or oppositional code. Indeed, by the 1970s, 
ironic decoding of empty Communist orthodoxy would become a sort of spontaneous 
passive resistance to the more marked absurdities of the regime. (This stance, as Alexei 
Yurchak (2006) has argued, was not so much oppositional as creatively adaptive, a way 
of playing with the available toys in the sandbox.) But in the late 1950s and early 60s—
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the post-Secret Speech period known as the “Thaw”—irony was not yet king. Many 
members of the Soviet intelligentsia took Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign to 
heart, but they were not rolling their eyes at the communist experiment; they were 
searching for a way to restore the presumed purity of its roots. And they were looking for 
guidance and inspiration in this search.  
In this environment, the encoders of cultural messages played an extremely 
important role; in the Russian tradition, artists are expected to provide not simply 
diversion from reality or even reflection of reality, but instruction on how to live within 
reality. Beginning in the 19th-century, artists had taken up the “accursed questions” of 
Russian life—What is our place in the world? What is to be done? Who is to blame?—
like a high-stakes homework assignment. In answering such questions, it would be 
unacceptable for artists to continue shaping their answers with an old code that excluded 
observed reality. While most Thaw-era artists did not dispense with socialist-realist 
tropes and codes (Prokhorov, 2002), they began to change the way they built their word-
and-image worlds upon the increasingly pliable socialist-realist scaffolding. If they 
wanted to fulfill their cultural duty, to follow the path of Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and 
Mayakovsky, they would need to open the code to worldly input. 
To open a code, though, is to violate its fixed nature—that is, to make it 
unintelligible. Without codes, life can become baggy, formless, intimidating in its chaos. 
Codes are the child of narrative thinking—the habits of thought that allow us to create 
scripts for our world and our lives; scripts transform the ambiguous elements of life into 
recognizable, “priceable” commodities in the narrative economy. If our narrative tells us 
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that X leads to Y, we can more easily deduce the worth and meaning—that is, the 
codified value—of X in our lives. Can we really free ourselves from this adaptive 
scripting, which can so often ease the cognitive burden of life? 
The opening of conventional codes is, then, one of the trickiest propositions in the 
creation of artistic or journalistic artifacts. No representation of life is free from some sort 
of restrictive code. We are all hemmed in by the limitations inherent in having a point of 
view, and the need to impose form on a world in flux. But there is a sort of sliding scale 
of representation, in which we open codes up in a number of ways: One of these is to 
include in our representation a reflexive awareness of our own point of view; this allows 
us the privilege of our own script without denying the scripts of others. Another is to 
populate our represented worlds with multiple voices and multiple scripts, each of which 
are given the space for expression and integrity—the ability to enter the story, the 
competition among scripts. Dostoevsky was a master at this development of multiple 
voices, which Bakhtin called polyphony. (Sarah Young (2004) offers an outstanding 
discussion of competitive scripting in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot and the Ethical 
Foundations of Narrative.) 
Seen in this light, “open encoding” is the telling of tales in which the master 
narrative has not pre-determined the actions and attitudes of the characters and the 
shadings of the setting. It is an encoding in which the accidents of creation are permitted 
to happen. This very openness to “accidents of creation” is a sort of creative ideology. It 
is not an outright rejection of scripting, but an awareness that the world is composed of 
competing scripts, all of them operating above the unscripted stuff of nature, attempting 
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to tame that nature, sometimes succeeding, sometimes being utterly defeated, but most 
often having subtle, unexpected, and even unintended consequences. 
Scripting, of course, takes place not only in works of art, but in political, cultural, 
and individual life. We are forever creating stories about our world and ourselves. When 
we gather a bit of power—whether the power of an older sibling, a titan of industry, or a 
President—we often consider it a right, or perhaps a duty, or maybe just an irresistible 
temptation, to make others subject to our scripts. On the grand scale, the competitive 
rough and tumble of human scripting does spin the tiller of history, but rarely in a 
direction prescribed by any single script. (This, of course, is one of the insights at the 
heart of Tolstoy’s War and Peace.)  
Totalitarianism consists in the attempt to administratively wipe out not only the 
humbling underlying inaccessible truths of time and nature, but also all competitive 
scripting about those truths. Marxism-Leninism could posit neither humbling truths nor 
competitive dialogue about them. It was an attempt to install a master narrative that 
dictated both the national dialogue and the sketch of the world in each individual mind. 
This is why the late-Stalinist insistence on “conflictlessness” in cinema was the 
apotheosis of Communist cultural hubris. It was an authorial attempt to erase 
contradictory words and images from Soviet life once and for all; dialectical materialism 
remained the religion of the realm, but the dialectic was a museum piece, in which all 
contradiction was pre-scripted by the master and the synthesis was a forgone conclusion, 
the end of dialectics. 
* * * 
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This dissertation examines the ways in which different scripts of memory and 
longing operated in the world of the Soviet cinematic Thaw. The key terms for this 
examination, suggested by Svetlana Boym in The Future of Nostalgia, are “restorative 
nostalgia” and “reflective nostalgia.” Boym is particularly interested in the link between 
nostalgia and national identity, and I discuss these links, as well as the deeper 
implications of reflective nostalgia, in the first section of this literature review. Next, I 
explore Henri Bergson’s phenomenological theories, which emphasize the centrality of 
memory in the way we perceive and process the material world. In Bergson’s vision, 
memory allows different temporalities to be contiguous and coexisting in the present 
moment; coexisting temporalities wind up in dialogue with one another and with the 
present moment. The next section discusses the integrity of the cinematic image within 
the narrative economy of a film, and gives particular attention to Deleuze’s “time image”. 
Subsequent sections include discussions of temporal layering, nostalgic commodification, 
and nostalgia as the longing for lost possibilities. The penultimate sections of the chapter 
include a critical discussion of recent literature on Soviet cinema. The chapter concludes 
with notes on methodology. 
2. Restorative and Reflective Nostalgia 
Benedict Anderson (2006) has argued that nationalism is characterized by 
“atavistic fantasizing”; communities create new conceptions of longed-for half-imaginary 
yesterdays as a source of legitimacy. No sooner does a grouping of people begin to define 
itself as a community than it casts its gaze backward in search of its very own 
mythological antiquity. This gaze is characterized by the longing for a lost sense of self, 
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longing that transforms the mental phenomenon of memory and the social phenomenon 
of history into the emotional phenomenon of nostalgia. But the backward glance needs 
not cover a distance of centuries, or even decades. The flow of time brings countless 
transitions to cultural and personal life, and our sense of loss can adhere to even the 
smallest units of time. At the most fundamental level, national and civic identity are 
experienced as personal identity, and it is the small perceptions of personal life that shape 
the way we define ourselves as individuals—the way we experience who we were, who 
we are now, what we value, and what we long for.  
Boym (2001) has argued eloquently that nostalgic longing is not a purely social 
process, but exists at the intersection of personal memory and social frameworks. In The 
Future of Nostalgia, she writes that the nostalgic backward glance can take two principle 
forms, roughly corresponding to the etymological fragments of the word “nostalgia” (the 
Greek nostos means “return home” and algia means “longing”):  Restorative nostalgia 
emphasizes nostos and “attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home.” It 
proposes to have a concrete idea of what this time or place looks like, a totalizing vision 
encompassing aesthetics, ideas, and the nature of relations within the half-imagined 
world. It is a form of “national memory that is based on a single plot of national 
identity”—a story of what was, how it was taken away, how it must be revived, and how 
efforts at revival are endangered by unpatriotic conspirators. Restorative nostalgia posits 
an us and a them—those who share the vision of revival, and those who stand in the way. 
Like most totalizing visions, restorative nostalgia functions in a highly coded manner; it 
loves symbols and knows precisely what they mean. It is a vast abstraction that redefines 
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our relationship with things in the world, a transparency overlaid on the map of life. It 
determines the very nature of seeing. 
Because it is a collective and programmatic vision, impossible to implement 
without leadership, restorative nostalgia is an attractive tool for leaders of movements 
and nations. It is one of the ironies of restorative nostalgia that what begins as a sense of 
dissatisfaction with the present—a resistance to the hegemony of the now—can be co-
opted by present leaders. Stalin realized this as early as the 1930s, when, in the wake of 
the bewildering modernisms of the Soviet ’20s, he fostered a nationwide boom in 
sanitized folk culture (Stites, 1992). His use of nostalgia as a leadership tool intensified 
during World War II—known in the Soviet Union as The Great Patriotic War—with 
appeals to the military, scientific, and even religious glories of the pre-Revolutionary 
past. Selective restorative nostalgic use of the patriotic archive continued, as we shall see, 
long after Stalin’s death. One must consider that at some point restorative nostalgia 
becomes no longer “nostalgia” at all—no longer an affect, but a strategy, a policy, an 
ideology. 19 
Boym’s second type of nostalgia is reflective nostalgia. Reflective nostalgia 
functions at the crossroads of individual consciousness and shared frameworks of 
memory. It emphasizes longing itself rather than the revival of the longed-for thing; it 
recognizes that what is lost does not come back in the same form; it “delays the 
homecoming,” writes Boym, “wistfully, ironically, desperately” (Boym, 2001, p. xiv). 
Reflective nostalgia, then, is a sort of spiritual suffering, the only treatment for which is 
                                                
19 Boym sees restorative, not reflective, nostalgia at the root of late-20th century national and religious 
revivals.  
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to think long and hard on “the ambivalences of human longing and belonging.” Those 
who suffer from reflective nostalgia are less likely than restorative nostalgics to see life 
as a pitched battle with modernity; they recognize life’s contradictions as a fact of 
existence, and engage their sense of longing by exploring “ways of inhabiting many 
places at once and imagining different time zones.” They are lovers of details, not 
symbols. They see their nostalgia as “an ethical and creative challenge” (Boym, 2001, p. 
xiv).  
Reflective nostalgics long for fractional shards of multiple pasts; they create from 
these shards numberless mosaics of past and present. They long not for the details typical 
of an era, but for those that have personal significance, idiosyncratic images latent in the 
mind and half-bleached by time. Sometimes one cannot find the image at all, only a 
yearning for a time before certain things became whatever they are. Reflective nostalgia, 
in this sense, is the creative ache of trying to remember that for which one has no 
memory-image, the flash on the horizon that disappeared before we could even be certain 
what it was. 20 
Boym’s categories present an interesting parallel to Adorno’s “identity thinking” 
and “dialectical thinking” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002). Like restorative nostalgia, 
identity thinking is consumed with the importance of abstract labels: the living 
phenomenon is compulsively re-framed as the symbolic marker, and along the way it is 
                                                
20 Restorative and reflective nostalgia as discussed here can be seen as distant points on a three-dimensional 
matrix of determinacy (the precision with which nostalgia knows what it wants), activity (the aim to 
actually restore the longed-for place or time), and totality (the breadth of social existence to be concretely 
transformed). At intermediate points in this matrix lie such familiar nostalgias as the impulse behind 
Disneyland’s Main Street USA, the passion for restoring classic cars, and the appreciation of vintage 
clothing.  
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freighted with imposed social significance. In Adorno’s view, the added symbolic freight 
almost always serves the interest of hegemonic forces in society. (Though today one can 
imagine oppositional identity thinking as well.) Dialectical thinking, on the other hand, 
embraces the concept of “contradiction,” which, according to Adorno, is a type of 
reflection—the will to see the world as it is, even if it contradicts the preferred symbolic 
model of the world. This way of seeing the image of life on its own terms is inherently 
open and liberating. Boym’s reflective nostalgia is characterized by this mode of seeing 
and remembering, and, in the arts, it shows itself in what Hall would call an open 
encoding of the represented world—that is, one much more available for negotiated or 
oppositional decoding.21 
Because of its embrace of both personal memory and multifaceted frameworks of 
collective memory, reflective nostalgia can often be a hallmark of complex artworks. In 
writing about the films of the “New Wave” in Soviet cinema that came during and after 
the Thaw, Herbert Marshall references the Soviet critical model of calling films that fell 
outside the thematic and stylistic precepts of socialist realism “difficult films” (Marshall, 
1992). These films often used poetic collage and Aesopian imagery rather than traditional 
narrative structure, and, crucially, often dealt with materials from the distant past. 
Marshall refers to the makers of such films collectively as “the Archaic School”—he 
includes Andrei Tarkovsky, Sergei Paradzhanov, Otar Ioseliani, and others. Their work 
was commonly attacked by the Soviet authorities as “intellectual cinema”; in their 
                                                
21 When we speak of created things, there are two instances of nostalgia—the nostalgia of the creator, who 
“encodes” his artifact with his or her own nostalgic longing, and the nostalgia of the person who beholds 
the artifact, which may be different than that of the creator (Hall, 1974). Reflective nostalgic encoding is 
likely to be more “open” and ambiguous than restorative-nostalgic encoding, and thus more inviting to a 
diverse range of affective and intellectual responses from the beholder. 
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capacity to bewilder the Soviet authorities, they had much in common with their aesthetic 
forefather, the great director of the Soviet silent era, Alexander Dovzhenko, who 
similarly meditated upon the images of disappearing and disappeared time, and was 
harshly critiqued for both formalism and “biologism”—the presentation of time and 
nature as not entirely subject to the will of man. Soviet regimes from the 1930s onward 
eagerly attempted to co-opt national feeling, but filmmakers who offered complex, 
reflective embodiments of such feeling were often marginalized or suppressed (Dunlop, 
1992) (Marshall, 1992). 
3. Bergson’s Philosophy of Perception and Memory 
Henri Bergson, the great French philosopher of the late 19th and early 20th 
century, is an important figure in my study of nostalgia, history, and creativity. Bergson 
was renowned in his time for his logically precise, compellingly written, and 
scientifically well-informed meditations on the roles of intuition, perception, and spirit in 
human consciousness. Bergson was a primary inspiration for the mid-century 
phenomenologist Maurice Mereau-Ponty, and after a period of eclipse his thought was 
brought into the spotlight once again in the closing decades of the 20th century by the 
philosopher Jacques Deleuze.22  
Bergson’s insight that memory is the determining factor in the way that we 
perceive, process, and communicate images in the world helps us link Boym’s reflective 
nostalgia to the creative process of filmmaking—which, at its base, is precisely the 
perception, processing, and communication of images. Bergson argues that the deeper 
                                                
22 Deleuze (1989) acknowledges Bergson’s profound influence on his conception of the cinematic “time 
image,” which I will discuss later in this chapter. 
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and broader the memory we “bring” to the perceptive act, the richer our perception of 
images will be. An open, reflective-nostalgic mind enables precisely the “indeterminate” 
depth and breadth of memory Bergson advocates. Bergson also posits a coexistence, or 
layering, of times, that is fundamental to my discussion of nostalgia for a “contiguous” 
past—that is, for a past that refuses to be truly past. (I will discuss temporal layering in 
greater detail later in this chapter.) Bergson acknowledges a central paradox of such 
coexistence when he writes that “the essence of time is that it goes by” and then proceeds 
to argue eloquently that the past is present in our every perceptive act: “The psychical 
state, then, that I call ‘my present,’” he writes, “must be both a perception of the 
immediate past and a determination of the immediate future” (Bergson, 1991, pp. 137-
138). The theory of perception Bergson maps out in his 1896 landmark Matter and 
Memory rewards a broad-based understanding, and the review that follows will give the 
reader some insight into my frame of reference in this study: 
 
At the root of Bergson’s conception of consciousness is the elementary and 
vaguely scandalous assertion that the universe exists (p. 63). This universe is a vast 
constellation of images; at the center of any individual’s world is an image of a special 
sort—the body. The body moves through space, acting upon and being acted upon by 
other images. It perceives these external images in two ways: The more primitive, and 
more important to survival, of these ways is determinate perception. The body perceives 
in an image of the external world exactly what it needs to perceive in order to 
successfully make its next move: When I see a falling branch above my head, the most 
important quality to perceive in the branch is the quality of falling; it matters very little 
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whether the branch is oak or birch, white or tan, whether the branch may have moss on its 
north side and a sizable knot on its south. In the moment, I am unlikely to recognize any 
of these qualities. I sense precisely what is necessary for the proper motor reaction—that 
is, to get out of the way of the falling branch. Out of necessity, the representation of the 
image or the branch in my mind is something much less than the reality of the image 
itself (p. 35). Consciousness does not add to an image; it must always subtract. 
Consciousness subtracts from the image in indeterminate perception as well. It 
simply subtracts less. The more sophisticated the brain of an organism, the more capable 
it is of perceiving more than is necessary for the simple (survival) motor reaction. In 
other words, higher intelligence means the capacity to perceive the functionally useless. 
(History is littered with connoisseurs of Bergsonian uselessness. Walter Benjamin (1999) 
spoke of the souvenir collector’s capacity to liberate things “from the drudgery of 
usefulness.” The contemplative intellectuals of the Russian 1840s earned for themselves 
the label “superfluous men”.) The Russian philosopher Aleksei Losev wrote that each 
image holds within it an entire universe of characteristics and connotations—indeed, its 
very own dialectic of ideas and counter ideas, shattering the Cartesian/Aristotelian 
dualism of object and idea (Lossky, 1952, pp. 292-297). If you seek an idea about a thing; 
it suffices to look intensely at the thing. Losev’s concept dovetails nicely with Bergson’s 
indeterminate perception: Any worldly image has more within it than we can possibly 
process. Indeed, our effectiveness as bodies in action demands that our perception 
subtracts from the object. But when we have both the sophistication of intellect and the 
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luxury of reflection—in other words, when the branch is not falling—we have the 
capacity to perceive more in an object than is strictly necessary. 
We process the image in two immediate ways. First, we process in order to act in 
relation to the external world. We can get out of the way of the branch, we can catch the 
branch, we can shout for help once the branch has struck us and opened an impressive 
gash in our head. Second, once we have perceived the image, and perhaps attempted to 
act in relation to the external world, we sense the internal action of our body. This action 
is processed as affect. We feel pain. We feel fear. Perhaps, when no one comes to help, 
we feel sadness, or even regret that we have so few helpful friends. The image of the 
external world has called upon the image at the center of the world—that is our body—to 
act internally upon itself. 
A perceived image becomes part of our trove of pure, or virtual, memories. These 
memories are essential to all future perception. In Bergson’s model, perception and 
memory are mutually constituted: stirred by a new perception of a worldly image, the 
relevant pure memory “comes out to meet” the image. Upon this meeting, the memory is 
no longer pure or virtual, or even memory—it is an active phenomenon, the “memory-
image,” which completes the perception, fleshes it out, provides it meaning and context. 
Upon our very first childhood perception of a stove, we do not know it is a stove, but as 
we acquire a store of memories of the stove, our perceptions of it are completed by those 
memories: It is a stove. It is hot. Mother uses it to make food. I should not touch it when 
mother is using it to make food, because that is precisely the moment when it is hot. 
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Some memories lead us directly to action, without creating the representation of 
an image in our mind: These memories are nothing more than habits, appropriate learned 
reactions to familiar objects or constellations of objects in the external world. Other 
memories form pictures—these are the result of attentive perception. Attentive 
perception, writes Bergson, “involves a reflection…the projection, outside ourselves, of 
an actively created image, identical with, or similar to, the object upon which it comes to 
mold itself” (p. 102). 
Bergson argues that memories are not stored as images in the brain. In their 
virtual, or pure, form, accumulated recollections do not have sensory detail, only the 
capacity, when activated by current perceptions, to call upon the sensory centers of the 
brain to reconstruct imagery in the present. The mind’s eye, then, sees in a memory not 
the past, but an image being created at that very moment by diverse sensory centers at the 
distant reaches of the brain.23 
* * * 
Bergson locates the body between past and future, image and action. It is, he says 
“that part of my duration which is in the process of growth.” (138) The body, in short, is 
the place where we feel the flux of the material world. But what is this material world? 
Matter, Bergson writes, is “a present which is always beginning again” (138). 
That is, insensate matter is that which repeats, or “acts” its past, while a living thing is 
that which acts anew, and thus brings change (beyond geological change) to the material 
                                                
23 This is not only in accordance with recent neurological science (see Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio 
Tononi’s Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (2001)); it also presupposes artistic forms that 
accept that the images of past and present are layers in a unified spatio-temporal environment: Memory is 
the mind’s present, not its past. 
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world (itself included). Useful motion depends on our recognition of the matter that 
surrounds us; recognition is the process that permits us to compare our immediate 
perception of matter to our acquired, generalized understanding of what things are. 
Without this comparison, living things are condemned to forever react to the world only 
through uninformed guesswork. More advanced brains are those which make more 
intensive use of memory: that is, they not only react and move, but reflect, bringing ever 
more memory to bear on the imagery of the material world. Our ability to perceive the 
complexity of the material world increases in proportion to the amount of memory we 
utilize in the act of perception: in this way, perception becomes reflection. The present 
perception, which is always technically a memory (“the remembered present,” as 
Edelman and Tononi (p. 107) call it), becomes an image mediated by thought, a 
coordinated complex of richly grasped sight, sound, smell and touch, accompanied by 
conceptual understanding, affective response, and even doubt. 
Our capacity to sense such heterogeneity in the material world is not a given: it is, 
rather, an ingenious solution we impose on the continuity of matter in the universe. Since 
matter occupies our entire sensory world—air and object alike—our minds must, for the 
sake of our own survival, learn how to perceive strict boundaries between material 
objects that, in reality, blur into one another like shades in a rainsplattered watercolor. 
This blurring of boundaries reflects the reality of the material universe: What we call 
“space” is a limitless and indivisible vibration of matter; there are no breaks between 
matter, no emptiness, no place we can declare the end of matter. There is only ceaseless 
vibration, the hum of creation. 
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Our minds impose a similar, and even more artificial, disciplining grid on time. 
Actual duration, Bergman writes, has no “instants”; a motion that takes place in time and 
space is indivisible; it is not a series of mini-movements that can be measured in units of 
distance and time. A movement is not a movement at all if we impose these imaginary 
subdivisions upon it: What is half a movement? An eighth of a movement? To imagine 
the point at which to measure fractional movement, we must impose an imaginary 
cessation of the movement in time and space, an interruption to its duration at which we 
match it up to an imaginary time-grid with arbitrary but agreed-upon units (Bergson calls 
this “homogeneous time”) and an imaginary space with equally arbitrary units grafted 
upon the essential continuity and indivisibility of space. The divisible line one would 
draw to graph a movement in time and space cannot represent actual movement and 
“duration in its flow” (191); it can only symbolize the duration to make it more 
convenient for our use.  
Bergson does not condemn the use of these imaginary and arbitrary time-space 
grids; they are essential to facilitate our effective action within and upon the material 
universe; action becomes almost incomprehensible without them. But, he argues, if we 
are to speak about true knowledge, and to attempt to understand the nature of how man 
survives, thrives, and ultimately goes beyond surviving and thriving to reflect and create, 
we must be willing to admit that we have created a world of minutes and miles as a tool, 
that nature in reality unfolds not in homogeneous time and space but in movements that 
occupy certain durations in undivided space, and that these durations may—depending on 
the nature, capacities and needs of the being perceiving them—appear to stretch or 
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contract to infinite lengths or imperceptible flashes. (This is precisely what cinema does 
with time.) “Imaginary homogeneous time,” writes Bergson, “is…an idol of language, a 
fiction… In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many 
different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of 
different kinds of consciousness and thereby fix their respective places in the scale of 
being.” (p. 207) 
If what we call space and time are, in actuality, continuous motion and indivisible 
duration, they become extraordinarily supple conceptions for the reflective mind. Our 
indeterminate perception can draw more from the motion of matter, allowing more 
memory to pour forth into the moment of perception—bringing, indeed, the entire plane 
of individual memory to bear upon the object under examination. (Bergson (1991, pp. 
152, 162) provides insightful diagrams to illustrate this penetration of matter by 
memory.) As we do this, the pure memory is activated, the various sensory centers of our 
brain generate inner sight and sound and smell, and what was virtual and image-less is 
coordinated among the parallel systems of the brain to form a “memory-image”—a 
present internal image composed of perceptions of the past.  
Bergson’s conception of  “virtual” memory consists of sensory traces of the past, 
disbursed to distant nodes of the individual brain, which are summoned by a stimulus and 
cobbled into a “memory image” (p. 163). The neuroscientists Edelman and Tononi 
describe a strikingly similar process called “reentry”—“the ongoing, recursive 
interchange of parallel signals between reciprocally connected areas of the brain, an 
interchange that continually coordinates the activities of these areas’ maps to each other 
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in space and time” (Edelman & Tononi, 2001, p. 48). They compare the cobbling 
together of an image in the mind to a chamber quartet playing without a score, with each 
musician (read: parts of the brain) instinctively responding to cues from the others to 
create a unique whole.24 
Bergson’s memory image, the remembered past, informs, interacts, and contrasts 
with the newly perceived image, the “remembered present” that we see before us. The 
more intently we look upon the images of the material world, the more we can extend the 
tension of our memory, breaking with the generic, imposed rhythms of homogeneous 
time and space. We have torn the transparency that human consciousness, for eminently 
practical reasons, has laid over time and space, and replaced it with one of our own 
individual making. This is what happens when we become “lost in thought” or experience 
seemingly interminable “instants”. It is why sometimes, in moments of contemplation we 
may find that “time has gotten away” from us. (In reality, it is we who have gotten away 
from “time”.) This variant tension of memory also explains why, in moments of intense 
concentration, we may experience in our mind an extraordinarily rich and lengthy 
internal duration during a patch of homogeneous time in which the hands on our watch 
have scarcely moved. 
For Bergson, the essence of sentient life is movement, and the essence of 
movement is the solidarity of past and present (p. 218). The life-form that is slave to 
necessity must impose discipline on this solidarity, narrowing the sieve through which 
                                                
24 This image, in turn, is a fascinating echo of the 19th century Slavophile intellectual Konstantin 
Aksakovs’s description of unity-in-diversity, or sobornost, in the peasant commune as a choir in which 
each voice retains its utter uniqueness but the voices, attuned to one another, come together in utter 
harmony. 
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past can inform present; such a being hasn’t the luxury of seeing more than needs to be 
seen, and cannot countenance the indeterminacy of coexisting and conflicting images of 
time: The environment cannot be permitted to exhibit more than its most relevant and 
immediate traits, and the memory is useful only to the extent that it provides useful crib-
notes to these traits—notes that enable us to recognize, classify, recall useful responses, 
and react.  
But Bergson is interested in the outer boundaries, or perhaps the boundlessness, of 
human consciousness. If space and time are best seen as the duration of movement—the 
duration of the action of matter upon matter—then the division of past and present 
become less relevant. The action of our mind upon the world consists in perceiving 
matter in a particular way; this perception draws on previously perceived images that 
have now become present once more as memory-images. Thus the past becomes an 
active part of the present. It has made itself real in its action upon the world. Granted, this 
form of action is less easily diagrammed and symbolized as a motion across measurable 
homogeneous space and time, but it is an action: The mind—itself represented in space as 
matter—i.e., the brain—moves. The human brain is a veritable hive of movement, an 
extraordinarily active bit of matter, and never more so than when it is making copious use 
of the memory image: Consciousness, Bergman argues, moves constantly back and forth 
between the demands of present perception and the memory-images that can more deeply 
inform that perception.25 This internal movement engages an ever-greater number of 
                                                
25 This constitutive process is another element of the theory of reentry developed by Edelman and Tononi 
(2001) many decades later. 
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memories, calling upon them either because of their similarity to the perceived image or 
contiguity with the similar memory. 
The apparent complexity of Bergson’s thought has at its core the beautiful 
simplicity of corresponding to our own consciousness of the way our minds work: I order 
a cup of coffee and look around the old cafe, I remember a distant day in a similar place, 
I recall a moment that took place just before we went to the cafe—my small son and a 
little girl playing on a windblown, deserted blacktop playground beneath the scorching 
desert sun; I remember the sound of the tetherball chains, the balls themselves long since 
removed, clanging against the poles; I recall a story I once wrote with a similar 
concluding image, a story I was proud of, which I ought to have published but never did; 
I feel a sense of regret sweep over me, and then, a sense of determination to write once 
more. 
The usefulness of my resolve to write again can be debated; what is clear, though, 
is that the impact of memory upon perception has utterly transformed my experience of 
the “present” moment in the café. A present that, in its most determinate sense, ought to 
have consisted in me taking my coffee from the counter, being conscious not to spill it 
upon myself, and drinking it, was turned into a present in which I perceived not only the 
hot mug in my hands, but the clanging chains of my son’s early childhood and my own 
creative regret, events spanning ten years in homogeneous time but at this very moment 
coexisting as the present action of my mind in response to the cues of the material world. 
The memories are not an adjunct to my perception of the coffee shop, but an integral part 
of my perception of the shop. My consciousness has managed to find a rhythm of 
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duration different from the homogeneous, measurable rhythms that purely determinate 
perception would have required. I have, in these few moments, contracted time and made 
seemingly disparate scenes share the present moment. I have freed myself from the 
rhythms of necessity. 
Bergson spends much of Matter and Memory arguing against both materialism 
and idealism. He writes with scientific precision and a pronounced taste for the logically 
verifiable. Nonetheless, what he seeks in the end is to demonstrate the union of body and 
soul, and he apprehends in memory the unmistakable stamp of the divine. Memory, 
Bergson writes, allows our consciousness to contract “ a growing number of external 
moments in its present duration”; in doing so, it intensifies our experience of life. The 
memory-image gives us greater access to, and insight into, the implications of the 
material world, and enables us to break free from the responses of the automaton. It gives 
us the liberty to perceive matter and react to it in the unexpected and idiosyncratic ways 
that bring meaning to life and dynamism to the world. “Spirit borrows from matter the 
perceptions on which it feeds,” Bergson writes, “and restores them to matter in the form 
of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom” (p. 249). 
4. The Image 
In classical cinema—that is, the Hollywood model—the individual image often 
has little integrity of its own: It is a sort of commodity within the narrative economy; it is 
significant only insofar as it impacts the cause-and-effect relationship between shots, 
preparing the spatial and dramatic ground for the next cinematic visceral shock. In 
writing about the work of the postwar Italian neorealists, André Bazin noted that 
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something new had come along: The images Vittorio DeSica captured on film appeared 
to be closer to life than any Bazin had ever seen; this new kind of image functioned less 
as a coded sign within an artfully constructed parallel reality than as an “asymptote of 
reality,” an index of the real material thing, which contained within it and made available 
to the contemplative viewer an entire universe of often contradictory meanings (Bazin, 
2004, p. 82).  
Gilles Deleuze further developed this notion: The “movement image” of classical 
cinema had impacted viewers chiefly at the motor level, the level of shock; its purpose 
was functional—to orient the viewer within the spatial world of the cinematic action, an 
orientation without which shock was impossible. Deeply influenced by Bergson, Deleuze 
believed that in the postwar era a new kind of image had emerged—the time image, the 
purpose of which was to capture duration—to present a moment of existence as it unfolds 
in time. Deleuze’s description of the “crystal image”—part of his rich taxonomy of the 
time image—establishes that the image is not simply the site at which a single time 
unfolds, but in which all times simultaneously unfold, where past coexists with present: 
“What we see in the crystal is no longer the empirical progression of time as succession 
of presents,” he writes, “nor its indirect representation as interval or as whole; it is its 
direct presentation, its constitutive dividing in two into a present which is passing and a 
past which is preserved, the strict contemporaneity of the present with the past that it will 
be, of the past with the present that it has been” (Deleuze, 1989, p. 274). 
The time image is significant for the study of restorative and reflective nostalgia 
in the cinema: Like Bazin’s notion of the image as an “asymptote of reality,” the time 
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image is inherently polysemic. It is often a long take, giving the viewer time for 
contemplation. The duration of the shot permits us to see more than a symbolic or iconic 
representation of reality; we see through the icon and glimpse a photographed object, 
captured in time; indeed, we see time act upon the object and, if the object is a living 
being, we see it act within time.  This is a profound experience, and the image is spared 
from winding up a mere commodity within the narrative economy, its integrity subsumed 
by its structural role. The image is given room to be more of what it is, with all the 
associative richness and multiplicity that implies. Meanwhile, we as viewers are given 
room to perceive the image more deeply, to bring more memory to bear on the act of 
perception. Thus the time image, with its invitation to thought and its resistance to easy 
symbolic usage, is an ideal vehicle for the nuanced expression of reflective nostalgia. The 
time image is a vehicle for open encoding, and reflective nostalgia, by its very nature, is 
an emotional register that cannot be expressed in closed encoding. 
Whereas restorative nostalgia feeds off the image with a fixed meaning, reflective 
nostalgia sees in each image a complex emotional world: the object of longing carries 
with it the mysteries and obfuscations of lost time; this is part of what makes it so 
tantalizing, and so impossible to simply restore. If the restorative-nostalgic image is a 
symbol for an imposed concept, the reflective-nostalgic image is an index of lost time 
itself. As we have seen, Losev conceived of the material artifact as containing within 
itself the entire idea-thing dialectic, upon which no meaning needs be imposed from 
outside, and within which resides an infinite number of diverse meanings (Lossky, 1952, 
pp. 292-295). He has a worthy heir in the great Soviet director Andrei Tarkovsky, who 
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made well known his preference for the self-contained image to the symbol, which attains 
significance only through imposed meanings. “Everything is real,” Tarkovsky told Hervé 
Guibert of Le Monde (Gianvito, 2006, p. 86). An image, he continued, “possesses the 
same distinguishing characteristics as the world it represents. An image—as opposed to a 
symbol—is indefinite in meaning. One cannot speak of the infinite world by applying 
tools that are definite and finite” (Bielawski). Tarkovsky believed that this indefinite, or 
indeterminate, image allowed his films to be “co-creations” between filmmaker and 
audience (Tarkovsky, 1986). It is no coincidence that Tarkovsky was, as Deleuze himself 
says, one of the greatest innovators of the time image (Deleuze, 1989, p. 42). Indeed, 
years before Deleuze published Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Tarkovsky wrote a landmark 
essay in the journal Problems of Cinema Art defining cinema as “imprinted time” 
(Tarkovsky, 1967). He developed his ideas further in Sculpting in Time (1986), using as a 
starting point Basho’s Haiku: 
 
The old pond was still 
A frog jumped in the water 
And a splash was heard 
 
Reeds cut for thatching 
The stumps now stand forgotten 
Sprinkled with soft snow 
 
Why this lethargy? 
They could hardly wake me up. 
Spring rain pattering. 
 
For Tarkovsky, the organic merger of image and time in these lines point toward a 
cinematic ideal.  
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How simply and accurately life is observed. What 
discipline of mind and nobility of imagination. The lines 
are beautiful, because the moment, plucked out and fixed, 
is one, and falls into infinity. The Japanese poets knew how 
to express their visions of reality in three lines of 
observation. They did not simply observe it, but with 
supernal calm sought its ageless meaning. And the more 
precise the observation, the nearer it comes to being 
unique, and so to being an image (pp. 106-107).  
 
It is important to understand, though, that for Tarkovsky the cinematic image presents not 
simply the fact of an object, but the filmmaker’s perception of the object.  
In cinema it is all the more the case that observation is the 
first principle of the image, which always has been 
inseparable from the photographic record. The film image 
is made incarnate, visible and four-dimensional. But by no 
means every film shot can aspire to being an image of the 
world; as often as not it merely describes some specific 
aspect. Naturalistically recorded facts are in themselves 
utterly inadequate to the creation of the cinematic image. 
The image in cinema is based on the ability to present as an 
observation one’s own perception of an object (p. 107).  
 
A Bergsonian account would argue that Tarkovsky brings a very deep store of memory 
forth to meet the perceived object, enabling him to look more deeply into the object and 
glimpse facets of it that no one else could see. 
In his comments on Lev Tolstoy’s “The Death of Ivan Ilich,” Tarkovsky makes 
explicit his belief in the constitutive relationship between image and memory. When 
Tolstoy’s dying protagonist sees a glimmer of light, he wants to say to his wife and 
daughter, “Forgive me”; instead he says, “Let me through.” Tarkovsky sees in this 
crystallized moment the essence of the open image, which reveals itself in countless ways 
depending on the memories of the beholder: “Clearly that image, which shakes us to the 
very depths of our being, cannot be interpreted in one way only,” he writes. “Its 
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associations reach far into our innermost feelings, reminding us of some obscure 
memories or experiences of our own, stunning us, stirring our souls like a revelation” (p. 
108). 
* * * 
Yevgeny Margolit (2001, p. 37) has pointed out that one of the innovations of 
Thaw cinema is the use of the “subjective camera,” which “deconventionalizes … 
traditional, familiar conceptions of the world.” This deconventionalization permits a form 
of longing different from, and opposed to, the hegemonic forms. There are many things 
from the past one can long for, and many ways to long for them, but conventional 
symbols of the past are encoded with preferred meanings that attempt to restrict the 
viewer’s reading.  
This brings us back to Bergson’s determinate and indeterminate perception. In 
determinate perception, as we have seen, we perceive an image in the world only to the 
degree that is useful to us; there may be more to the image, but since that “something 
more” is unnecessary, we never even perceive it. Indeterminate perception is of a higher 
order, in which we begin to perceive that which is not immediately useful, including the 
ambiguities and contradictions in an image, and store the image in memory for the 
reprocessing and recollection that is the stuff of thought (Bergson, 1991). These concepts 
have important implications for cinematic nostalgia: The symbolic image and the 
movement image have specific purposes and are to be perceived instrumentally by the 
viewer, who implicitly understands what to take from the image. The time image, on the 
other hand, permits the indeterminate perception of the image—summoned by the 
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filmmaker from personal and cultural memory, defamiliarized by the camera, and 
reprocessed in the memory of the viewer. This distinction between types of cinematic 
image underpins two very different registers of longing: restorative and reflective 
nostalgia. 
5. The Layering of Time 
Anderson (2006) argues that pre-modern societies regarded time and space as a 
virtually unified field, a conception of “sacred time” in which all that is holy exists today 
and has always existed; a village’s past, for instance, is palpably present in its present. 
Temporal difference resides not in the difference between last year and this year, but 
between an ordinary day and a holiday. Only with the arrival of print capitalism did this 
conception of time begin to give way to “empty homogeneous time” in which the content 
of time was no longer spoken for: Subject to the dynamism and disturbance of capitalism, 
today was no longer essentially a copy of yesterday, and tomorrow’s realities could not 
be more or less reliably read in advance. The drive toward productivity and progress 
meant that today had to replace yesterday, and the still-empty and unknown tomorrow 
would have to replace today (Anderson, 2006, pp. 22-25).  
Under Anderson’s conception, nostalgia would be unlikely in a pre-modern 
society; how can one long for a bygone time if time, in the modern sense, does not go by? 
Nostalgia, meanwhile, became first a disease of the mobile individual and later a 
Romantic preoccupation of modern societies. If restorative nostalgia stresses the 
Romantic search for national identity, reflective nostalgia is closer to the temporal-spatial 
homesickness identified by the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer, who coined the term 
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“nostalgia” in 1688. In the face of relentlessly passing time one longs for the moments 
that have slipped away without having been properly appreciated or fully explored.  
Panofsky (1960, p. 112) and Billington (1970, p. 634) have argued that nostalgia 
begins precisely when historical continuity and, perhaps more importantly, contiguity, 
has been lost. To paraphrase Panofsky’s elegant formulation, only when one has realized 
that Pan is dead does one trouble oneself about the resurrection of Pan. Nostalgic 
appropriators, Panofsky believes, are cut off from the traditions they appropriate. But it is 
precisely the peculiar survival of the seemingly lost—the contiguity of the past—that 
sparks the nostalgic affective response. Our shadowy awareness of a lost-but-present past 
fuels our recollection and reformulation of its imagery. Presence does not preclude 
nostalgia: What is present often feels simultaneously lost, and that what is lost often feels 
hauntingly present. Time—particularly in Russia—never became as homogeneous and 
empty as Anderson’s thesis might have us believe. In his landmark essay on Dostoevsky, 
Bahktin emphasized the remarkable contiguity of seemingly irreconcilable “historical” 
types in late 19th-century Russia, where capitalism had entered the social fray as an alien 
force, inserting its efficiencies and demands for communication across both classes and 
territorial expanses into a culture where since the time of Peter I, classes had developed in 
a sort of splendid isolation from one another.26 For Bakhtin, the signal accomplishment of 
Dostoevsky’s work was to represent the productive dialogic relationship between the 
                                                
26 The late historian Donald Treadgold once pointed out that Alexander Pushkin and Serpaphim of Sarov—
Russia’s greatest poet and its greatest saint—had been contemporaries without knowing of one another’s 
existence. 
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thrown-together figures of these different worlds (Morris, 1994). One might even say that 
Dostoevsky portrayed the dialogic relationship between different times.  
This relationship was often rich with nostalgic longing. Holy Russia, the Russia of 
Christian ethics, was not a phantom in the time of Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin, the hero 
of The Idiot. On the contrary, the 1861 liberation of the serfs had injected the peasant 
commune into the forefront of intellectual discourse. The worlds of the peasant and of 
Orthodox faith (reflexively connected in the mind of the 1860s intelligentsia) were for the 
erstwhile Russian gentry at once present and cut off. Myshkin’s longing for Christian 
simplicity is fueled by the simultaneous presence and lost-ness of simple Christians. And 
Nastassia Filippovna’s fierce and self-devouring longing for Myshkin himself is a kind of 
nostalgia for the historically (and, for her, biographically) lost goodness that he 
represents. He is a flesh-and-blood embodiment of historical contiguity, a merger of the 
demonstrably present and the irrevocably lost. 
Time, then, becomes layered, and nostalgia is the emotional embodiment of 
communication between the layers. The layers of time retain independent “voices”, 
offering themselves up across the gulf, sparking memory, longing, desire. Bakhtin lauded 
Dostoevsky for refraining from dominating and determining the voices and actions of his 
characters, for letting them enter into a fray with one another and spark sincere reactions 
and discoveries. This polyphony of characters’ voices is also a polyphony of times—a 
choir of images and memories from past and present colliding in the moment and 
sparking potent longing among the characters. Here Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope—the 
time-space upon which characters must live their lives—collides with his notion of 
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polyphony to create a polyphony not only of characters, but contiguous chronotopes: 
chronotopic polyphony.27 
We see this very dialogue of eras in the intellectual-artistic life of the Soviet 
Thaw. Vladimir Paperny (2002), in his cultural history of Soviet architecture, Culture 
Two: Architecture in the Age of Stalin, writes that the culture of the Soviet 1920s and 
1960s were both future-oriented and fueled by the notion of rupture with the past. But 
while it is true that Thaw intellectuals sought a rupture with the Stalinist past, with its 
emphasis on grandiose Russo-classicism, they did not reject all pasts. “There is a curious 
peculiarity of the futurological wave of the 1960s,” writes Paperny, 
It perceived itself to be precisely the second wave. It did 
not strive to cremate all of the past, but only that which was 
burned by the 1920s; thus, the 1920s themselves become 
for the new wave the starting point of the future. Moreover, 
this new wave was most aggressive toward the epoch that 
divided it from the 1920s,that is, toward Culture Two. In 
the realm of politics this was expressed in the idea of a 
“return to the norms of Lenin”; in the sphere of spatial 
thought, in the new interest given to the avant-garde of the 
1920s (Paperny, 2002, p. 24). 
 
The intellectuals of the Thaw rejected one past by embracing another past, by summoning 
the longed-for memory-image of the vibrant 1920s and making it active in the cultural 
                                                
27 The polyphonic dialogue of chronotopes both stirs and is stirred by nostalgic longing. In these pages I 
use the term nostalgia interchangeably with temporal longing and chronotopic longing, the longing for 
particular junctures of time and space. A Bergsonian approach to chronotopic longing has several 
theoretical implications: (1) Time-space is indivisible; the past is embedded in our experience of the 
present. Today’s chronotope includes within it the gifts of other times and places. (2) The gifts of any 
remembered time-space, however, are infinitely divisible, according to the needs and perceptions of the 
individual. The longing mind does not necessarily long for all of the facets of a given chronotope. It picks 
and chooses. (3) Chronotopic longing implies longing for a deeper experience of the present space and 
time. (4) The gift of human communication gives us access to chronotopes beyond our immediate 
experience. (5) The longing individual imports the gifts of other chronotopes into one’s own lived 
experience. We constantly reshape our chronotope through dialogue with other chronotopes. 
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enterprise of the Soviet ’60s. The past was made present; artists of the 1960s, nostalgic 
for the 1920s (whether they had experienced them or not) managed to resurrect and 
reprocess images of a lost past and layer them onto the present. The artists of the Thaw 
believed that the Stalin era had cut off the continuity of the creative ethic of the 1920s, 
but through their nostalgia for an imaginary Leninism they managed to make the past 
contiguous with the present, and this contiguity generated a fruitful dialogue between the 
two epochs. 
6. Nostalgia, Postmodernism, and Commodification 
Reflective nostalgia is very different from the sort of postmodern nostalgia 
derided by Frederic Jameson (1991). Postmodern nostalgia emphasizes the re-use of 
commodified forms in the creation of market-friendly pastiche; Boym’s concept of 
reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, emphasizes affect, the feeling of longing. 
Reflective nostalgia is not the commodification of forms but the exploration of a non-
commodified space where time and matter can be appreciated apart from Benjamin’s 
“drudgery of usefulness.” In restorative nostalgia, on the other hand, old forms do suffer 
from both economic and ideological commodification, becoming useful in both trade and 
politics.28  
Both kinds of nostalgia collage the old into the new, but restorative nostalgia 
imports determinate public meanings—ideological superstructures with precise aims—
                                                
28 One could say that Boym’s reflective nostalgia is precisely the longing for an emotional counterpoint 
(perhaps embodied only in the memory image itself) to the rampaging processes of displacement, 
abstraction, and commodification; it is the yearning for a meaningful, contemplative, and specific 
relationship with spaces and times. This is not to say that cultural artifacts encoded with reflective nostalgia 
can never become commodified; within the world art film market, Tarkovsky films became a niche 
commodity. But at the heart of Tarkovsky’s nostalgia was personal longing, not the desire to engage a 
useful past as a tool or bludgeon. 
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into the present, while reflective nostalgia collides cultural forms and indeterminate 
private meanings. These private meanings often concern the relationship between private 
and public worlds, but they are idiosyncratic rather than ideological, based more on 
affective longing than on programmatic restorative social goals. The memory shards 
imported into the reflective-nostalgic collage are thinner, more delicate, more 
multifaceted, and more subtly integrated into the present than the sizable chunks of 
refurbished masonry brought into the restorative nostalgic collage. Reflective nostalgia 
has the slipperiness of memory, while restorative nostalgia has the sturdiness of social 
myth.  
Boym does not distinguish Western postmodern commodity-nostalgia from 
restorative and reflective nostalgia. As a thought exercise, though, one might look at 
Warhol’s Campbell’s cans, or Lamplight Village, a 1990s neo-craftsman housing 
development on the outskirts of Las Vegas, Nevada, and call whatever “nostalgia” they 
express heavier than reflective nostalgia but lighter and nimbler than ideological 
restorative nostalgia. In some cases commodity-nostalgia may be more closely located to 
either of the other types on a sliding scale (Warhol would be closer to indeterminate 
reflective nostalgia, and the housing development—with its purposeful evocation of a 
“simpler time”—closer to determinate-ideological restorative nostalgia). But commodity 
nostalgia often lacks both the ideological determinacy of restorative nostalgia and the 
deeply personal affective longing of reflective nostalgia. 
It is important to remember that restorative and reflective nostalgia are not 
categories of good and evil. Restorative nostalgia may lack the sense of shimmering 
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possibility and deeply personal emotionality that animates reflective nostalgia, but it is 
not necessarily negative. It depends what the nostalgia is for. Nostalgia for Dickensian 
Christmas imagery is not the same as, say, nostalgia for Stalinist monumentalism and the 
time of “the firm hand.”  The nuance can go further: Kipling nostalgia may be longing for 
Kipling-style adventure and exploration alone—or it can be longing for adventure, 
exploration, and the power relations of colonialism. (Some might argue that longing for 
the former is necessarily longing for the latter. But it seems fair to say that the longing to 
join Riki-Tiki-Tavi in fetes of derring-do may not always imply an embrace of British 
imperialism.) If in the pages that follow, restorative nostalgia begins to look irredeemably 
bad, this is a function of the context with which we are working, where restorative 
nostalgia was often a useful tool of Stalin and post-Stalin conservatives to preach a 
gospel of autocracy, statist glory, national exceptionalism, reflexive anti-Westernism, 
and, in some cases, anti-Semitism. 
We should also remember that an audience’s affect may not match a producer’s 
affect—or the producer’s strategic attempt to beget a particular audience affect. A 
producer may attempt to encode work in such a way that it evokes emotion X, but our 
perception, under the influence of our own memory associations, may lead us instead to 
emotion Y. In other words, we as decoders may encounter an artifact that appears to the 
critic’s eye to have been encoded with restorative nostalgia and proceed to process it in a 
reflective-nostalgic way, replete with indeterminate, personal longing. Boym, for 
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example, sees the reconstructed Cathedral of Christ the Savior29 in central Moscow and 
the re-landscaped, fairy-tale themed Alexandrovsky Garden outside the Kremlin, as 
perverse examples of restorative nostalgia. And there is every possibility that Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov championed these projects precisely to evoke a sense of imperial 
grandeur church-state unity, and mystical national rootedness. But do the thousands of 
families who mill through the church grounds and the garden (with its meandering 
simulacrum of the long buried Neglinnaya River) really find themselves cast into a 
restorative-nostalgic reverie on Great Russian exceptionalism? Perhaps, instead, they 
wind up reflecting on time-befogged memory-sensations of what it feels like to be in a 
celebratory public space as a child with one’s parents, or as a young suitor, or as a lonely 
adolescent. The idea of open public space lodges in the young mind even when the public 
spaces of one’s youth were not really all that open; it is an ideal of city life that we 
manage to grab as a cherished, if inflated image, and utilize for comparison for all our 
lives (we do the same with childhood forests, lakes, and mountains).  
The sense of being in a public space, both alone with one’s own brimming 
sensations and together with the crowd, is one of the great imaginative gifts of urban 
childhood; it gives us our first notions of sobornost—all those different faces and strides 
and moods, all the unpatterned crisscrosses that seem somehow to conceal a pattern—an 
old man goes this way, a young woman that, a boy in glasses passes between them and 
                                                
29 Construction of the original structure, whose purpose was to commemorate Russia’s 1812 victory over 
Napoleon, began in 1839. The cathedral was finally completed and consecrated in 1883 (Filatev, n.d.-b). 
Stalin demolished the cathedral in 1931 to make way for a grandiose Palace of the Soviets. The palace was 
never built; Khrushchev built a large circular public pool on the site (Filatev, n.d.-a). In the 1990s, Boris 
Yeltsin and Yuri Luzhkov championed the reconstruction of the cathedral, and major construction was 
completed with extraordinary speed between 1995 and 1998. The rebuilt cathedral was consecrated in 2000 
(Filatev, n.d.-c). 
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seems for a moment to be coming straight toward you, somehow agitated, full of promise 
or threat, and then, hearing his mother’s worried sing-song, he scampers off. All of this—
and not dreams of the conquest of Kazan—may come to mind in Moscow’s new 
“restorative-nostalgic” spaces. We cannot assume that monumental public space puts its 
users into an ideologically monumentalist state of mind. And, while it is advisable to 
keep old things standing, with the pockmarks of time intact, it is also reductive to 
imagine that restorative simulacra are incapable of evoking reflective nostalgia. Nostalgic 
longing is not programmed to haughtily distinguish between reality and simulacra. And 
simulacra, once they are realized in space, take on their own reality. When my son was 
four years old, I took him to Disneyland. On Main Street USA, I felt intensely nostalgic. I 
was not nostalgic for the mores and gender roles of small-town late-19th-century 
America. I was nostalgic for my own childhood half-dream of celebratory public space. 
* * * 
 
A central critique of nostalgia, then, is that it replaces some “true” past with a 
false one, painful memory with sanitized imagery. Linda Hutcheon (1998) writes that the 
past summoned by nostalgia is not the past as we have experienced it but rather as we 
have idealized it through the lens of longing. Nostalgia, she writes, “is less about the past 
than about the present. It operates through what Mikhail Bakhtin called an‘historical 
inversion’: the ideal that is not being lived now is projected into the past. It is 
‘memorialized’ as past, crystallized into precious moments selected by memory, but also 
by forgetting, and by desire’s distortions and reorganizations.” This tendency toward 
distortion, though, is not always irredeemably negative; nor is it always escapist. 
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Hutcheon writes that the trajectory of distortion leads us to construct a “simple, pure, 
ordered, easy, beautiful, or harmonious past.” But our nostalgia, on the contrary, is often 
for a time of adventure, a time when we felt in some way more alive, when there were not 
fewer possibilities, but more. We connect to images of pain, anxiety, uncertainty and 
hardship with a peculiar sense that these very images signified the openness of time. 
When we are nostalgic for childhood or adolescence, we do not so much smooth over all 
the passion and chaos as find something to cherish in it. This is not a sanitizing of the 
images themselves, but a tacit judgment in how to emotionally perceive these images. 
Here Bakhtin’s historical inversion does indeed play a role, as our present circumstances 
do not lacquer our past but inform our framing of it. 
Indeed, reflective-nostalgic artists are often aware of the willful nature of their 
nostalgia. Bergson’s Matter and Memory, as Walter Benjamin (2007a) points out, goes so 
far as to build a philosophy, even a prescription, around the possibility of us opening up 
to broader and more indeterminate memory. Bergson, writes Benjamin, “leads us to 
believe that that turning to the contemplative actualization of the stream of life is a matter 
of free choice” (pp. 157-158). Proust’s mémoire involontaire, then, “involves an 
imminent critique of Bergson.” But Bergson does not advocate some sort of forced 
memory production; rather he invites us to make ourselves available to memory. This 
availability emerges from our attention to life, our recognition of the worth of its 
moments and its matter. When Proust says that the past is present in an object, but that 
we stumble upon the object by chance, he is tacitly building upon this notion. Proust’s 
memories may seem to come unbidden as he bites into his madeleine, but they are no 
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doubt informed by his state of mind at the moment he takes the bite, the talents of his 
mature imagination, and his attention to life during the decades between the moments 
recalled and the mouthful of cookie. In other words, the madeleine may have come to 
him by chance, but he was supremely well prepared for it. It is not too much of a stretch 
to say that Proust remembers because he wants to remember, and that the way he 
remembers is shaped by his mature needs and desires. 
Imaginative reuptake of the past is one of the roots of creative individuality; the 
“idealized” past can become more real and reliable than the “real”. As Boris Pasternak’s 
Zhivago approaches home after the upheavals of the Great War and the Bolshevik 
Revolution, he reflects that  
[t]he first real event since the long interruption was this trip 
in the fast moving train, the fact that he was approaching 
his home, which was intact, which still existed, and in 
which every stone was dear to him. This was real life, 
meaningful experience, the actual goal of all quests, this 
was what art aimed at—homecoming, return to one's 
family, to oneself, to true existence (Pasternak, 1958, p. 
164). 
  
Zhivago is quite aware that he uses the stuff of memory, of an invigorating and vanished 
world, to build a sort of spiritual aquarium around himself. He does not apologize for this 
tendency:  
I have to put up with whatever happens, so why shouldn’t I 
ignore the facts? You tell me my ideas don’t correspond to 
reality. But where is reality in Russia today? As I see it 
reality has been so terrorized that it is in hiding (Pasternak, 
1958, p. 224). 
 
Zhivago is not concerned with consensus factuality, but freedom of perception. Freedom 
of memory is indispensible to freedom of perception. And memory is a reconstructive 
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process of the imagination: It emerges from real experience, and very often captures a 
great deal about the original experience, but it is always geared in some way toward 
either motor action or affective experience in the present.  
Reflective nostalgic affect does not imply a lacquering of the past: to lacquer the 
past is to seal it as a completed work. On the contrary, reflective nostalgia insists on 
seeing the past as an open trove of indeterminate images. The past cannot be imported 
into the present as a sealed fetish item because it is not a unified item but a loose 
collection of images, each of them in associative dialogue with other images in time. 
Memory images communicate both vertically, with present images, and laterally, with 
other images from the past. To selectively reflect upon and frame specific images, moods, 
and phenomena of the past is not to take them “out of context, ” but simply to take them. 
The circuit by which memory is reconstructed does not require the importation of 
complete historical and ideological context.  
Sergei Oushakine (2007) cautions us to avoid interpreting nostalgic longing for the 
forms of an era as nostalgia for the ideology and historic particularities of the era. In his 
essay, “We’re Nostalgic But We’re Not Crazy,” Oushakine analogizes nostalgic 
communication with the adaptations aphasiacs make to recover the gift of speech. Just as 
aphasia sufferers rebuild their verbal world by appropriating and recombining blocks of 
found language, nostalgic communicators make use of forms from the past not only to 
summon up old feelings but to adapt those feelings to the communication of new feelings 
for which no adequate vocabulary exists. Oushakine argues that a “historicizing” critique 
of nostalgia, while “important,” misinterprets the true nature of nostalgia. The 
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historicizing critique emphasizes the context in which cultural forms were created, rather 
than the forms themselves, and too often attempts to read nostalgia for forms as a longing 
to re-acquire the political baggage of that context (Oushakine, 2007). 
As Walter Benjamin famously wrote, the nostalgic collector removes old artifacts 
from the contexts that make them mere commodities and thus liberates them from “the 
drudgery of being useful” (Benjamin, 1999, p. 19). Similarly, Oushakine suggests that 
post-Soviet nostalgia can remove artifacts from the Soviet ideological context that made 
them useful; thus stripped of their former usefulness, old forms are liberated to represent 
something substantially different than they once did. In our longing to communicate, 
Oushakine argues, it is precisely the forms that matter. “The cultural logic of these 
reincarnations,” he writes, “has more in common with the act of mechanical retrofitting 
(facilitated by the digital age) rather than with the process of political restoration” 
(Oushakine, 2007).  
Seen in this light, nostalgia is not an ideological program but an affective guide to 
personal communicative choice. It makes its way into the social sphere when similar 
iterations of nostalgia are shared among different community members who are reflecting 
upon common experiences or socio-historical narratives. Certainly one's attempt to 
convey the affect in ones own words and images can evoke nostalgia among others. But 
the specific longing and image-generation is always individual. When great masses seize 
onto grandiose pseudo-histories and demand restoration of grandeur, they have siezed 
upon a sealed package of the “past”, shaped neither by personal memory nor individual 
reflection on representations of the past, but by the present ideological repackaging of the 
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past by present ideological actors. An argument can be made that such “restorative 
nostalgia” is, by definition, not nostalgia at all, because it is no longer based upon longing 
or memory or the personal sense of loss. It is nothing more than the acceptance of an 
ideological program that happens to tell an effective story about the past. The individual 
who accepts such a program might have been longing for something before this 
acceptance, but support of such a program is not an expression of nostalgia, but one of in-
the-moment determinate ideological support. Longing has been cast aside and replaced 
with acceptance of a predefined community of grievance and action. This community is 
no longer based on memory and nostalgia, but on determinate action in accord with an 
actively propagandized shared narrative. 
Such public restorative pseudo-nostalgia is often seen as “lacquered” or 
“varnished” memory and is contrasted with “authentic memory”—history with all its 
warts. But the blemished face of history can be as false as the lacquered one. There is 
little to be gained from the notion that nostalgia, in all its iterations, is a reactionary, 
falsifying force—or at best a force that resists progressive change. This school of thought 
argues first that nostalgia is an avoidance of the new; second, that it is an opposition to 
the new; third, that nostalgia always harkens back to a falsely reconstructed pleasurable 
past; and fourth, that true memory will recall a past replete with damage, grievance and 
repercussion. Such thinking leaves no room for Boym's reflective nostalgia, or indeed 
nostalgia as real people in the real world actually experience it. 
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7. Nostalgia for the Lost Possibility 
In an interview with Gideon Bachmann, Andrei Tarkovsky defined nostalgia as 
“sadness for that lost span during which we did not manage to count our forces, to 
marshal them, and to do our duty” (Gianvito, 2006, p. 94). This bears close relationship 
to the conception of nostalgia in Lawrence Raab’s poem, “The Uses of Nostalgia”: “Then 
it’s not the past I yearn for, but the idea of a time when everything important has not yet 
happened” (Raab, 1994). Nostalgia is a longing for the imaginary possibilities 
represented by the path not taken: What if “everything important” had been able to 
happen in an entirely different way? If restorative nostalgic appropriation seeks a return 
to an imagined version of what did happen, reflective nostalgia ruminates upon the 
tantalizing incompleteness of the past, and upon the many possible imagined versions of 
what did not happen but, in other circumstances, might have. Restorative nostalgia 
depends on the mental slight-of-hand that allows one to believe that the lost world truly 
existed, was improperly taken away, and now can and should be remade; reflective 
nostalgia stoically accepts that the past is always unconsummated—all that remains are 
the cherished signposts gesturing toward a destination never reached. There is a dream 
lingering here, in this phantom territory of the “might have”—a picture of a world that 
never reached fruition and which is thus available to an infinite number of imaginative 
recapitulations, sparked by the past but not constrained by it, enacted in the present but 
not contained by it. In this way, reflective nostalgia is a formidable progressive force, one 
that collides two powerful and dialectically related emotions: the longing for what never 
quite was and the thirst for deeper and more creative engagement with what is. 
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8. Selected Works on Thaw and Post-Thaw Soviet Cinema 
The most comprehensive survey of Thaw cinema is Woll’s Real Images: Soviet 
Cinema and the Thaw, which includes brief but insightful discussions of the era’s 
important films and how they both reflected and impacted the broader political-cultural 
landscape from Stalin’s death in 1953 until the late 1960s. Another impressive, if shorter 
survey is Prokhorov’s (2001) “The Unknown New Wave: Soviet Cinema of the 1960s,” 
part of the University of Pittsburgh booklet Springtime for Soviet Cinema: Re/Viewing 
the 1960s, which includes Prokhorov’s essay and Yevgeny Margolit’s “Landscape, with 
Hero,” an outstanding critical essay on the way atmosphere, which had been tamed as 
man’s dominion in the films of the Stalin era, took on a vibrant and unpredictable life of 
its own in the cinema of the Thaw. Margolit (2001) sees Kalatozov’s use of natural 
landscapes in The Unsent Letter (Neotpravlennoe pis’mo, 1959) and Khutsiev’s use of 
urban landscapes in Ilich’s Gate and July Rain (1967) as landmarks in the portrayal of 
environments that, contrary to Stalinist dreams of dominion, often frustrate the aims and 
shape the fates of man. Originally published in the Russian collection Cinema of the 
Thaw (Kinematograf ottepeli) (Troiianovskii, 1996), Margolit’s essay argues that nature 
is inherently chaotic and spontaneous, and thus anathema to the Stalinist ethic in which 
all nature was to be subject to the conscious and purposeful hand of man. Chaos returned 
to cinematic settings during the Thaw. In The Unsent Letter, nature humbles and destroys 
a state geological mission, and the triumph of its sole survivor is not discovery but 
survival. In Khutsiev’s films, meanwhile, Margolit argues that the streets are not staging 
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grounds for the designs of man, but rivers that both shape and are shaped by the eddies of 
human activity. 
Meanwhile, Prokhorov’s doctoral dissertation, Inherited Discourse: Stalinist 
Tropes in Thaw Culture (2002) introduces an important corrective to the notion that 
Thaw culture represented a clean break from  the culture of late Stalinism. Prokhorov 
argues that Thaw culture continued to be oriented around the late Stalinist cultural tropes 
of war and family, and the central narrative device remained the bildung of the positive 
hero (Prokhorov, 2002, p. 46). The significant changes that arrived with the Thaw, then, 
represented a partial rather than complete break with the culture of late Stalinism: 
Continuity and transformation can coexist; indeed the transformations of the Thaw 
actively fed off of the “inherited discourse” of the Stalin years.  
Among Thaw and post-Thaw filmmakers, Tarkovsky has been the subject of the 
most extensive scholarship in both Russia and the West, and this scholarship sheds light 
not only on Tarkovsky’s career, but on the paradoxical situation, at once threatened and 
oddly sheltered, of auteur filmmakers in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. The classic 
Tarkovsky text from Russia has long been Maya Turovskaya’s Tarkovsky: Cinema as 
Poetry (1989), which was translated and published in the West in 1989, less than three 
years after the filmmaker’s death. Among Western scholars, the most comprehensive 
study was for many years Johnson and Petrie’s The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky: A Visual 
Fugue (1994), which draws on over 50 interviews with Tarkovsky’s contemporaries to 
illuminate his creative biography.  
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Robert Bird, meanwhile, has produced two impressive works, the monograph 
Andrei Rublev (2004) and Andrei Tarkovsky: Elements of Cinema (Bird, 2008), a review 
of Tarkovsky’s entire career. Bird has particularly sharp insights into the power of the 
Tarkovsky’s images; of special note for our purposes is his observation that the 
“materiality” of the Tarkovskian image “neutralizes historical clichés” (2004). Bird goes 
to great lengths to demonstrate that despite Tarkovsky’s anti-materialist rhetoric in his 
book, Sculpting in Time (1986), and his diaries, published as Time Within Time (1991), 
the director’s cinematic ethic was far from some spooked response to technological 
modernity. Rather, Tarkovsky was specifically interested in the power of cinematic 
technology to aid human vision. For him, cinema was a technological wonder that served 
as a mediating membrane between author and audience, between audience and filmed 
materiality, and between filmed materiality and the spiritual experience of both author 
and audience. Tarkovsky’s approach, meanwhile, was rooted in profound associations 
across space and time. Bird—who has done a great deal of research on both Russian icon-
painting and the concept of sobornost—reminds us that the icon, like the cinematic 
image, is a mediating membrane between artist, viewer and spirit (or, in the traditional 
formulation, between viewer and God). Thus there is not simply a continuum between 
ancient spiritual tradition and modern cinematic technology, but even an overlap and 
shared purpose. 
Tarkovsky’s deep spirituality, and his despair with modern materialism, was not a 
statement of longing to be rid of the stuff of the 20th century, but to be free from the 
straitjacket imposed by its story. Instead, he proposes a gateway to other kinds of stories 
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that propose a different kind of relationship between man and material—whether the 
material of cathedral walls in Andrei Rublev or outer space in Solaris. The new 
relationship sees every interaction as a path toward spiritual understanding, toward a 
deeply individual solution to the ethical problem of living in the world. These interactions 
are always mediated by memory, and in Tarkovsky’s telling they lead up to the catharsis 
of sacrifice. 
Other worthy filmmakers—most notably for our purposes the great Marlen 
Khutsiev—have received very limited attention in the West. (Khutsiev is mentioned in 
many general histories of the Khrushchev era, but only for Khrushchev’s attack on his 
1961 film Ilich's Gate, which was shelved, reedited and released in 1965 as I Am 
Twenty.) Brinton Tench Coxe’s (2008) excellent article “Screening 1960s Moscow: 
Marlen Khutsiev’s Illich’s Gate” begins to fill this void by bringing welcome attention to 
the film’s rejection of “a grand narrative of socialist realist Moscow” in favor of “a more 
intimate, though expressly urban, Moscow space.”30 Coxe takes the notion of intimacy a 
step further, invoking the film scholar Henri Lefebvre’s theory that cinematic images are 
augmented and completed by viewer memories. Joining Lefebvre’s idea with Walter 
Benjamin’s notion that Moscow is a city in a state of permanent remont (repair, 
remaking), Coxe argues that Moscow is constantly reinventing and recontextualizing its 
spaces, and that “in Ilich’s Gate we find a heightened emphasis on how memory informs 
the creative narrative of the Moscow text that we engage.” Coxe emphasizes the temporal 
                                                
30 Coxe also makes a much-needed contribution with his “An Imprint of the Times: Marlen Khutsiev’s July 
Rain and the End of the Thaw” (2005), which places Khutsiev’s treatment of Moscow in his 1966 film in 
the context of the fading idealism of the erstwhile Thaw youth. The notion that Khutsiev, in this often 
melancholy film, had a presentiment of the post-Thaw cynicism of the 1970s, is shared by Khutsiev’s most 
renowned Russian commentators Miron Chernenko (1998) and Lev Anninsky (1991).  
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layering within the film, focusing primarily on the urban geography of the film and 
Khutsiev’s invocation of multiple Moscows. With this urban study of Moscow as his 
primary goal, he does not reach into the issues of temporal longing and ethical quest that 
I will discuss later in this dissertation. 
Two Western books give a valuable overview of the political economy of the 
Soviet cinema.  Louis Harris Cohen’s The Cultural and Political Traditions and 
Developments of the Soviet Cinema, 1917-1972 (1974) is an exhaustive study of the first 
55 years of the Soviet film industry, with large excerpts from Soviet documents, articles, 
and letters. Val Golovskoy and John Rimberg’s Behind the Soviet Screen: The Motion 
Picture Industry in the USSR 1972-82 (1986) offers an insider’s view of the Soviet 
cinema in the Brezhnev years. Nicholas Galichenko’s Glasnost—Soviet Cinema 
Responds (1991) offers helpful essays on a wide range of post-Stalin Soviet directors, as 
does Who’s Who in the Soviet Cinema (1978), a impressive guide by Irina Shilova and 
Galina Dolmotovskaia. 
Many Russian-language memoirs and articles from Soviet cinema journals such 
as Iskusstvo Kino (The Art of the Cinema) have dealt with various Thaw and post-Thaw 
filmmakers, and also provide invaluable social and political context about the world of 
Soviet film production in the post-Stalin years. Iskusstvo Kino, which has long been the 
nation’s leading cinema publication, prints critical articles, memoirs, and archival 
materials. For the present work, the journal’s outstanding 1988 compilation of documents 
and letters surrounding the troubled birth of Khutsiev’s Ilich’s Gate/I Am Twenty was 
invaluable (Demenok, 1988). In the post-Soviet era, the journal Seans has emerged as a 
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outstanding source of both memoirs and critical articles. Finally, the excellent three-
volume Russian collection Kinematograf ottepeli, filled with critical essays, memoirs, 
and official documents, is invaluable for any scholar of Soviet cinema from the death of 
Stalin to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which the collection’s editors see 
as the moment when Thaw idealism was dealt its death blow and the era came to a end 
(Fomin, 1998; Troiianovskii, 1996, 2002). 
9. Revising Revisionism 
A relatively recent trend in Western scholarship has been to examine post-Stalin 
Soviet cinema as an art form rather than as a canary in the political coalmine. For the 
most part, this is a necessary corrective to a tendency (though far from a universal one) in 
the Cold-War era popular press, and in some scholarship, to view the Soviet arts through 
crude bifocals in which a portion of artists were “dissidents” and the rest were 
“conformists”. The depoliticizing tendency has a substantial impact on the discourse on 
the legacy of Andrei Tarkovsky, whose defection in 1984 took on the dubious sheen of a 
political-cultural triumph for the West, and whose own tendency toward self-
dramatization—he titled his diaries Martyrology—left his creative biography ripe for 
revisionism. It also, however, impacts discourse on filmmakers who neither left the 
Soviet Union nor dramatized their situations, such as Marlen Khutsiev. If Tarkovsky 
invited deconstruction with his sublime expressions of creative pain and desire, Khutsiev 
tacitly discouraged discussion of the controversial nature of his polyphonic neo-realism, 
where variant truths converged and diverged at the crossroads without any clear 
delineation of which among them might be the truest truth. Khutsiev was not given to 
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grand pronouncements on his work or the pressures he faced, but his work was in its way 
as challenging as Tarkovsky’s.  
In the post-Cold War environment, scholars understandably work to look beyond 
the hackneyed “dissident/conformist” label and attempt to examine the Soviet Union on 
its own terms, as a “normal” society with mass-appeal films, art films, and occasional 
hot-button political films, and not to reflexively confuse the art films with the political 
ones. Bird (2008) represents a healthy example of this tendency, with his insistence on 
looking at Tarkovsky neither as a martyr or a prophet, but as a master filmmaker. 
Nevertheless, in the Soviet context, the artistic statement often did become a political 
one, whether the artist intended it to be one or not. And we do little to increase public 
understanding of the period’s art if in our attempt to see beyond the Cold War paradigm 
we begin to willfully ignore the specific problems of historical place and time. In the 
following pages I will introduce and contend with several illustrative instances of the 
post-Cold War depoliticizing trend in scholarship on Soviet cinema. 
* * * 
In introducing his generally perceptive essay, “The Energy of Anxiety,” Vladimir 
Goldstein (2008) first mounts a fierce attack on the notion that Tarkovsky’s art merited 
him a role as a public, political figure. He argues that Tarkovsky gained notoriety in the 
West because it was useful to the West for elite Soviet cultural figures to appear to be 
suffering under the heel of the regime and bravely fighting back. Goldstein argues that 
Tarkovsky allowed himself to be used in this way. The result was “the tired image of a 
suffering dissident intellectual and his or her individualist search for so-called humanistic 
 
 
116 
values in the face of mountain of cultural and political repression,” an image that now 
“has to be probed beyond Cold War rhetoric” (Goldstein 180). 
Goldstein is making a peculiar case here, one that seems to be more in response to 
press imagery in the early 1980s than to anything that has been written about Tarkovsky 
in the responsible scholarship of the last two decades. No responsible scholar regards 
Tarkovsky as a political dissident in the heroic mold of Anatoly Marchenko, Larisa 
Bogoraz, Ludmila Alexeyeva, Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. For these 
dissidents, incidentally, the idea that intellectuals suffered in their search for “so-called 
humanistic values in the face of a mountain of cultural and political repression” was not a 
“tired image” but a lived experience. If purveyors of snarky post-Soviet scholarship are 
somehow “tired” of history, perhaps it would be better for them to stop attempting to 
write about it.  
Marchenko had two separate stays in the gulag; the second stay was a punishment 
for writing a book about the first, My Testimony (1969). These figures protested the 
Brezhnev-era jailing of writers such as Yuli Daniel and Andrei Siniavsky and fomented 
letter-writing campaigns calling for greater openness in Soviet society.31 The political 
dissidents fought for better treatment of political prisoners, publicly opposed the 1968 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, and helped found the Soviet Samizdat movement, with its 
underground self-publishing and distribution networks.  
                                                
31 The leading mind behind the openness, or glasnost campaign of the mid-1960s was Alexander Esenin-
Volpin, son of the great early Soviet poet Sergei Esenin, who had committed suicide in 1925 when 
Alexander was one year old (Alexeyeva & Goldberg, 1990). 
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Larisa Bogoraz, whose first husband, Yuli Daniel, had been sent to the camps for 
publishing a book abroad, was herself sent to the camps after protesting the Czech 
invasion. She became seriously ill with ulcers and could not eat. The response of the 
camp administrators was to assign her to harder labor. She was forced to carry heavy logs 
to the mill. She survived, but her second husband, Marchenko, had been sent back to the 
camps. None of the committed dissidents went unscathed: Sakharov was sent into 
internal exile, Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the country, and Alexeyeva had to leave 
when she realized that the alternative was the camps. Marchenko died in the camps in 
1986 after guards tried to break his hunger strike by force-feeding him through the nose 
(Alexeyeva & Goldberg, 1990). Against this background, Tarkovsky’s quest for creative 
autonomy and a better apartment seem to pale.32  
The revisionist critique that Tarkovsky was “not a dissident” is a classic straw-
man hunt. While some among the filmmaker’s friends and fans have fostered the 
inevitable mini-cults of personality, even these view Tarkovsky as a seer rather than as 
some kind of political freedom fighter. Scholarly commentators since the late 1980s, 
meanwhile, have not emphasized the dissident trope. Indeed, Johnson and Petrie (1994), 
who published the first and, until Bird’s 2008 volume, only comprehensive Western 
                                                
32 Tarkovsky’s later complaints, though concerned higher stakes: On July 10, 1984, Tarkovsky, who had 
gone to the West with government approval in order to shoot the joint Soviet-Italian production Nostalghia, 
held a press conference to announce that he would not be returning to the Soviet Union. He said he feared 
that if he returned he would not be permitted to shoot another film. Tarkovsky’s old, estranged film-school 
friend, Andrei Konchalovsky—the two had taken markedly different creative paths in the years since they 
had co-written the script for Andrei Rublev—had told Tarkovsky that these fears were unfounded, but 
Tarkovsky had responded with unfounded accusations that Konchalovsky had been specially sent by the 
authorities (Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky, 1990). In any case, the authorities’ next move did little to 
demonstrate good will: The government refused to let Tarkovsky’s adolescent son Andriusha join him. This 
was a shameful and cynical attempt to use the boy as human bait to draw the director back to Russia. By 
the time Andriusha was permitted to leave for Europe in 1986, his father was already dying of cancer in a 
Paris hospital. Tarkovsky died on December 29, 1986. 
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study of Tarkovsky’s life and work, had already in the early 1990s taken the “revisionist” 
position that Tarkovsky was no dissident. One wonders what exactly Goldstein, writing 
nearly a decade and a half after Johnson and Petrie, believed he was revising.  
Johnson and Petrie challenge the validity of the biographical legend of Tarkovsky 
as martyr. “By refusing to accept Tarkovsky simply as a long-suffering and tragic martyr 
of a monolithic government-run cinema juggernaut,” they write, “one can begin to 
explore objectively his real and substantial accomplishments in cinema.” They argue that 
the key question one should ask in studying the peripeteia of Tarkovsky’s career is “not 
why Tarkovsky was allowed to make only five feature films in some twenty years in the 
Soviet Union, but how he managed to make that many films, considering the extent to 
which they diverged from the accepted thematic and stylistic norms of socialist realism.” 
This seems an eminently reasonable question. Tarkovsky did have a much better time of 
it in Soviet cinema than Aleksandr Askoldov, who never made another film after the 
banning of Commissar (1967), and Kira Muratova, whose masterpiece, Brief Encounters 
(1967), was banned for more than two decades. But then Johnson and Petrie attempt to 
buttress their argument with a specious comparison of difficulties faced by art filmmakers 
in the Communist world and the West: “After all, [Tarkovsky] was making 
noncommercial films (labeled “difficult” in the Soviet Union) which certainly would 
have been hard to fund in the West, where the ideological Soviet censorship would (as he 
was to discover when he moved there) have been replaced by an almost equally 
deleterious economic ‘censorship.’” 
Much to their credit, Johnson and Petrie themselves don’t seem to buy the 
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specious argument that the difficulties of producing art films in the West somehow 
diminishes the significance of the obstacles he faced in the Soviet Union. In fact, one 
page after they sarcastically dismiss views of the Soviet film system as a “monolithic 
government-run cinema juggernaut,” Johnson and Petrie write,  
Goskino was, until the perestroika (restructuring) of the late 
1980s, a gigantic, centralized bureaucratic institution which 
controlled every aspect of the cinema industry: some forty 
studios in all fifteen Soviet republics, distribution, 
professional education (the renowned All-Union State 
Institute of Cinematography, VGIK), film research 
institutes, trade publications and critical journals (Iskusstvo 
kino and Sovetskii ekran), the central film archives 
(Gosfilmofond), the Central Film Base (the storage facility 
for “shelved” films and original copies of all films), a print-
duplicating factory in Moscow, a script studio, the Theater 
of the Film Actor, and even a symphony orchestra . . . 
Despite the recent rapid disintegration of this state-run 
monopoly and the rise of a multitude of private film-
production enterprises [in the post-Soviet 1990s], during 
Tarkovsky’s time the dictum attributed to Lenin was in full 
force and Goskino in full control [my emphasis-GBM]. 
 
This is, of course, a substantially different landscape of command and control than the 
Western cinematic market. Because the Western market is not exclusively presided over 
by officials empowered to decide what is ideologically correct and what is not, its 
judgments—though often hard to swallow—are not “censorship” but systemic hegemony 
with a good number of cracks and leaks and outlets for oddity. In the West, Tarkovsky 
made two highly unconventional films, Nostalghia and The Sacrifice, between 1983 and 
1986; the films were released and marketed and nobody took ideological exception to the 
extreme views of personal and political sacrifice central to both films (Domenico’s public 
self-immolation in Nostalghia; Alexander’s arson of his family home to mystically 
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prevent nuclear Armageddon in The Sacrifice). That’s two uncompromisingly 
individualistic films in four years after five in twenty years in the Soviet Union.  
While I agree that Tarkovsky had a busy and fruitful time in the Soviet 1970s, 
creating Solaris, Mirror, and Stalker, the argument that there is some sort of equivalence 
in his experiences in the East and the West resembles many Cold War-era attempts on the 
political left to posit moral equivalence between the Soviet and Western systems. Twenty 
years after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is not triumphalist or retrograde to say that the 
McCarthy hearings, bad as they were, were not equivalent to Stalin’s purges; and on a 
more subtle level, that the irritating narrowness of commercial film production was not 
the equivalent of the Soviet Union’s organized ideological, aesthetic, and economic 
control over each artist’s fate.  
As for the argument that the Soviet cultural system was somehow not 
“monolithic,” we can readily concede that there were constant collisions of interests in 
every meeting from the studio creative councils to the highest levels of central 
committee—Mikhail Romm could argue with Mark Donskoi; Ekaterina Furtseva could 
argue with Presidium hardliners Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Ilichev. But the fact remains 
that in the end there was a single funding source, a single source of ideological 
acceptance, a single power that could green light a script or market a film. If Goskino or 
the Central Committee decided you would not make a film, then you would not make a 
film. There was no shopping your project around to independent producers or the film 
boards of European social democracies. None of this is to paint the Western culture 
industries in bright colors: They, too, exhaust and embitter the non-commercial artist. But 
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the nature of pressure applied is qualitatively different, and the range of production 
possibilities is larger by an order of magnitude. Since the end of the Cold War it has 
become fashionable to wink at the difficulties of Soviet artists, to erect the straw man of 
Tarkovsky-as-dissident and then knock it down by saying that Tarkovsky was not a 
dissident.  
Tarkovsky was no dissident, but he faced difficulties far different from those of, 
say, an American art film director who can’t attract sufficient funding. U.S. government 
officials rarely harangue American directors for the ambiguity of their images, their lack 
of conventional narrative logic, and their insufficiently emphasized love for the 
motherland. And if they do have a problem with a director’s unsatisfactory patriotic 
fervor, there’s not a whole lot they can do about it. It is one thing not to receive sufficient 
money to put the vision in your head onto the screen; it is another to be told by your 
government that your feelings are alien, unpatriotic and destructive to your countrymen, 
and therefore would be better left unexpressed.  
Tarkovsky was indeed fortunate to direct five Soviet films in 20 years, four of 
them unconventional (Ivan’s Childhood (1962) was aesthetically unique in its dream 
sequences and graphic depiction of dead Nazis, but it was firmly within the tradition of 
the Thaw-era war film). But scholars are disingenuous if they consider this good fortune 
a measure of the Soviet system’s leniency. It was a fluke. If Andrei Rublev had not been 
shown, against the regime’s wishes, at the 1969 Cannes festival, and if Tarkovsky had 
not as a result become an international celebrity, the film would have languished for 
twenty years just like Askoldov’s Commissar, Muratova’s Brief Encounters, and Andrei 
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Konchalovsky’s The Story of Asya Klyachina, Who Loved But Did Not Marry. Moreover, 
it would have been unlikely that his subsequent films, particularly The Mirror (1974), 
would see the light of day. (As it was, The Mirror received second category distribution, 
showing only at out-of-the-way-theatres and small film clubs.) He would not have 
received the outrageous favor of being permitted to re-shoot Stalker (1980) in full after 
the peculiar episode in which Tarkovsky said that the original director of photography, 
Georgii Rerberg, had been working with inferior film stock, and instead of merely 
replacing the stock, dismissed Rerberg and started over. He would not have been invited 
to Italy to shoot Nostalghia in the early 1980s. He would not have, at long last, received 
his apartment across the street from Mosfilm. (Western scholars talk about this offering 
as if it were an outrageous luxury. I lived in the same building in 1993 while working at 
Mosfilm. It was comfortable, but not luxurious even by Soviet standards. Russian 
cinematic workers of all stripes, from lighting technicians to sound editors to drivers, 
lived in these buildings surrounding the studio.)  
In the context of Soviet cinema, Tarkovsky was in many ways fortunate. And 
even with all that luck, he was still systematically harassed and demoralized. A concerted 
effort was made to frame his cinema as alien to the interests of his own country, a country 
he wanted to love. By the early1980s, when he was working in Western Europe, 
Tarkovsky was sufficiently suspicious of the motives of Soviet authorities that he refused 
to come home for fear he would never be permitted to make another film. We can, like 
Rublev co-writer and estranged friend Konchalovsky (1990), see Tarkovsky’s self-exile 
as tragic and unnecessary. But his worries were not groundless. Tarkovsky was not 
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persecuted like Marchenko or even Solzhenitsyn, but he was systematically unloved by 
the organizations with total control over a creator’s access to resources and audience. It is 
senseless to create a revisionist model that fails to acknowledge the very unique 
emotional toll taken by the peculiarities of the Soviet artistic system. It is senseless, when 
one writes about cultural history, to drain the history from it. 
Tarkovsky himself found the notion that he was a dissident amusing. There is a 
scene in Chris Marker’s One Day in the Life of Andrei Arsenievich in which a film crew 
asks Tarkovsky for an interview; the team is making a documentary about dissidents. 
Tarkovsky answers with a wry smile: “Why not about the kolkhoz  [collective farm]?” 
(Marker, 2000). For him, “dissident”, like “kolkhoz” was a label from a closed set of 
regime-defined choices. His task was not to reinforce the circular, trapped intercourse 
within the closed set, the regime’s symbolic syllables chasing one another’s tails, but to 
open the set up to a larger universe. Tarkovsky’s contemporaries recognized that he could 
not be comfortably placed in the dissident-regime dialectic. Konchalovsky (1990) offered 
perhaps the ultimate concise summary of Tarkovsky’s character in his essay “I Have 
Dreams of Andrei”: “Andrei was not a dissident. In his pictures he was a philosopher, a 
man from another galaxy” (p. 195). 
This line leads to a key question: In the late Soviet Union, was it possible that a 
philosopher from another galaxy, no matter how ostensibly apolitical his 
philosophizing—might be decoded in a way that rendered him unexpectedly “political” 
in the eyes of the authorities? Like Dovzhenko and Eisenstein before him, Tarkovsky 
didn’t have to be a dissident to wind up finding himself in a politicized, and politically 
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vulnerable, position. One can say that Tarkovsky is not a political filmmaker, but one 
cannot depoliticize him as a public figure. Simply by being who he was and creating as 
he created in the environment in which he lived, he became a political sign. The 
regime—the times—decoded him as such. One could not reach in the peculiar directions 
he reached without outing oneself as a wrench in a system that fancied itself fine-tuned. 
It was precisely because Tarkovsky was cast as such a sign in Soviet cultural 
politics that he did indeed suffer. His ideas, like the ideas of many ostensibly nonpolitical 
Soviet artists, were greeted not merely with incomprehension, but suspicion. And this 
suspicion had financial, emotional, and creative costs. It would have been far easier for 
Tarkovsky to create simpler films, but he kept presenting the studio and Goskino—led 
until 1972 by the puritanical Alexei Romanov, who dreamed of socialist-realist 
orthodoxy, and later by Filipp Ermash, who dreamed of Soviet blockbusters—with what 
were called “difficult” projects. Meetings of the studio artistic council—ostensibly 
“comradely” discussions in which colleagues offered constructive criticism—were often 
adversarial affairs, shot through with incomprehension, jealousy, and pro-regime 
posturing. No doubt Tarkovsky’s own thin skin did not help his cause in these meetings; 
at the same time, his films never would have come to light without his stubbornness. 
Tarkovsky had found a way through the leaks of post-Stalin hegemony—yield on nothing 
and make it clear that progressive intellectuals beyond the Soviet borders have got your 
back. He wound up with films that never received wide domestic distribution, but at least 
he wound up with films.  
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Throughout his career, in the face of official disapproval, Tarkovsky assiduously 
avoided the path of least resistance; it is hardly melodramatic or “tired” for scholars to 
consider his career in the context of the resistance he faced, and the ways in which his 
films, in challenging the conventions of Soviet (and world) cinema, also challenged the 
political-cultural assumptions of Soviet society itself. 
* * * 
If we look at art and film within the continuum of public communication, we see 
that one hardly needs to set out to create a polemical work for the work to wind up having 
polemical implications. In the complex act of decoding a work, both personal and socio-
political predilections come to bear. And depending on these predilections we may look 
upon work that is different even in ostensibly non-political ways as either a validation of 
or an affront to our worldview. This is particularly true in societies, such as the Soviet 
Union, where the weight of a prescribed worldview—from the meaning of history to the 
relative value of different forms of work to the proper form of artistic, journalistic, and 
personal expression—lay so heavily upon both the creators and consumers (the encoders 
and decoders) of communicative messages.  
Stalin’s rapacious attacks on “formalism” in the early 1930s are, of course, the 
classic example of how politically loaded the act of decoding can be in an environment 
where the range of acceptable encodings is exceedingly narrow, and where notions of the 
acceptable shift with the whim of a single man. The great “formalist” filmmakers, poets 
and graphic artists of the Soviet 1920s were, if anything, histrionically fulsome in their 
support for the Soviet experiment. The pronouncements of Eisenstein, Vertov, Kozintsev 
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and Trauberg, and Mayakovsky, offer ample evidence of deep-seated enthusiasm for the 
young revolution (Marce, Schnitzer, & Schnitzer, 1973; Michaelson, 1984; Youngblood, 
1991). But the Stalinist decoding labeled them not only as “formalists” but as “bourgeois 
formalists” and, as they hastened to renounce their “mistakes” and alter their methods, 
these artists could not help but note that in the give and take of public communication, 
not only their work but their very persons had been decoded in a way that abruptly 
transferred them from the vanguard to the retrograde. The context in which they lived had 
left them politicized in a way diametrically opposed to the encodings of image (and self) 
with which they had hoped to freight their films. 
 In the milder political climate of the 1960s, the peculiar power of Soviet 
decoding still had the capacity to politicize culture and cultural workers in unexpected 
ways. In Ilich’s Gate, Marlen Khutsiev set out to make a film about the outsized legacy 
of the lost generation of 1940s warrior-fathers. By 1962, the children these fathers had 
left behind were entering adulthood and had somehow to find within themselves the 
sense of meaning and mission and public spirit that had—according to the sacred stanzas 
of Soviet social memory--inspired the fathers to give their lives. He made a film about 
young people searching their private hearts for public meaning—for a unity of the 
universal questions—Who am I? What am I here for?—with the traditional Russian-
Soviet collective queries—How shall we live? What is to be done? The film was an 
attempt to find in a time of peace—moreover, a time of peace without terror—a level of 
public spirit worthy of the warriors. 
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 The film’s argument, subtle but available to those willing to hear it, was that in 
the absence of war and terror, in the absence of the coercive motivating forces of 1941 
and 1937, public spirit must become a matter of personal conscience, and that young 
Soviet people have the moral capacity to make the right choice, to live not only for 
themselves, but for one another, and to build a nation worthy of their fathers. These ideas 
were precisely in line with the values of the Thaw that had been unleashed by Nikita 
Khrushchev’s February 1956 speech to the 20th Party Congress. Moreover, they were 
precisely in line with the philosophical implications of Khrushchev’s economic plan: 
Having renounced coercion as a motivating force in Socialist construction, Khrushchev 
had indicated that the new force would be enthusiasm (Hanson, 1997). Khrushchev 
sought a new economic engine in neither the people’s fear nor their economic self-
interest, but in their belief, their sincere faith in the worth of the Soviet undertaking. 
Despite this extraordinary aligning of Khrushchev’s dream and Khutsiev’s, the 
First Secretary proved incapable of seeing in the film what Khutsiev had put there. 
Instead of seeing in Khutsiev’s hero Sergei a young man forced by the loss of his father 
to find within himself the wherewithal to become a worthy, incorruptible, and public 
spirited Soviet man, Khrushchev saw a generation egotistically asserting that its members 
could go it alone. In an infamous March 8, 1963 meeting with the artistic intelligentsia at 
the Kremlin, Khrushchev accused Khutsiev of trying to drive a wedge between 
generations. He deeply resented the film’s culminating scene, in which the ghost of the 
23-year-old hero’s father, who had died in the war when his son was still a baby, is 
unable to answer the young man’s question, “How shall I live?” “Even a dog,” thundered 
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Khrushchev, “will not abandon its young.” He said Khutsiev’s young heroes were at once 
disrespectful, morally decrepit, and old before their time (Demenok, 1988, p. 100). He 
believed that the film’s “sons” were rejecting the generation of the fathers, and he 
brushed past the central dilemma of the film—that the purges and the war had left a 
generation fatherless.33 
Four days later, at a meeting of the artistic council at Gorky Studios, formerly 
supportive colleagues lashed out at Khutsiev and his co-writer Genadii Shpalikov for 
their “mistakes” in Ilich’s Gate. The critiques ranged from diplomatic to bizarrely ardent. 
On the diplomatic end of the scale, the veteran director and studio artistic supervisor 
Sergei Gerasimov, finding himself in an awkward position after championing the film, 
made meandering remarks about his preference for realism and followed them by 
suggesting that Khutsiev, like his generational peers Voznesensky and Yevtushenko, had 
become dizzy with his own talent. In the middle was director Stanislav Rostotsky’s 
statement that “the party had a right to be angry [at the film] and could have been even 
more angry. 
I understand Khutsiev’s and Shpalikov’s worries. I 
understand how hard it is for them. [But] I want them to 
remember that they are answering not only for this criticism, 
and not only to the studio, but, if you really want to know, 
for the future development of our cinema, because any 
failure or mistake of this kind can put the breaks on the 
development of art in the direction the Party requires 
(Demenok, 1988, p. 104). 
 
The director Tatiana Lioznova, meanwhile, said that Gerasimov had gone too easy on 
Khutsiev and Shpalikov during the making of the film, and then tossed a small rhetorical 
                                                
33 Khutsiev’s own father, an Old Bolshevik, had been killed at the height of the purges in 1937. 
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grenade at the filmmakers: “Why do you hesitate to speak directly about your love for 
Soviet power?” On the vituperative edge, the actress Maria Barabanova launched into a 
wholesale denunciation of the film as unpatriotic. She was, she said, unconvinced that 
Khutsiev was really going to change the conception of his film in response to 
Khrushchev's criticism. She implied that Khutsiev had no business answering this 
criticism with anything but wholesale repentence and assurances that he would refrain 
from his offensive ways: “Khrushchev is the authority. He said ‘No’. And we are all 
saying ‘No’. ” She tarred Khutsiev with the grave Soviet accusation of pessimism, and 
then with the even graver one of disloyalty: 
You showed such disrespect for the Party's voice in the 
studio. We on the studio's Party control commission might 
not be gifted, but we're people who know how to think and 
feel . . . I, a simple viewer walk into the theater, watch a 
film for three hours, and then the main character says: 
“How shall I live?” Why did I watch this movie? He 
doesn’t know how to live. Khutsiev should have moved his 
hero with the plot; he should have brought him to a clear 
answer (p. 109). 
 
Khutsiev was both bemused and enraged by Barabanova's outburst. 
I'll say this to you, Maria Pavlovna: I'm hearing today for 
the first time about your position on the film. But many 
times you squeezed my hands in the corridor and said, 
“How beautiful it is!” Many times you told me this in front 
of witnesses. It’s not right to act this way. Never forget that 
a moment will come when you have to look a person in the 
eye. I can look you in the eye, and if after your display 
today you can look me in the eye, I’ll envy your nerve (p. 
110). 
 
 A fierce speech from the summit of Soviet power, it turns out, had a way of altering 
previously held opinions in the artistic community.  
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Khutsiev had to re-edit and “correct” the film, which was released in its revised 
form, as I Am Twenty (Mne dvadtsat’ let) only in 1965. The original version of Ilich’s 
Gate was not released until 1990. Like the formalists of the 1920s, Khutsiev found that 
the Party’s chosen decoding had “read” him in an entirely different way than he had 
intended. It had seen him as engaging in generational polemics. In his response to 
Gerasimov, Khutsiev had said that he and Shpalikov had “never for a second in any way 
tried . . . to make a film opposed that which we serve—that is, our motherland, our 
people, and our Party.” And there seems little doubt that, though this was a “correct” 
statement for the occasion, it was also a sincere one. Even three decades later Khutsiev 
insisted in a 1996 interview that he “never made polemical films” (Troiianovskii, 1996, p. 
190). But Khutsiev’s Ilich’s Gate and July Rain (1967) were implicated in the polemical 
discourse of late-Soviet cultural politics, and they and he became part not only of the 
cultural history of the Soviet Union, but of its inextricably linked political history as well. 
* * * 
For many Thaw artists, politics were inadvertent, undesired, and unavoidable. The 
sense of freedom that had given life to their era was itself political in it origins. A tyrant 
had died and an irascible new leader—a round and red-faced peasant who would have 
been unable, even if he tried, to put on godlike airs—had the guts to call the dead man a 
tyrant. The Thaw that ensued was a kind of political dream. Artists convinced themselves 
that they were allowed to do certain things, and then they did them. Sometimes they even 
got away with it. Their dreams were not political, but their assumption that they could 
dream in public was inescapably political. And, even during the height of the Thaw, the 
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riskiness of the assumption was often made thumpingly clear. In the winter of 1962-63 
alone, Nikita Khrushchev heaped abuse upon the era’s emblematic sculptor, Ernst 
Neizvestny, its most celebrated poets, Voznesensky and Yevtushenko, and one of its 
cinematic pioneers, Khutsiev. A politician has the ability, with a single sentence, to turn 
an artist into a political figure.  
The young creative intelligentsia of the Thaw were people who had experienced 
the extraordinary moment of being promised—or convincing themselves they had been 
promised—that they could ignore the codes that had bound their elders. No sooner had 
they taken up the promise than it was withdrawn—or perhaps it had never really been 
given. The mind played tricks that way in the years after Stalin’s death. Artists let 
themselves believe that a more secure purchase on life was somehow a guarantor of 
other, less fundamental, freedoms. The freshest of generations curdled along with its 
illusions.  
The revisionist verdict on the Thaw intelligentsia plays on these illusions; the 
artists, it turns out, were not only superfluous dreamers, but ridiculous and deluded 
absolutists—not just Oblomovs, but modern day Myshkins, minus the holiness. In 
George Faraday’s (2000) Revolt of the Filmmakers, young post-Soviet film workers, one 
after the next, condemn the romantic, stubborn art-house ethic of the aging cinematic 
Thaw generation, arguing that it somehow prevented post-Soviet films from 
demonstrating sufficient “professionalism” and, in turn, accounted for the ruinous state of 
the Russian film industry at the turn of the 21st century. 
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But it was precisely illusions that emboldened Thaw artists to see promises where 
none had been made and to feel boldness where little was warranted. Illusions permitted 
Mikhail Romm to stand up at the November 1962 conference on “Tradition and Novelty” 
and gleefully denounce the entire ideologically reliable wing of the literary intelligentsia. 
Illusions emboldened Khutsiev and Shpalikov to create their baggy masterpiece, Ilich’s 
Gate, which in its very form challenged the Soviet idea that to all things there is a 
manageable and ultimately soothing narrative. Illusions also allowed Khutsiev and 
Shpalikov to believe that what they had created was an appropriate, and even 
enthusiastic, embrace of Soviet patriotism.34 Illusions sent Shpalikov to the grave of 
Mikhail Romm on the day Shpalikov would end his own life. Shpalikov wanted to give a 
speech by the graveside. He was not permitted to speak. Illusions had done him in. In the 
end, they had killed the creator. But before they killed him they had enabled him to 
create. 
10. Notes on Methodology 
There is a story behind these pages, and that story would be difficult to replicate 
or verify. It begins with the feelings these films produce in me, so my method is from the 
                                                
34 This illusion was shared by other commentators, who tend to look at the film’s assault on cynicism and 
embrace of ethical conduct as a indicator of its “Soviet” propriety. Konchalovsky makes a telling play on 
words in his memoirs when he describes Khutsiev as a deity not of neorealism, but of “neo-sotsrealism” 
(Konchalovskii, 1998). The view that the film was perfectly “Soviet” and that the attacks on it were merely 
the ignorance of the uncultured Khrushchev at work neglects the temporal and textural complexity of the 
film. Both Ilich’s Gate and Khutsiev’s 1966 film July Rain, however, present a stern challenge to the 
dominance of clear, traditional plotting and characterization in socialist-realist cinema—its populist, almost 
Hollywood emphasis on the story arc. Khutsiev’s emphasis on personal ethics and social responsibility is 
not necessarily a salute to a specifically Soviet reality; it is a statement of much broader support for 
thoughtful and empathetic conduct in the public sphere. The polyphonic discourse among his characters, 
settings, and images, meanwhile, hints at the rather un-Soviet possibility that there are different ways to 
thoughtfully engage one’s time and place, and that the ethical quest lacks a single path or a fixed 
destination.  
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very start infected with subjectivity. I love these films. And they invoke in me a peculiar 
sense of chronotopic longing for worlds both beyond my own and deep within my own. 
This was my starting point. Next, I asked, why? What installed this deep magic into the 
films—or, to put it more sharply: What is it in these films that helps me to experience this 
deep magic? What did the makers of the films do that charged the synaptic gap between 
their images and my reception of those images? How did they do it? This, for me, is not a 
technical question, but an imaginative one, a question requiring a degree of empathetic 
engagement with the filmmakers and their world. After all, these works of art emerged 
from the feelings, philosophies, life stories, and historical circumstances of their makers. 
In the broadest sense, my method can be termed historically based textual analysis. This 
project would be impossible without study of the history not only of the time and place of 
the films’ creation, but of the broader expanses of Russian culture. In my case, my 
research here is an organic continuation of two decades of scholarly, occupational, and 
personal engagement with Russian life and history. Or, to return to one of those 
unscientific, unverifiable terms—it is the product of love. 
(a) Selection of films 
I have chosen the films and filmmakers in this study not solely for their social 
power, nor for their topicality or typicality or popularity. I can, nevertheless, justify my 
choices on historical as well as personal grounds. Because I am interested in the roots of 
the affective power of the creative act, I have chosen three auteur filmmakers, Mikhail 
Kalatozov, Andrei Tarkovsky, and Marlen Khutsiev. Each of them was an important 
figure during the Thaw, and each remains important in the history of Soviet culture. 
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Kalatozov was the Thaw’s great cinematic bridge to the experimental spontaneity 
of 1920s Soviet cinema; while The Cranes Are Flying (1957) is generally regarded as his 
greatest film, I have chosen to focus here on I Am Cuba for three reasons: First, while 
Cranes preceded Rublev (1966) and Ilich’s Gate (1961/65) by several years and was a 
document of the early Thaw, the planning-to-completion arc of I Am Cuba occupies the 
same five-year period (1961-66) as the other two films, a period in which the political 
foundations of the Thaw were slowly crumbling. Second, I Am Cuba is a striking 
document of Thaw-era neo-Leninism, and analysis of it sheds light on the political 
context of the era and continues the historical discussion I began in chapter two. Lastly, I 
Am Cuba is the apotheosis of experimental Kalatozov-Urusevsky style, the natural end-
point of the path Kalatozov began three decades earlier in Salt for Svanetiia and 
continued in The Cranes Are Flying and The Unsent Letter (1959).  
I have chosen Tarkovsky’s Andrei Rublev in part for its great importance as an 
artistic and historical document—the film is widely considered the great masterpiece of 
post-Stalin cinema. But I have also selected the film because it an early expression of the 
intelligentsia’s late-Soviet reengagement with old Russian history and spirituality, a 
reengagement that divided the intelligentsia into new versions of old 19th-century 
ideological camps: the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. The discourse around these 
camps evolved through the 1970s and ’80s and helped give rise to both a spiritual 
renaissance and post-Soviet national chauvinism; at the heart of the discussion is a divide 
more fundamental than that between East and West—the question of how memory and 
longing work, the question of restorative and reflective nostalgia. 
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Marlen Khutsiev’s Ilich’s Gate, meanwhile, is the Thaw’s quintessential 
expression of youthful hope, tension, longing, and disappointment. Neya Zorkaya (n.d.), 
the late dean of Soviet film criticism, called it “the key film of the 1960s.” Khutsiev’s 
film is particularly apt material for this study: In its setting, its surface concerns, its 
episodic set-pieces, and its style, Ilich’s Gate is an utterly contemporary 1960s film. And 
yet it is virtually bathed in memory and temporal longing.  
My focus on auteur cinema in these pages is not a dismissal of the collaborative 
nature of cinema. The genius of Kalatozov is inextricably linked with that of Urusevsky. 
Tarkovsky’s emergence as an artist is bound up with his relationships with his co-writer, 
friend, and rival, Andrei Konchalovsky, and his camera operator, Vadim Yusov. Marlen 
Khutsiev’s deep understanding of the emotions of Thaw-era youth is to a degree the fruit 
of his collaboration with co-writer Gennady Shpalikov, and Khutsiev’s neo-realist style 
in Ilich’s Gate owes much to the camera of Margarita Pilikhina. One might say that each 
of the directors is a sort of synecdoche for an authorial team.35  
Nonetheless, the history of each of these films is not a history of cobbled-together 
studio creation—it is the history of almost obsessive directorial pursuit of a vision. The 
naïve beauty of the Thaw—as unsophisticated as it may seem to some contemporary 
critics—was that artists saw an opportunity to express themselves. We have to ask 
ourselves, though, what this means: Does self-expression imply self-absorption, a 
separation from the world? Or does it mean the expression of the world as filtered 
                                                
35 Khutsiev has explicitly underlined the ties between his life and his film: “All three heroes, each in his 
own way, expressed my situation at the time, my character, my approach to life. At that time my son had 
just been born, and I was always running with milk bottles like [Slavka]. I dreamed of being like Kolka, 
uninhibited, bold, able to drop into a conversation on the fly and strike up an acquaintance. And, like 
Sergei, I was also tormented by the question of how to live” (Musskii, 2005). 
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through the self? Here I will examine precisely how these filmmakers expressed the 
world, how the filmmakers absorbed the world through the scrim of life and memory and 
history and made from it something new for us. This was the process by which Thaw 
artists turned the notion of sincerity into the action of being sincere. And it was 
something more than sincerity. It was generosity. 
(b) Notes on versions 
Two accepted versions of both Tarkovsky’s film and Khutsiev’s remain in 
circulation, presenting both opportunities and complications for the scholar. I have 
chosen a seemingly contradictory strategy: I am focusing on the originally released 
version of Andrei Rublev, but the originally suppressed version of Khutsiev’s Ilich’s 
Gate. In the following paragraphs I will explain why. 
In 1987, the year after Tarkovsky’s death, Soviet film archivists released the 
director’s initial cut under the title The Passion According to Andrei. The film, at 205 
minutes, is 20 minutes longer than the canonical version, and the episodes unfold in a 
different order. There is a tendency when discussing auteur films that run into 
bureaucratic hurdles—whether at Western or Soviet studios—to accept the “first draft,” if 
it is released, as the “real” draft. But Tarkovsky himself—never one to refrain from 
pointing out suffered slights—always insisted that he had made all of the cuts himself, 
and that he was pleased with them.  
Nobody has ever cut anything from Andrei Rublev. Nobody 
except me. I made some cuts myself . . . And I declare and 
insist that in my sincere opinion the latest version is the 
best, the most successful, the most beautiful in the way I 
understand that word (Bird, 2004, p. 34). 
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Tarkovsky said that his cuts had only “removed excessive time which was not 
intended.” In the wake of criticisms for the film’s violence, he had, he admitted, cut back 
on the gore—in particular, shots of the burning of a cow, the lancing of a fallen horse, 
and the close-up of masons with gouged-out eyes were removed. But he argued that he 
had made the cuts for artistic reasons, “in order to induce psychological shock instead of 
merely creating an unpleasant impression that would only destroy our intent.” Indeed, the 
elliptical power of the film’s violence remains—we may not see the Tatar warrior lance 
the horse, but its terrible fall from a wooden stairway in the shorter version is no less 
terrible. “I do not regret at all,” said Tarkovsky, “that the film has been shortened to its 
present length.”  
Larissa Tarkovskaya, the director’s second wife—they were married in 1970, but 
she had worked on Rublev and the two had been involved since the mid-1960s—said that 
Tarkovsky 
never accepted the smallest compromise—and always got 
his way. He was the only Soviet director to do exactly as he 
wanted. He was absolutely without compromise. And when 
many journalists often asked if he was forced to make cuts 
in his films, I could provide an answer, since I saw every 
film cut. He never compromised over a single frame. He 
did only what he wanted (Leszczylowski, 1988).  
 
Larissa was a fierce crafter and defender of her husband’s biographical legend, 
and she was never shy about pointing out the offenses done to him. Here, though, she 
goes against the grain of the martyr storyline toward a more poignant and productive 
narrative: the artist willing to exhaust himself in unwelcoming conditions in order to get 
it right. In any act of editing—particularly after the “suggestions” of someone with 
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authority—an artist deals with the creative tension between the desire to leave things as 
they are and the nagging, perfectionist sense that, however off-the-mark the suggestions 
might be, the thing really could be made better. It is a wringing, emotionally exhausting 
process, but if after the suggestions one is left to make the changes on one’s own, some 
sort of creative inspiration kicks in, and the changes can shed the logic of the censor and 
take on the logic of the artist. The initial 205-minute cut, as Bird writes, had been 
completed in such a hurry that the name of the famous actor and clown Yuri Nikulin, 
who played the tortured monk Patrikei, was left off the credits (p. 32). It is not 
inconceivable that Tarkovsky sincerely believed that his removal of 20 minutes 
streamlined and improved the film. Bird, after an exhaustive analysis of the two versions, 
believes some of the elliptical power of the original is lost in Tarkovsky’s re-edit, in part 
because transitions between scenes and segments were made slightly more explicit. But 
these small concessions to narrative coherence do not at all deprive the film of its 
uncanniness, its temporal disconnects, and its invitation to viewers to imaginatively fill in 
blanks. 
Meanwhile, the 185-minute cut of Rublev did not on its own secure the film’s 
release—if the film had not been, through confusion in the Soviet film industry, released 
against the authorities’ wishes to the 1969 Cannes Film Festival, it might have, like other 
mid-1960s film such as Kira Muratova’s Brief Encounters and Alexander Askoldov’s 
Commissar—have languished on the shelf for another 20 years. Instead, the 185-minute 
version of Rublev stunned critics at Cannes, gained an international reputation, and was 
released in the Soviet Union in 1971. Though for years the film was distributed in various 
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bastardized editions in the West, it was the 185-minute version that first entered into the 
international cinematic pantheon. Bird (p. 35) sees a change afoot; today, he says, most 
festivals show the 205-minute version. “It remains to be seen,” he writes, “which edit of 
the film, and indeed which version of which edit, becomes accepted as canonical.” Bird 
believes—and I agree—that the two versions may coexist, with their differences 
becoming part of the productive and enjoyable discourse about the film. Either of the 
versions could have fit my purposes in these pages, but I have chosen to work primarily 
with the 185-minute version, which first entered into Soviet consciousness. 
The decision on whether to deal chiefly with one version or the other of Marlen 
Khutsiev’s masterpiece was a complex one. On one hand, I Am Twenty shares several 
traits that caused me to select the 185-minute version of Rublev: It was the version that 
came to Moscow’s screens in January 1965, more than three years after it had initially 
been shot. And it remained the only version one could watch until Ilich’s Gate was 
restored and released in 1990. Moreover, Khutsiev had not merely made changes 
demanded by the authorities; he had taken the opportunity to improve on scenes he felt 
could have been better in the original. Nevertheless, unlike Rublev, Khutsiev’s I Am 
Twenty reflects substantive changes that altered, even if subtly, the ideological tenor of 
the film.  
After two years of pressure from the highest levels of government, Khutsiev 
managed to make changes to his film that did not destroy its impact or compromise its 
uniquely prismatic points of view; the arguments I make in these pages hold true for 
either version of the film—I Am Twenty remains a powerful document of the era, of 
 
 
140 
Khutsiev’s extraordinary talents, and of his Tarkovskian stubbornness in the face of 
powerful opposition. Nevertheless, it is an incomplete document, lacking some of the 
subtle suggestions and evocations of Soviet life with which Khutsiev and his 
screenwriter, Gennadi Shpalikov, had expressed their worldviews. I will refer to both 
versions in these pages, but as a “master version” for discussion, I will use Ilich’s Gate.36 
(c) Mode of analysis: Internal script discovery 
In this study, I situate films and images within Soviet cinematic, social, and 
cultural history. But I also engage the images in these films as cultural artifacts traveling 
across time and space, often invoking nostalgia, a longing for what has been lost, or for 
what never was, for unrealized potentialities, sometimes embedded in the image, 
sometimes notably excluded from the image. Such images perform a crucial function, 
mediating the relationship between private consciousness—the director’s, the Thaw 
viewer’s, the contemporary Russian viewer’s, mine—and public time and space, the lived 
world of the now, with all its demands for determinate perception and action. 
Cinematic images mediate our relation with space and time by engaging us in—
and embedding us within—dialogue. There are, of course, many “scripts” within a film 
besides the one that was written. Each character, having taken on life as an image within 
the filmed work, has an internal script—an idea of life, a picture inside the head with 
which the external world is constantly compared. The atmosphere of the film has multiple 
scripts; different backgrounds seem to tell us different stories and challenge both the 
master script and the characters’ internal scripts. The camera has a script, casting its gaze 
                                                
36 I have included a scene-by-scene description of the film in the appendix. 
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on characters from different distances and angles, juxtaposing them with different 
backgrounds, leaving them out of the frame altogether. Viewers are faced with the task 
and pleasure of experiencing these scripts and the ways in which they collide and 
contend. In the end, the scripts collide with additional scripts from the world outside the 
film—scripts in the culture at the time of viewing, cultural memory scripts about the time 
in which the film was made, and personal memory scripts in the mind of the viewer. 
The film’s internal scripts, then, emerge from the photographed matter—they are 
all grounded in a reality, the reality of the film—but they are successively developed in 
the determinate or indeterminate mind of actors, directors, camera operators, and, 
ultimately, viewers, each with reference to his or her own life experiences and experience 
and awareness of history. In this paper, I am performing the inescapably subjective task 
of identifying the scripts embedded in scenes, images, character arcs, camera choices, and 
structure. These scripts contend with one another; sometimes they complement each 
other, other times they jockey for supremacy. This approach is unavoidably reflexive and 
contingent. It is an attempt to read the process and product of artistic creation and 
communication—and to offer one version of how they function both within and beyond 
the time and place of their creation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REENTERING TOMORROW: 
NOSTALGIA FOR AN IMAGINARY LENINISM AND  
MIKHAIL KALATOZOV’S I AM CUBA 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A Havana drive-in movie theater, 1959. Convertibles and sleek sedans in neat 
rows, an occasional couple sitting on the hood of a car, paying little attention to the 
screen. The cinema-shadow of a grinning Fulgencio Batista, brand new medal for 
something-or-other around his neck, his well-fed cheek fulsomely kissed by a well-fed 
lady. Clean-cut young men arrive on foot, move stealthily between cars, hurl flaming 
bottles at Batista’s smile. The screen burns. The boys escape in a convertible of their 
own. 
This is the first scene in the third part of Mikhail Kalatozov’s 1964 film, I Am 
Cuba. The film is divided into four associatively linked parts, each of them capable of 
being a stand-alone short film: The first part contrasts the decadent Havana nightclubs 
haunted by American playboys with the impoverished lives of the Cuban women the 
playboys exploit. The second unfolds the tragic fate of a tenant farmer when the land on 
which he grows sugarcane is sold out from under him to the United Fruit Company. The 
fourth part of I Am Cuba tells of the gathering of Castro’s forces in the mountains of the 
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Oriente Province. But it is the third story, the tale of fresh-faced student rebels 
intellectually alienated but culturally at home in a world of chrome-trimmed cars, that 
best captures the attitudes of the celebrated, urbane Soviet filmmakers who had come 
across the sea to commemorate Cuba’s revolution and wound up reflecting upon the lost 
promise of their own. I Am Cuba, on its surface a film about the revolutionary Caribbean 
future, can be fruitfully read as an expression of nostalgia for a revolutionary Russian 
past that had been sundered by decades of Stalinism. 
* * * 
In the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, undertook a project of terrifying difficulty.  He would attempt 
to simultaneously revive enthusiasm for the ideals of Leninism and transform the 
relationship of state and subject from one of domination to one of hegemony; tacitly 
agreed-upon social limitations would replace arbitrary coercion. Among the devices at his 
disposal in this effort was the enthusiastic faith in modernization that was at the time 
influential in many regions of the world.37 In its attempt to return to Leninist roots, the 
Soviet Union set out simultaneously to become the conduit of modernization to the Third 
World and to modernize itself. Josef Stalin had industrialized the country, but 25 years of 
coercive domination and warfare had not brought the rewards of modernity—consumer 
goods, adequate housing with plumbing, a sense of normalcy in which production was an 
                                                
37 Boym (2001, p. 22) writes that while modernity is a “critical project,” modernization is “a social process 
and a state policy that usually refers to industrialization and technological progress.” But the social process 
and the critical project are inextricably linked: “Modernity and modernisms are responses to the condition 
of modernization and the consequences of progress. This modernity is contradictory, critical, ambivalent 
and reflective on the nature of time; it combines fascination for the present with longing for another time.”  
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economic activity rather than a high stakes struggle for national defense and personal 
survival.  
I Am Cuba sheds light on many of the central elements of Khrushchevism: The 
modernizing instinct, the ambivalent relationship with material beauty (which becomes 
both at once a sign of what is desirable, and indeed possible, and an ideological marker of 
bourgeois decadence) and a nostalgia for an imaginary Leninism—its clear lines of battle, 
its sense of moral clarity, and, most importantly, its promise of a better day. This vision 
of Leninism excludes (or simply naturalizes and ignores) the relentless centralizing and 
fiery intellectual intolerance—the nonstop battle against doctrinal “deviations”—that 
marked Leninism in political practice. It was precisely these authoritarian traits of 
Leninism that Stalin had seized upon and intensified by an order of magnitude. 
Nonetheless, for many Soviet citizens, the name of Leninism continued to be associated 
with the cultural enthusiasms that were activated by the first decade of the revolution and 
subsequently quieted and punished by Stalin. The first revolutionary decade was a tug of 
war between revolutionary “spontaneity” and revolutionary “consciousness”—between, 
on one hand, the desire to personally channel and embody the energy of revolutionary 
change in often idiosyncratic ways and, on the other, the recognition that the only true 
and trustable revolutionary will belonged to the Party.  
Both Kalatozov and I Am Cuba director of photography Sergei Urusevsky began 
their artistic careers during the raucous 1920s. Soviet avant-garde art and cinema was a 
veritable circus of “isms”, which seemed to form, battle, disband and reorganize not by 
the day, but by the hour. Lenin himself did not much care for these “isms”—“I do not 
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understand them,” he wrote to the German Revolutionary Clara Zetkin, “I take no joy in 
them”—but he tolerated them through the years of his leadership (Macdonald, 1954). 
After Lenin's death in 1924, the boisterous heyday of avant-garde spontaneity continued 
through the years of Party power struggles in the mid-1920s and the Stalin's consolidation 
of power in the late 1920s. By the early 1930s, though, Stalin had put an end to the 
productive cultural tension of the spontaneity-consciousness debate and designated 
“consciousness” a clear-cut winner.   
By Khrushchev's time, the promise of early Soviet culture had long since been 
burned up in the cauldron of Stalinism and war. In an effort to enlist artists in the rebirth 
of Leninist enthusiasm, the post-Stalin party leadership began in the mid-1950s to 
cautiously broaden the boundaries of socialist realism. Artists were given more leeway to 
depict life as they saw it; the model of the politically conscious positive hero striving to 
fulfill a defined historic role gave way to more complex characterizations. Lyricism and 
humanism made their way onto the nation’s movie screens, most famously in the second 
film Kalatozov and Urusevsky made together, The Cranes Are Flying (1957), which won 
the Palm D'Or at the 1958 Cannes Film Festival for its depiction of tragedy, forbearance, 
and redemption on the World War II home front.  
The film’s heroine, Veronika (Tatiana Samoilova), is seduced while her beloved 
is at the front, but the film passes no judgment on her. The tragedy is private rather than 
public, emotional rather than political. It is a matter between Veronika and her 
conscience. Her subjectivity is the gravitational center of the film; the real stars here are 
Samoilova's eyes. In a bewildering world, Veronika is watchful rather than vigilant: 
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seeing the world, a necessarily open and spontaneous act, must precede the conscious 
business of shaping it. The aesthetics of the film, meanwhile, bordered in many scenes on 
the kind of experimental formalism for which Eisenstein, Vertov, and the other great 
filmmakers of the 1920s had been denounced. The Cranes Are Flying was not in any way 
an oppositional film, but it signified the new hopes of the Thaw. It was a moment when 
the extension of artistic possibilities was in general harmony with Khrushchevian 
hegemony: they worked together, in this case, to chip away at the older hegemony of 
Stalinist thematics.  
By 1962, when Kalatozov and Urusevsky were in pre-production for I Am Cuba, 
the Thaw had already gone through a series of intermittent chills. Kalatozov’s The Unsent 
Letter (1959) was attacked for its formalism and pessimism (Doros & Heller, 2007) 
(Woll, 2000, p. 133).  But the general sense of enlarged thematic and aesthetic possibility 
remained, together with the idealistic hope that artistic spontaneity could play a role in 
building a new and humane Soviet socialism. For Kalatozov and Urusevsky, the Cuban 
Revolution seemed to provide a perfect occasion to reengage Leninist idealism and 
embody socialist spontaneity.  
After three years of preparation and production, I Am Cuba was released in 1964. 
The film showed only briefly in Cuba and Russia, and then it was quietly shelved for 
nearly 30 years. The Cubans, according to the Brazilian documentary film The Siberian 
Mammoth, which traces the fate of I Am Cuba, found the film aesthetically unfamiliar 
and excessively romantic. In a word, it felt foreign. Moreover, the history depicted in the 
film was still so fresh in the Cuban memory that it was no doubt difficult for Cuban 
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viewers to accept the air of nostalgia (Soviet nostalgia, to boot) and legend that suffused 
the film. In Russia, meanwhile, the romance of the Cuban revolution, so intense among 
young people at the end of the 1950s, had begun to fade along with the energy of the 
Thaw itself. The Cuban missile crisis, the great-power resolution of which left Castro 
feeling excluded and duped, had complicated relations between the two countries. 
Meanwhile, the film’s innovative techniques brought old-fashioned grumbling about 
overindulgent formalism. In particular, Kalatozov’s intoxicating rendering of the material 
surfaces and cultural energies of pre-revolutionary Havana won few friends for the film 
among a Soviet Party leadership still struggling to deliver on its promise of improved 
material wellbeing for everyday Russians. 
What follows is a study of the roots of the peculiar nostalgia in I Am Cuba, a 
temporal longing that both blurs geographic lines and challenges the notion that nostalgia 
is an inherently conservative emotion. As Svetlana Boym (2001) has argued, reflective 
nostalgia rejects fixed narratives of lost purity; instead it engages idiosyncratic images of 
lost time, deploys them in the mosaic of the present, and plays a creative, even 
progressive, role in life. Against the background of this progressive nostalgia, I discuss 
the meaning of modernization in the Soviet context and its powerful relevance to the 
culture and cinema of the Khrushchev-era Thaw. Next, I discuss the careers of 
filmmakers Kalatozov and Urusevsky in the context of the history of Soviet cinema. Here 
I pay particular attention to the filmmakers' connections with 1920s avant-garde cinema, 
the role of the cinema in Soviet modernization discourse, and the ways in which the 
forward march of modernization merged with the backward glance of renewal. This 
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historical discussion provides a foundation for the chapter’s final section, where I discuss 
key elements of the filmmakers’ transnational nostalgia in I Am Cuba: their idealized, 
exuberantly modernist Leninism, their remediation of formalist film aesthetics, and their 
delighted embrace of modern urban spaces.  
In I Am Cuba, Kalatozov and Urusevsky hold the progressive dreams, formalist 
exuberance, and revolutionary urbanism of the Soviet 1920s up to the mirror of 1950s 
Cuba. They look longingly upon the idealism of the Cuban revolutionaries and the 
shimmering surfaces of the erstwhile bourgeois city and ask: Can we believe like 
revolutionaries, produce like capitalists, and share like socialists? Can the Soviet Union 
deliver on the Russian Revolution’s promises of purpose, justice, and plenty? Cuba, alas, 
offers inspiration without answers, and the filmmakers—like their 1920s predecessors—
wander beyond ideology into a sort of phenomenology of seeing. Revolutionary 
outcomes remain a mystery, but revolutionary art endures as a palliative pleasure and an 
emissary of hope. 
* * * 
While I Am Cuba has been celebrated by film critics and scholars for its visual 
virtuosity (Smith, 1999), it has received little attention as a social document and a telling 
artifact of Soviet intellectual history. Even Woll’s insightful and exhaustive Real Images: 
Soviet Cinema and the Thaw (2000) mentions I Am Cuba only once, calling it “a wildly 
melodramatic exultation of Castro’s Cuba,” though the entire film takes place in Batista’s 
Cuba (p. 184). Zorkaya’s survey of Soviet cinema dismisses the film as an “experiment 
for cinematographers,” arguing that in the film “form was predominant” but “contentwise 
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the film was a typified portrayal of the ‘flaming continent,’ of revolution in general” 
(Zorkaya, 1991, p. 214). Liehm and Liehm (1977) call the film “a real catalogue or 
textbook of the formal possibilities of film photography, avoiding carefully any 
confrontation with reality” (p. 215). Kalatozov is a major filmmaker, with two classics—
Salt for Svanetia and The Cranes Are Flying—on his résumé, the latter of which had 
major historical significance; it is, then, strange to see one of his works dismissed with 
such a minimum of reflection.  
This dismissive attitude is no doubt partly due to the film’s general unavailability 
between 1964 and 1993; it is possible that some of the Soviet-era commentaries on I Am 
Cuba are based not on an actual viewing, but on characterizations in a 1964 special issue 
of Iskusstvo Kino devoted to the film (Woll, 2000, p. 184). But the attitude is also the 
residue of Cold War scholarship on late Soviet cinema, which often examined cinematic 
content as if it could be separated from form—as if the social significance of a film could 
only be derived from its literary themes, plot, and characterization. In Cold War and 
immediate post-Cold War discussions of post-Stalin cinema there was in particular a 
tendency to examine films for the extent to which their literary elements broke with 
socialist-realist tradition. John B. Dunlop’s (1992) article “Russian Nationalist Themes in 
Soviet Films of the 1970s”, while insightful and highly informative, is a good example of 
this thematic content-based approach. This approach still has its place; in a highly 
hegemonic cultural context, it is obviously fruitful to examine themes and plot points for 
unexpected references, unusual characterizations, and sly alterations of emphasis. After 
all, for all its formal innovation, The Cranes Are Flying was rightly recognized as an 
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epochal accomplishment largely because of its breaks with the past on the levels of theme 
and characterization. Nonetheless, the thematic content approach neglected the ways in 
which, even in an ostensibly propagandistic film such as I Am Cuba, imagery can subtly 
complicate the literary devices of plot and characterization. (The slippery properties of 
the image were never lost on the Soviet censors, who rarely missed a chance to denounce 
a film’s “formalism”.)  
As the legacy of cultural Kremlinology fades, studies of Soviet cinema are 
increasingly embracing the unity of form and content in examining not only the aesthetics 
but the social positioning of a film. Such an approach will be more open to understanding 
the importance of I Am Cuba not only as a showcase for innovative cinematography but 
also—in part because it was such a showcase—as an important cultural and historical 
artifact. In her article on Kalatozov’s final film, The Red Tent, Paula Michaels (2006) 
even goes so far as to argue that I Am Cuba ranks ahead of The Cranes Are Flying as 
Kalatozov’s masterpiece (p. 315). This may be a debatable point, but it is refreshing to 
see the film taken seriously as more than a “textbook” of form, and such a comment 
surely indicates that, more than 40 years after its completion, I Am Cuba merits reflective 
critical study as both a cinematic and social document. 
2. Remembering the Future: Nostalgia and Modernization 
How can we place the nostalgic backward glance at the heart of Khrushchev's 
stridently forward-looking Thaw? How is it possible that Khrushchev's famous desire to 
catch up with the West, and then to surpass it, was motivated by longing for a lost 
yesterday? In a sense, the post-Stalin Soviet Union, like Castro’s Cuba, was a nation 
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longing to emerge from a prolonged period of imposed and alien political-economic 
brutality. Forward motion was at once about surging toward tomorrow and putting a 
battered nation back together. The desire for modernization was laced with a nostalgic 
sense of longing for lost wholeness. Behind the desire for modernization lies the quixotic 
desire to be made new—the desire for renewal, the thirst to have some lost life force 
returned to one's nation in a new way. Seen in this light, modernization is not only about 
obtaining a new way of life, but about regaining something that has been taken away. 
When a community—tossed by history into periods of dislocation, deprivation, transition, 
and redefinition—casts a backward glance in search of a binding and half-mythological 
identity, it is searching for a way forward. Anderson (2006) argues that this backward 
glance is both a catalyst for and product of modernization: The longing for lost wholeness 
creates an appetite for modernization, but modernization itself often winds up further 
sundering the sense of wholeness. 
The relationship between nostalgic longing and the modernizing desire, then, is 
cyclical. The dream of moving forward (in Russian, vperyod—one of the keywords of 
early Leninism) is fueled by visions of a lost, and perhaps imaginary, past. But the 
“modernized” nation often winds up getting something more and something less than it 
bargained for—neither the novelty nor the sense of renewal materializes in the hoped-for 
form, and nations are left remembering the fond, dashed dreams of modernization. A new 
nostalgia emerges, nostalgia for the lost future. 
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3.  Dreamers of an Interrupted Dream 
In Anderson’s model, and the earlier modernization model of Daniel Lerner 
(1958), the broad distribution of stories creates the imaginative terrain upon which the 
story of nostalgic identity and modernizing redemption can spread. Stories are distributed 
not only in space, though, but in time: The modernization narratives of Soviet 1920s art 
survived in the memories and documents those years left behind. Mikhail Kalatozov and 
Sergei Urusevsky came of age during the ’20s, and both were products of its 
revolutionary creative ferment. Urusevsky was a painter and a student of the great 
graphic artist Vladimir Favorsky and the constructivist luminary Alexander Rodchenko 
(Doros & Heller, 2007; Prokhorov, 2001). Urusevsky shot documentary footage at the 
front during World War II, and then became a cameraman for feature films. In 1956, he 
and Kalatozov began their partnership with The First Echelon, which dramatized 
Khrushchev’s (ultimately ill-fated) program of cultivating the Soviet “virgin lands.” 
Through their next three films together, The Cranes Are Flying (1957), The Unsent Letter 
(1959), and I Am Cuba, Urusevsky doggedly pursued his goal to convey reality through 
the expressive image, which, he believed, should be self-sufficient without dialogue. This 
desire (which, understandably, was frustrating to the screenwriter of I Am Cuba, the 
celebrated poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko (Carlson, 2004)) can reasonably be seen as 
Urusevsky’s longing to recapture the extraordinary expressiveness and independence of 
the graphic and cinematic imagery of his youth. His guiding principle as a cameraman 
was “the need to emancipate film from the domination of the word, which enslaves the 
unused possibilities of visual representation” (Margolit, 37). 
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At the dawn of the Soviet film industry, Kalatozov was a business student in his 
native Georgia, but by 1925 he had caught the cinema bug. He began as an actor, then 
became a cameraman. He learned from the great documentary filmmakers Dziga Vertov 
and Esther Shub (Doros & Heller, 2007). Kalatozov’s first film as a director, Blind 
(1930), was not a great success, but his second, Salt for Svanetia (1930), is one of the 
great documentary films of the Soviet silent era (Doros & Heller, 2007; Leyda, 1983). By 
this time, Kalatozov had imbibed the spirit of creative shot composition (low angles, 
slanted frames) and the Eisensteinian “dialectical montage” (editing that doesn’t simply 
move the story forward but collides images in the hope of generating both visceral 
emotions and synthetic ideas in the viewer). With these techniques in his creative arsenal, 
Kalatozov brought his camera to a Georgian mountain community where the routines of 
both subsistence and spirit had changed little since medieval times (Leyda, 1983). The 
results are striking, a stirring documentation both of the folkways of Svanetia and of the 
cinematic exuberance of the late 1920s. They are also striking when viewed in the 
context of Kalatozov’s future work: The mix of subjective framing, acrobatic camera 
movement and high speed tracking of images that some have credited to Urusevsky alone 
in the team’s Thaw-era films are on impressive display in Salt for Svanetia.  
Kalatozov's silent masterpiece reflects the peculiar temporal ambivalence at the 
heart of early Soviet cinema and at the heart of the very idea of modernization. The pre-
industrial struggle for daily life is so lovingly depicted—even in its tragic moments—that 
it becomes impossible to read the film as an uncomplicated call for socialist industrial 
progress. Like Alexander Dovzhenko's Earth, which was made the same year, Salt for 
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Svanetia refuses to look forward without simultaneously looking back. The intellectual 
inheritance of the Soviet revolutionary spirit mixes the utopian, past-denying forward 
thrust of Marxist modernization with the back-to-the-people dreams of the 1870s Russian 
narodniki, or populists, who simultaneously idealized the peasant commune and sought 
to transform it through literacy and political consciousness. If, under conditions of 
capitalism, holiness had melted into air and the sacred had been profaned, the dream of 
the Socialist modernizer was not to mock the sundered spiritual instinct, but to renew and 
repurpose it.  
In the 1930s, as we have seen, experimental montage fell into official disfavor, as 
did the mass protagonists seen in Salt for Svanetia and Eisenstein's Strike and Battleship 
Potemkin. Under the vigilant eye of Stalin and Goskino chairman Boris Shumiatsky, the 
cinema of socialist realism sought “movies for the millions”, with comprehensible plots 
and individual, politically conscious heroes who brought progress to the motherland. 
After the triumph of Salt for Svanetia, Kalatozov completed his 1932 film Nail in the 
Boot just as the new set of preferences was solidifying into doctrine. The film, to say the 
least, failed to divine which way the winds were blowing: It was an exuberant, masterful 
document of the previous decade's avant-garde, a war epic featuring rapid-cut editing, 
unconventional camera angles, double exposures, and constructivist meditation on the 
movement of machines. Nail in the Boot was denounced for formalism; Kalatozov was 
given an administrative post at the Tbilisi Film Studio and was not permitted to shoot 
another film until 1939 (Leyda, 1983).  
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The cinema still preached modernity—the 1930s, after all, were the years of 
heavy-industry development and the organizing of the countryside into collective farms 
based on a factory model. But the goals of the modernizing narrative had become much 
narrower: What was advocated was not simply modernity, or even Communist 
modernity, but the modernity of the Stalinist synthesis, in which the Great Man was the 
source of all revolutionary thought, and revolutionary thought from anyone else had 
become both superfluous and dangerous. The Stalin regime used communication to seek 
not the empathy of its subjects, but rather their obedience and loyalty against enemies, 
real and imagined, internal and external. The cinema's task was not to make 
propagandistic arguments but to provide quasi-religious fetish images (a task with deep 
roots in Russian culture, where the painted icon was an object not of representation but of 
veneration). This is not to say that the cinema of the era was necessarily slavish: 
Kalatozov's comeback films, Manhood (1939), and its wartime follow-up, Wings of 
Victory (1941) gave him the opportunity to develop what Michaels has astutely noted as 
the central theme of his film work: courage. Kalatozov, writes Michaels, “has a proclivity 
for what one critic describes as ‘high melodrama,’ but his underlying concern with guilt 
and innocence, cowardice and bravery helps him to elude banality” (Michaels, 2006, pp. 
315-316). 
By the late 1940s, though, the very act of communication became suspect, and the 
Soviet film industry was reduced to producing a handful of grandiose, ideologically 
correct “masterpieces” each year. The task of these films was not to encourage 
modernization, which was, in the Stalinist funhouse mirror, already achieved, but rather 
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to enforce mythologies of the genius leader, the genius country (all of whose geniuses 
naturally and directly prefigured the current genius leader, and are embodied in his 
person), and the circling sharks of a hostile world. Kalatozov’s contribution to the 
circling-sharks genre was Conspiracy of the Doomed (1950), a film about anti-socialist 
plotters in the newly Sovietized Eastern Europe. 
The disappearance of any kind of realistic rhetoric of modernization found its 
real-world echo in the “abysmally low standard of living” in the late Stalinist Soviet 
Union. Roy and Zhores Medvedev argue that the rough conditions of day-to-day life, 
more than the moral deprivations of dictatorial rule, had eaten away at people’s 
confidence in their government. “People would be convinced of the superiority of the 
Soviet system,” write the Medvedevs, “only if it could be shown that all the sacrifices 
demanded by centralization and dictatorial methods produced tangible economic 
results—not only in the form of heavy industry but in the availability of consumer goods, 
foodstuffs, and clothing as well as improved housing and working conditions” 
(Medvedev & Medvedev, 1978, p. 74). One of the biggest literary sensations of the Thaw 
was caused not by a historical exposé or some abstract paean to freedom, but by 
Dudintsev’s 1956 novel, Not By Bread Alone, which depicted a Soviet Union so choked 
by cronyism and bureaucracy that it had been unable to make even the most modest 
strides toward technological modernization (Medvedev & Medvedev, 1978, p. 73). 
For filmmakers such as Kalatozov, the onset of aesthetic Stalinism seemed to 
close the perceptual gateway to the creative spontaneity of the 1920s, cutting off a world 
of tantalizing possibilities. The headlong pursuit of the undefined future had been 
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replaced by a world in which all the answers had already been written down. Under 
Stalin, there was no past or future other than the one the leader posited from his perch in 
the present: The independent temporal imagination, or at least public display of it, was 
effectively abolished. With his condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, 
Khrushchev effectively returned to artists the gift of time. Suddenly, there was space—
still limited, but more than had been available in decades—to ponder both the past and 
the future, and to evaluate the Soviet project of modernization.  
Khrushchev himself, a cooperative survivor in the hazardous upper reaches of the 
Stalin-era party, used his new power to dream anew the dreams of his revolutionary 
young manhood, when, for a certain type of excitable mind, Leninism seemed to point 
the way to utopia. The Leninist dream, in Khrushchev's nostalgic version, posited a 
utopia built upon the sincere enthusiasm of the people; this model had been subsequently 
hijacked by the Stalinist model of a fortress nation built upon coercion, terror, and the 
imprinted sense of absolute duty (i.e. Do this because your life depends on it; spies and 
wreckers are at your sides, murderous foreigners are beyond your borders, and Comrade 
Stalin is at your back). Khrushchev's model was a hegemonic vision of the construction 
of the Communist utopia as a society built by all, for all, out of the enthusiasm of all. It 
was a conjunctive dream of a harmonious voluntary society, one that recalled the 
Slavophilic conception of sobornost as the harmonious social choir, where each 
individual voice, in singing its most heartfelt notes, blends seamlessly into the common 
song. It was the sort of beautiful vision that holds up well until someone hits an errant 
note. 
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Filmmakers such as Romm and Kalatozov shared Khrushchev's enthusiasm for an 
imaginary Leninism, and they relished the opportunity to discover within themselves 
sincere voices that could contribute to the new Soviet modernization. They had started 
their careers during the last gasp of Soviet formalism; they were the heirs of the great 
cinematic masters of the 1920s—Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Kuleshov, Vertov—men who had 
greeted the promise of Leninist modernity with great enthusiasm and then seen their 
dreams and careers shattered when it turned enthusiasm was not what the Stalin regime 
needed from them. (Another of the 1920s legends, Alexander Dovzhenko, had tempered 
his enthusiasm from the start with a nostalgic sense of the world modernization would 
condemn to extinction.) Both the older and younger generations of Thaw filmmakers 
shared Khrushchev's nostalgia for an imaginary Leninism, a nostalgia for the future that 
had never arrived, but now, perhaps, would. They began the Thaw era in 1956 as 
supporters of the new Khrushchev hegemony, happy soldiers in the creation of a humane 
Communist modernity in which individual consciousness and social progress could 
comfortably coexist and organically support one another. 
The Thaw gave Kalatozov the opportunity to return to the themes of courage and 
discovery—though this time the courage was not only depicted onscreen, but lived 
behind the camera. With The Cranes Are Flying, Kalatozov and Urusevsky pioneered the 
path back to avant-garde aesthetic exuberance and forward to subjective visions of an 
unpredictable world. The film’s contribution to Thaw culture is well summed up in an 
inscription on a watch given at an East German Film Festival to Tatiana Samoilova, who 
played the tragic heroine of Cranes:  “At long last we see on the Soviet screen not a 
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mask, but a face” (Woll, 2000, p. 73). Meanwhile, the renowned Russian poet Yevgeny 
Yevtushenko, who co-wrote the I Am Cuba script with the Cuban poet Enrique Pineda 
Barnet, has said that The Cranes Are Flying “tore down the Iron Curtain”—a statement 
that projects the film’s effect 30 years into the future, and yet feels entirely apt (Carlson, 
2004). The irony is that Kalatozov’s heroic gift to an unknown future was motivated by 
his longing glance at the long-gone Soviet 1920s. He would glance backward once more, 
looking to find the lost spirit of the revolution in I Am Cuba. 
4. Cutting Edge Cuba: Soviet Visions of Spontaneity Lost 
When they arrived in Cuba in 1962, Kalatozov and Urusevsky purposefully 
decided that they would not make a film about Cuba as they found it, a nation already 
enraged by the U.S. invasion at the Bay of Pigs, embittered by Khrushchev’s willingness 
to deal with the U.S. during the Cuban missile crisis, and frustrated with the economic 
dislocations—such as the disappearance of consumer goods—that attended the 
prohibition of the market and capital flight (Carlson, 2004). They wanted to make a film 
about revolutionary enthusiasm and idealism, not about great power politics, economic 
adjustment, or the post-revolutionary gathering of power by Fidel Castro and his 
associates. (They had, one imagines, seen more than enough power-gathering in 
Moscow.) The filmmakers’ decision to look back to capture the eve of revolution, 
however, meant recreating Batista’s Havana, with all its visual seductions. The second 
sequence of the film—a kaleidoscopic shot of bathing beauties on a rooftop pool, the 
blinding white modern skyline in the distance—already tips the viewer off to the film’s 
accidental subtext: bourgeois vulgarity can be beautiful. The next episode, in which a 
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smarmy, stereotyped trio of nightclub-haunting American men treat Cuba (and Cuban 
women in particular) as their plaything, is a corrective to the attractiveness of the 
swimming pool scene, as is a later sequence that takes us to the crumbling, half-flooded 
slum in which the regretful prostitute, Betty, lives. Nevertheless, the subtext of 
intoxication with the modern runs throughout the urban episodes of the film, and hints at 
a nostalgia that goes beyond nostalgia for Leninist energy.  
The Russian 1920s, after all, were not only an age of revolutionary spirit, but also 
of the relative plenty brought by Lenin’s 1921 New Economic Policy, which permitted 
the return of a limited market economy after the austerity (and famine) of “war 
communism”. Behind the longing for the urban vibrancy of the NEP period may lurk a 
more subversive, if subconscious, nostalgia: nostalgia for 1913 as the last moment of 
Russian imperial plenty, cultural richness, and gradualist reform before the coming of the 
First World War and, in its wake, the Revolution. Nonetheless, nostalgia for plenty does 
not contradict nostalgia for the revolutionary spirit—what it does is issue a rebuke and 
reminder to Soviet power: Remember that the promise of communism is not to restrict 
material progress but to accelerate it, not to restrict the fruits of human enterprise, but to 
make them available to all. When the camera, as the viewer’s eye, actually enters the 
pool alongside the bathing beauties, it says: Picture yourself here. You deserve this too. 
Full Communism, the kind Khrushchev had promised would come to Russia by 1980, 
would have to mean the extension of the beauties of modernization to all.  
The scene of Betty's ecstatic, angry dance in the nightclub is open to many 
readings. We can see her as wholly objectified by both the Americans ogling her in the 
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scene and by the Russians directing and shooting the scene. But this is not their dance; it 
is hers, and in it she expresses rage and joy and a blessed moment's self-possession in a 
realm the men cannot begin to grasp. The bar belongs to her for a moment. The country 
belongs to her. When we watch Betty's dance, we watch not with the objectifying eyes of 
her audience; rather, Urusevsky, drawing on the full arsenal of expressive 1920s avant-
garde angles, manages to capture the dance from the point of view of the dancer. This is 
not point of view as conventionally understood, but the point of view of the inner eye. It 
is how Betty might see herself if she were outside herself: This, of course, is the meaning 
of ecstasy, the experience of being outside oneself.  
We will later learn that Betty is not her real name, that she has a boyfriend, a 
sweet-voiced street salesman who traffics in fruit and drugs, that he has no idea that to 
support herself she dances at the bar and occasionally sleeps with her audience members. 
(One of the Americans, a shy, scholarly type, expresses interest in how she lives; he 
spends the night with her at her home in the Havana slums but seems incapable of 
understanding that he is doing her no favor, and that she despises him.) It is a landscape 
in which everyone is compromised but the spirits of art and transcendence remain 
stubbornly alive. Betty's dance and her boyfriend's avenue songs gesture toward a faith 
deeper than religion, a spiritual mettle that will prove them useful in the coming 
revolution.  
Kalatozov and Urusevsky understood well that socialist modernization belonged to 
the category of faith. The technical fetishes of the 1920s, the militant atheism, the loudly 
proclaimed search for “scientific” solutions in everything from economics to poetry, were 
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all part and parcel of a young faith, a search for ecstatic self-transcendence; the 
manifestos of 1920s artistic groups read like shamanistic incantations: there is a 
worshipful primitivism underpinning the future-worship of young post-revolutionary 
leftists. Dziga Vertov's Kino Eye group called for “the emancipation of the camera, 
which is reduced to a state of pitiable slavery, of subordination to the imperfections and 
the shortsightedness of the human eye,” and went on to declare their allegiance to “the 
camera as a kino-eye, more perfect than the human eye” (Michaelson, 1984, pp. 13-14). 
 This spiritualization of Leninism had deep roots.  For many Russians, the 
Communist promise of an eventual utopia beyond labor and the tyranny of rational time 
was a renewal of a complex of ancient, unsinkable millennial hopes sometimes summed 
up as “The Russian Idea.” During the 19th century, Russia’s great intellectual debate was 
between those who advocated a Western path of development—the Westernizers—and 
those who believed that Russia had its own path, based on the Orthodox ideal of 
conjunctive togetherness and the values of the peasant commune—the Slavophiles 
(Riazanovsky, 1965). In Weberian terms, the Westernizers believed in a rational-legal 
basis of socio-political legitimacy, while the Slavophiles preferred a mix of traditional 
and charismatic legitimacy (Hanson, 1997). The genius of Soviet Marxism-Leninism lay 
in its ability, as an atheist ideology, to somehow co-opt the idealism of both rational-legal 
Westernizers and charismatic-religious Slavophiles and create a new faith that promised 
to redeem Russia.  Communism was a supra-national ideology of modernization, but its 
appeal lay in its connection with national myth: the new ideology would allow Russia to 
fulfill its prophesied role as the “Third Rome”—the leader of the world, at once 
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exceptional and exemplary—and to create an entirely just, secularly holy society. Within 
the early Communist movement there was even a group of writers and thinkers who 
called themselves the God Builders and wanted to make the ideology’s implicit religious 
parallels explicit. Lenin was not amused, though he did make one of the leading God-
Builders, Anatoly Lunacharsky, his first Commissar of Enlightenment. 
The Stalin era had replaced the unifying ideal with the unifying leader, and 
replaced enthusiastic quasi-religious participation (a key term for Lerner) in the process 
of Communist modernization with compulsory, quasi-religious obedience to the word of 
the master. The nostalgic connection with the ancient Russian dream of sobornost—an 
organic, cooperative togetherness in which individual expression and community goals 
are mutually supportive—was severed. The Stalin synthesis made it clear that the path to 
progress necessitated the effacement of self. Stalinist modernization was new without 
offering renewal. While convincing arguments have been made that Stalin's program was 
the logical next step in the unfolding and realization of the logic of Marxism-Leninism, 
the culture of high Stalinism, from the mid-1930 until his death in 1953, could not be 
more distant from the chaotic energy of the culture of the Soviet 1920s. And it was 
precisely this energy, more than even the most hopeful interpretation of Lenin's 
voluminous written record, for which the post-Stalin intelligentsia was nostalgic. It would 
be their job to return the energy of Leninist modernization theory to their own 
countrymen—to make of their country an inspirational beacon for countries around the 
world.  
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By the end of the 1950s, Russians were prepared to revisit the Revolution and 
reinvigorate their revolutionary idealism. The Cuban Revolution offered a perfect 
transnational metaphor. As Genis and Vail (1996, p. 59) write, “The Cuban Revolution 
became a metaphor not only for the October Revolution, but for its contemporary 
reincarnation—the liberal, Thaw revolution of the 1960s.”  
Cuba’s central place in early-1960s Soviet optimism is apparent in the famous 
May Day parade scene in Marlen Khutsiev’s I Am Twenty (1961, released 1965). Among 
Khutsiev’s iconic images of the 1961 parade—papier-mâché globes festooned with peace 
slogans, model rocket ships, portraits of Yuri Gagarin, who had gone into orbit on April 
12—we meet a group of young Cuban men walking and laughing through Red Square 
with rock star ease and pride. Meanwhile, a little boy is perched on his father’s shoulders, 
shouting Viva Cuba! Viva Cuba! Ealier, when one of the film’s young protagonists, 
Kolya, boards a wintertime trolley—number 777, no less, with a conductress named 
Nadia (Hope)—a simple affirmation has been finger-written in the windowfrost: “Cuba—
yes.” Khutsiev’s film follows the struggle of three young men to find themselves as 
individuals while reconnecting with the ethical ideals of the Revolution. The film’s 
fleeting citations of the Cuban struggle—much like its visual and poetic references to 
Mayakovsky, the avatar of 1920s spontaneity—make the case that vibrant individuality 
and revolutionary idealism are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing. 
* * * 
The Cuba imprinted by Kalatozov and Urusevsky is simultaneously close to 
modern Western pleasures, to revolutionary purity, and to ancient spiritual truths. In the 
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second part of I Am Cuba, the sequence of the tenant farmer working on land he 
considers his own has a strong kinship with Kalatozov's images of laboring villagers in 
Salt for Svanetia. Both draw on the tension between ancient practice and modern 
intrusion, and on the dream of spiritual ecstasy achieved through labor and sacrifice. 
Throughout the film's second part Kalatozov and Urusevsky continue to express their 
dual longings for revolutionary enthusiasm and spontaneity on the one hand, and for 
material beauty on the other. Perhaps the most optimistic scene in all of I Am Cuba shows 
a peasant girl going to the village store, buying a Coke, taking a swig and singing 
joyfully. Coca-Cola itself would be hard-pressed to concoct a better testimonial to the 
global gift of sugar water. This scene, it is true, is followed by the terrifying vision of her 
father burning the land he farms, which is soon to be taken by United Fruit Company, and 
dying in the smoke. There is an unstated expectation that the girl and her brother, with 
nowhere left to go, will join the ranks of the revolutionaries. But the scenes do not 
function as a juxtaposition in which the latter image renders the former vulgar, the way 
an Eisensteinian juxtaposition of luxuriating officers and abused sailors might. The Coke-
and-a-smile scene retains its integrity: we do not sneer at the apolitical vacuity of soda-
sipping, but lament the tragedy that the girl is unlikely ever to sip soda again. And, in 
some small way, the goal of revolution becomes to get a Coke back into this girl’s hand 
someday.   
The curious mixing of revolutionary nostalgia and nostalgia for the promise of 
material progress and wellbeing continues in the film’s most openly political segment, 
the story of Havana’s student revolutionaries. After the students torch the projected 
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image of Fulgencio Batista at the drive-in movie theater, they pull past a checkpoint, 
where a well-placed co-conspirator waves them on. They pull onto a Havana commercial 
street, gleaming beneath the great neon logo of General Electric, and stop in front of a 
shop with ceiling-to-floor place glass windows. Behind the window are comely 
mannequins in stylish gowns. The boys feign looking in the window while their leader, 
Enrique, tells them it will be safest if they do go home that night. The boys scatter, but 
Enrique remains. The shop windows are not transparently vulgar, simply transparent: 
what we see through them is not a bad dream, just a dream. Here Urusevsky’s 
photographic passion, his love of the visual material world, trumps any stereotypical 
ideological project. Political circumstance cannot drain the splendor from the image of 
the electrified Havana boulevard.  
But wait—here comes the navy, the U.S. Navy to be precise. Twenty-some-odd 
sailors amble onto the screen, arriving, apparently straight from a Gene Kelley-Frank 
Sinatra wartime flick. One of them plays the harmonica. The others sing, in perfect key, a 
bawdy tune about their heroic deeds, their invincible country, and “girls in old 
Guantanamo” who “never say no.” At this unfortunate moment, a pretty young woman in 
a black dress steps out onto the sidewalk, and the sailors, like hounds at the hunt, give 
chase. She sprints around a corner, the formerly singing sailors now whistling in hot 
pursuit, and comes upon Enrique, who is lingering before that magnificent window. She 
hides behind him. The sailors approach; one of them almost nose-to-nose with Enrique. 
Enrique does not give way. A tense moment, and, then, from one of the soldiers: “Aw, 
let’s give this guy a break, Steve.” The lead sailor, this Steve fellow, grins at Enrique—an 
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expression between menace and haughty dismissiveness—and begins singing once more. 
He turns, the sailors follow, and the pack of hounds transforms once more into the jolly 
crowd from Anchors Aweigh. (In the Russian voiceover, the menace of this scene is 
intensified significantly by the incorrect translation of  the English “give this guy a 
break” as the Russian equivalent of  “show this guy a thing or two.”)  
The scene of the singing sailors can be seen in two ways. On one hand, it captures 
the worst late-Stalin-era habits of the Soviet filmmakers. It is as if Kalatozov had never 
shot The Cranes Are Flying and was back once more to Conspiracy of the Doomed. The 
issue is not that the American presence in Cuba was not problematic—clearly it was (and, 
in the case of Guantanamo, remains) problematic. But these sailors are pure symbols, 
stick figures animated not by life or even by ideology itself, but by made-to-order 
ideologically inflected cultural stereotype. In other words, it was the kind of image late-
Stalin era artists learned to conjure in order to satisfy the very clear needs and definite 
assumptions of the political structure the served.  
On the other hand, the scene, with the cinematic splendor of its clean-cut, smiling 
sailors in dashing white clothes hints at the same ambiguity that fuels most of the film. 
Before and after they turn into a pack of hounds, these are simply energetic, cocky young 
military guys, not so unlike the Soviet Navy’s own energetic, cocky young military guys. 
If one seeks to portray demonic menace, a Broadway tune and the words “give this guy a 
break” hardly get the job done. After the sailors depart, the film has one of its most 
touching moments—a moment that captures the Thaw spirit of capturing what is most 
simply and fundamentally human in any circumstance: boy meets girl. Enrique learns that 
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the girl’s name is Gloria; she learns that he is Enrique. She is standing in front of the 
gleaming window display, a mannequin in a wedding dress, with tall electric candles on 
each side. Here is Gloria—escapee from American wolf-whistlers and new friend of a 
devoted revolutionary—framed against a decadent capitalist window display, and the 
filmmakers seem not to be drawing a contrast between her simplicity and glamor of the 
dress in the window but saying, simply, Why not her? Why shouldn’t Gloria have such a 
dress?  
Enrique’s subsequent adventures continue to bring to the screen a mix of 
revolutionary courage, deeply human sensitivity, and intense beauty. When Enrique 
decides he must assassinate the corrupt police chief who has killed several of his 
comrades, he heads into a gleaming white building at the top of which a rifle has been 
planted for him. As he enters, a toothless old man sings a  mournful, haunting song of 
forgiveness. Enrique continues methodically up the stairs, a great glass wall to his side 
opening up to the whitewashed splendors of modern Havana. The music echoes; he 
shakes it off. Reaching the roof, Enrique passes a series of brilliant white modernist 
buttresses. In both The Cranes Are Flying and I Am Cuba,, Urusevsky employs shots of a 
hero moving horizontally across a series of vertical markers: they can be birch trees or 
fence posts, as in Cranes, or sugarcane, as in the second part of I Am Cuba. The effect is 
not simply to aestheticize the shot and thus detract from its thematic meaning, but to 
permit the shot to speak in a voice that complicates mere novelistic thematics. Our lives 
are lived on a visual terrain, and the visual constantly complicates and ameliorates the 
“story” of the moment: Life is more than a plot, and a moment in life has meanings that 
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go far beyond its functional space in some narrative arc. As Enrique moves along the 
buttresses, the sun-drenched, whitewashed city glistens the distance. The beauties of 
civilization—and the camera’s attention to them—complicate our sense of his retributive 
mission. We know he is on his way to end the life of a killer before the killer can kill 
again, but we can keep neither our eyes nor our mind off all this beauty.  
As we have seen, such respected Soviet critics as Neya Zorkaya (1991) criticized 
Kalatozov and Urusevsky for being so committed to capturing visual beauty that they 
bleed the thematic significance from the scenes and render I Am Cuba a cold exercise in 
cinematic technique. But the visual splendor of Urusevsky’s shots cannot be separated 
from the thematics of the film: visuality is an essential part of the message of the film—
the world can never be grasped by stories or ideas alone: we need to look closer, and 
when we do we’ll see that everything is more complicated than we had imagined, both 
better and worse than we had thought. As in the best silent cinema of the 1920s, the 
image introduces polysemy into the seemingly pat arc of the story. When Enrique aims 
the rifle, he sees the murderous cop eating an omelet with his children on the balcony. 
The old man’s sensitive song returns. Enrique cannot fire. The song is an obvious 
signifying device for Enrique’s sensitivity, but throughout the scene the subtler signal of 
visual beauty has communicated a message of life. 
The film’s openness to beauty and to ostensibly “bourgeois” human sensitivity 
complements rather than contradicts the filmmakers’ high regard for the courage and 
revolutionary enthusiasm for Enrique and his fellow students. Indeed, Enrique’s friend 
and revolutionary mentor, Alberto, has told him that individual acts of terror are not the 
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road to revolutionary success. The students set to work printing bulletins to alert people 
that Castro, contrary to reports in the Havana press, is alive and gathering his forces in 
the Sierra Maestra. The police raid the printing-room and a young student, knowing full 
well the probable consequence, rushes to the balcony and begins showering the 
completed bulletins on the people below. A policeman shoots him and he falls to the 
ground, the bulletins still drifting down around him.  
Enrique witnesses the tragedy and is moved to take a new kind of action. Wizened 
by his abortive attempt to be an assassin, he adopts a more disciplined revolutionary 
consciousness to complement his impassioned spontaneity: His next appearance is in the 
canonical socialist-realist role of Orator. Speaking from the steps of the university, he 
exhorts his fellow students to continue their battle for justice. The peaceful demonstration 
is interrupted by a police warning; shots are fired; a dove falls. Enrique picks up the dove 
and walks stoically down the steps and onto the broad boulevard. The students follow 
him; Alberto begins to sing, and all of the students join in. The police turn their hoses on 
the students. Gloria moves anxiously through the crowd, calling for Enrique. (This shot 
echoes the scene in The Cranes Are Flying where Veronika searches a crowd in vain for 
her beloved Boris on the day he leaves for the front). In the chaos that follows, we hear 
only the sound of the hoses as Enrique, his eyes glazed with an infinite sadness, picks up 
a rock and walks toward the police chief. The chief fires. Enrique is hit but keeps moving 
forward, the hoses bearing down on him from both sides and forming a cross. Another 
shot, then another. The screen goes momentarily black. We witness Enrique’s fall 
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through his eyes, as the world around him is soaked and blurred by the unyielding, all-
consuming spray. 
Such scenes may invite the label of Communist kitsch, but 20th-century history 
offers many examples of similar (if less stylish) episodes when the solidarity of the 
people confronted the blunt edge of established power. Is a portrayal of the peaceful 
protests led by Mohandas Gandhi “anti-colonial kitsch”? Shall we call a rendering of the 
March on Washington “civil rights kitsch”? If the dove is something of a leaden symbol, 
it should also not be forgotten that 20th century protest movements were, at their heart, 
romantic, and were prone to such leaden symbolism. Kalatozov is not simply parroting 
socialist-realist tropes but sincerely celebrating the youthful sense of revolutionary 
solidarity. In any case, as Steven Holden of The New York Times pointed out in a 1995 
review, Urusevsky’s camera makes the film “much more than a relic of Communist 
kitsch” (Holden, 1995).  Indeed, the word “kitsch” implies a hackneyed, borrowed 
aesthetic, which makes no sense in discussion of a film whose enduring legacy has been 
its novel impressionistic vision of the world.  
The final scene of the students’ story begins with the ringing of church bells. The 
bell is one of the enduring symbols of Russian culture, both a marker of the city amid the 
vast countryside and “a means of bringing the word of God into the presence of men”; in 
traditional Russian culture, the sight and sound of the bell did not simply augment the 
Word, but, in a way Urusevsky would no doubt appreciate, embodied it: “There was no 
reason to write discursively about the imperfect world of here and now,” writes James 
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Billington, “when one could see—however darkly—through the beauty of sights and 
sounds a transfigured world beyond” (Billington, 1970, pp. 37-39).  
Urusevsky’s shot of the bells introduces a sequence that invokes the exuberantly 
inventive spirit of 1920s avant-garde Soviet cinema: Rushing down from the belfry, the 
camera captures Enrique’s funeral procession through the streets of Havana.  We see 
Gloria moving sadly through the crowd, then Alberto as he takes over for a pallbearer. 
The camera scales the side of a building, enters a cigar shop (oddly, the only scene of 
workers in an ostensibly socialist film) tracks along the shop while a Cuban flag is 
handed from one worker to the next and then hung out the window in tribute to Enrique 
and the revolution. Now the camera moves above the flag, past the balcony, and out over 
the teeming street as the city celebrates a new martyr and dreams of a better future. 
Both the “orator” scene and the funeral procession recapitulate classic socialist-
realist set-pieces. Kalatozov also used the orator device near the conclusion of both The 
First Echelon and The Cranes Are Flying. These devices, writes Semyon Freilikh, 
conclude a film with the hero in “a monumental stance, directing his gaze into the future, 
thus illuminating his communion with the life of the next generation” (quoted in Woll, p. 
34-35). But such traditional tropes do not negate a filmmaker’s sincerity or reduce the 
film to the ranks of time-serving propaganda. Prokhorov (2002) has eloquently 
demonstrated that even the most trailblazing films of the Thaw did not represent a 
complete break from socialist-realist cinema. Certain tropes and conceptions had become 
part of the Soviet cinematic language—what changed, sometimes subtly, sometimes 
markedly, was the context in which these tropes were applied and the aesthetics with 
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which they were shot. In any case, Stalinism can lay no exclusive claim to the images of 
the heroic orator or the mourned martyr. What’s more, for a filmmaker eager to reconnect 
with the revolutionary energy of the 1920s, the impassioned orator harkens not back to 
the hidebound administrative cleverness of Stalin, but to the romantic vision of Lenin, 
freshly arrived at Finland station in 1917, exhorting the gathered masses to build a new 
world. 
5. Conclusion 
Mikhail Kalatozov’s nostalgia for the Soviet 1920s is nostalgia for an invigorated, 
meaningful sense of social justice, for sincere emotion and even a sort of socialist 
spirituality in the performance of one’s social role, and for the courage to hold fast to 
high and heartfelt principles. It is also nostalgia for the unfulfilled and tantalizing promise 
of better material conditions for the people. For the Soviets of the 1920s, as for the 
Cubans of the 1960s, the promise of revolution was in large part a promise of 
modernization. The material product of human production was to be equitably divided, 
but it was also to become more plentiful, and, eventually, superior, to what had been 
offered under capitalism. It should come as no surprise that an ideology built around the 
means of production should espouse a fundamental goal of enabling more effective 
production.  
Kalatozov and Urusevsky had arrived in a newly socialist Cuba whose 
marketplaces were newly emptied and proceeded to recreate the last days of commercial 
Havana, with its alluring shop-fronts, its street-sellers with carts full of oranges (among 
more illicit goods), its hotel pools, its jazz, and its gleaming modern buildings. Their 
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images of this lost Havana—a Havana that spoke simultaneously of revolution and 
(improperly distributed) abundance—created an intense ambiguity at the heart of I Am 
Cuba. Those nightmarish days begin to take on the qualities of a daydream. The 
renunciation of bourgeois vulgarity remains at the film’s narrative surface; meanwhile, 
the layered images below are replete with longing for the glistening city, for a union of its 
energies and pleasures with the enthusiasm and justice of the Revolution.  
Memory offered a precedent for such hopes: The filmmakers had gotten their first 
taste of revolutionary aesthetics during the vibrant, heroic Soviet 1920s, years that were 
devilishly difficult in their everyday reality but thrilling in their unfulfilled promise. The 
spirit of creative experimentation that had given jazz to the West had its analogue in the 
visual culture of the Soviet 1920s. From the designs of the Stenberg brothers and El 
Lissitsky to the films of Sergei Eisenstein and the architectural visions of Vladimir Tatlin, 
early Soviet culture had been not merely modern, but the vanguard of modernism—a 
modernism that was the product of idiosyncratic individual vision liberated, inspired, and 
emboldened by the spirit of revolution. The promise of Leninism, for Kalatozov and 
Urusevsky, was the promise of justice, idealism, personal courage and heroism. But it 
was also the promise of spontaneous creativity, electrified modernity, and the unfolding 
splendor of the material world. 
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CHAPTER V 
REENTERING ETERNITY: 
NOSTALGIA FOR THE SPIRIT OF CREATION IN  
ANDREI TARKOVSKY’S ANDREI RUBLEV 
 
1. Introduction 
Rolan Bykov is sweating. Leaping, spinning, standing on his hands, kicking a 
drum with his feet, singing things that ought not be sung in polite company.  Fortunately, 
he is not in polite company, but on a film set, in a crude log hut, performing for actors 
dressed as peasants, having great fun describing the sexual misadventures of the 15th 
century Russian nobility. The film is Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1966 masterpiece, Andrei 
Rublev, a meditation on the life and times of Russia’s greatest medieval icon painter. 
Bykov plays the role of the skomorokh, the itinerant jester whose rough stock-in-trade is 
the profane leavening of a heavy life. His motion is elemental; it stirs the stillness like a 
hard spring wind; in medieval huts, as on Soviet film sets, the anarchic spirit is an 
indispensable and dangerous thing. The jester rests, accepts water from his grateful 
audience. Outside a window frame, rain falls hard upon the countryside. Three monks 
have entered for shelter; one will betray the jester. Henchmen of the Grand Prince will 
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arrive, pull the jester outside, bash his head into a tree trunk. He will lose his freedom. He 
will lose his tongue. The film will go unseen by the Russian public for five years; the 
Soviet authorities will consider it too blunt in its presentation of a cruel age. In 1969, the 
film will show at Cannes and win the International Federation of Film Critics 
(FIPRESCI) Prize. By 1971, the authorities will relent, and Andrei Rublev will make its 
way onto Soviet screens and begin its long ascent into the Russian cinematic canon.  
Bykov would later say that he saw in Tarkovsky’s works a nostalgia “not aimed at 
the past” (Bykov, 1990, p. 155). What can this possibly mean? Isn’t nostalgia all about 
the past? And what kind of nostalgia can one attribute to a director whose vision of the 
past includes such things as the removal of jesters’ tongues? Wouldn’t this be the 
opposite of nostalgia?  Bykov’s words, however, are not to be dismissed. Tarkovsky’s 
cinematic nostalgia, he said, replaced longing for a lost past with “a yearning for the 
future, whose roots he sought as an artist interested in history.” Like any good jester, 
Bykov gave conventional thinking a sly twist, and in doing so offered a gateway to a 
deeper understanding of Tarkovsky as a director, Andrei Rublev as a film, and the 
position of both filmmaker and film in Soviet culture.  
In this chapter, I will take up Bykov’s invitation and analyze the ways in which 
Andrei Rublev encourages and rewards a creative reconsideration of the very concept of 
nostalgia. In the first section, I outline the film’s narrative and point out the crucial 
questions it raises about the nature of hope and longing. The second section introduces 
and develops Svetlana Boym’s typology of nostalgia. Next, I discuss the conventional 
portrayal of Rublev as a historical figure and the film’s challenge to that portrayal. 
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Finally, building on the ideas of Henri Bergson, I explore the ways in which the 
materiality of the film’s images embodies an ambiguous, open-ended, and highly spiritual 
brand of nostalgic longing. 
2. The Narrative Arc of Andrei Rublev 
The film’s narrative begins in the summer of 1400 with Rublev’s departure from 
the Trinity Monastery in the forests outside Moscow; it ends 24 years later on the eve of 
his return to the same monastery, where he will paint his greatest icon, The Old 
Testament Trinity. The young Rublev we meet at the start of the film has acquired a deep 
but untested faith from the monastery’s founder, Sergei Radonezhky. But as a monk-
iconographer in the wider world, Rublev witnesses the depravity of his times, the 
fundamental imperfection and imperfectability of humanity. He is deeply disturbed by the 
deep chasm between the ideals of the spirit and life as lived by actual bodies, by the 
parallel disharmonies between man and man and man and nature. The apogee of his crisis 
comes when he must kill to save the life of an innocent. He will stop painting, stop 
speaking, renounce his artistic gift. His learned faith, as Tarkovsky (1986) has put it, will 
be burned in the crucible of experience. But it will be reborn.  
Andrei Rublev dispenses with the traditional socialist-realist biopic model of a 
positive hero who stands astride the action, disciplining the camera never to stray far 
from his path. Instead, the camera leaves Rublev repeatedly and for extended periods. 
Tarkovsky’s method is not simply to recreate Rublev’s life (approximately 1360-1430)—
of which only the barest outlines are recorded in medieval chronicles—but rather to draw 
from the history of his time a vision of the world with which the artist had to contend. 
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Only once, fleetingly, do we see the great painter paint, restoring a tiny fire-damaged 
icon of St. George. The film is not about the working life of an artist, but the life the artist 
must perceive in order to work.  
As we alternately follow and depart from Rublev’s path, Tarkovsky ushers us 
through a rogue’s gallery of his imagined 15th century: We meet an inventor-balloonist 
who takes flight even as his countrymen do all they can to stop this devilry; we enter the 
cabin with Bykov’s soon-to-be punished jester; we study with Rublev at the feet of the 
elderly, deeply conflicted icon painter Theophanes the Greek, who is simultaneously full 
of pity and brimstone for the tormented and tormenting Russian people (at one point 
Theophanes must pause in his creation of holy images at a Kremlin cathedral to beg the 
crowd outside to stop torturing its victim). Later, we share with Rublev the searing vision 
of flesh and firelight at a pagan midsummer night’s bacchanal and watch the next 
morning as the princely authorities ruthlessly hunt the pagans down; we witness the white 
perfection of undecorated church walls and the brutal blinding of the masons who built 
them; we ride with Russia’s Tatar overlords and the renegade forces of the Grand 
Prince’s brother as they savagely destroy the ancient town of Vladimir. Amid the chaos 
of the raid, we watch a Russian raider drag a simple young woman—a holy fool—up a 
ladder. And we watch as Rublev follows with an axe and saves her. In the dreadful 
aftermath, as snow falls in the ruined cathedral, Rublev will meet Theophanes’s ghost, 
confess to killing the raider, and take a vow of silence that will last 15 years. 
In the film’s final episode we meet Boriska, a boy whose deceased father was an 
expert bell-caster but who himself knows nothing of the craft, and we watch as Boriska, 
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driven by a deeper knowledge, leads a vast crew of older workers to cast a bell for the 
leering Grand Prince. Rublev himself is off-screen for most of Boriska’s tale, but he is, 
just as we are, watching. When the bell is complete, Boriska wanders off alone and 
collapses in exhaustion. Rublev breaks his vow of silence, comforts the boy, and 
proposes they go to the Trinity monastery together, Boriska to cast bells, Rublev to paint 
once more. In the epilogue that follows, the black and white film bursts into color and we 
see for the first time the works of Andrei Rublev.  
From this sketch of events, we can understand how Rublev’s youthful faith might 
be shattered. But how could faith be reborn from such unpromising narrative material? Is 
Boriska’s triumph—which earns not so much as a nod of acknowledgment from a Grand 
Prince who was more than ready to execute the boy if he failed—the sole source of hope 
on this bleak landscape? Does hope grow from the occurrences in the film, from the 
“story” within history? Rublev’s early faith was destroyed precisely by his perception of 
the social conditions and conventions of his time, none of which have changed by the end 
of the narrative. His thirst for a lost and illusory faith can hardly have been “quenched” 
by worldly events, and his longing for a better world must remain precisely a longing.  
How, then, does the film account for Rublev’s renaissance? The question requires 
us to consider the ways in which Tarkovsky has quietly seeded the cinematic soil with 
both history and counter-history. On one hand, the film presents painstakingly wrought 
events that appear to leave one with little to long for; on the other hand, it discovers 
beneath, within, alongside, and obscured by those events numberless spiritual 
possibilities that remain latent in man and nature, ready to inspire us if only we pause 
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long enough in the business of living to grant attention to life. Andrei Rublev rejects 
restoration of the past while inviting us to intense reflection upon the shards of latent 
beauty that lie within the past, beyond the past, and within us. As we shall see, by lacing 
his film’s images with ineffable indeterminate longing—longing at once temporal, 
material, and spiritual—Tarkovsky used one kind of nostalgia to shatter another. 
3. The New Nostalgia 
In a 1983 interview for American Film, Tarkovsky told J. Hoberman and Gideon 
Bachmann that nostalgia is “sadness for that lost span during which we did not manage to 
count our forces, to marshal them, and to do our duty” (Gianvito, 2006, p. 94). This is a 
radical reframing of the notion of nostalgia, in which the longing is not for what did 
happen, but precisely for what did not. In his films, Tarkovsky creates a narrative on one 
level, but on another he looks beyond the very concept of happening to fix upon 
polysemic images that invite the viewer’s creative contemplation of possibilities lost and 
found. He not only liberates his tale from the social straitjacket of Boym’s restorative 
nostalgia but actively shreds it. Restorative nostalgia calls for a past frozen into a system 
of conventional, ideologically inflected fixed images, prepared and packaged for 
superimposition onto the present. It is less an affect than a policy platform. But 
reflective nostalgia is the stuff of individual idiosyncratic longing, the collision of our 
unique and often dreamlike personal recollections with frameworks of social memory 
(Boym, 2001). It is often a longing for a past that is difficult to define, or even to 
picture—the lightning image of an opportunity briefly glimpsed and then lost in time.  
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In Andrei Rublev, Tarkovsky summons this flash in many ways, most notably 
through the ambiguous use of natural images that exist both within Rublev’s time and 
beyond it. At the conclusion of the film’s prologue, just after the balloonist’s fateful 
crash, Tarkovsky’s camera lingers on a horse rolling over on the damp green riverbank. 
The scene that precedes the image of the horse has nothing to do with horses, nor do the 
scenes that follow. Tarkovsky’s aim in the shot is clearly not to encourage us to piece 
together the relationship of horses to the life of Andrei Rublev or to the historical arc of 
the 15th century; the shot’s purpose, it seems, is not really for us to think about horses at 
all. Yet the presence of the horse, so indifferent to the dreams of the balloonist and the 
suspicions of the villagers, is deeply affecting, a supra-rational invocation of the integrity 
of life beyond history, beyond the social and political norms that so often enclose our 
daily experience and sense of possibilities.  
Tarkovsky will return to equine imagery throughout the film. In the devastating 
scene of the Tatar-Russian raid, his camera, in an early example of what would become 
the classic Tarkovskian long pan, will move left-to-right past a crowd of invaders 
slamming their way through the cathedral doors behind which the townspeople hide, past 
the grinning face of the Tatar chieftain and the guilty grimace of the Grand Prince’s 
younger brother, who has collaborated in this atrocity, and finally to the impassive and 
beautiful face of the young prince’s white horse. At the start of the shot, the chieftain 
asks, “Aren’t you sorry for the cathedral?” The prince does not answer, just scratches at 
his nose and stares into the distance as the camera moves by him and lingers on his steed. 
The horse, unlike its rider, is not a collaborator but a visual gateway to some undefined 
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space beyond all this, a time both before and after, a moment worth longing for.  The 
camera, as if awaking us from this brief dream, cuts to another horse being pushed from a 
wooden staircase, falling through the railing, writhing on the ground, where a raider 
plunges a spear through its heart; on the left side of the frame, a prostrate woman pulls 
her skirts down as a Tatar raider stands over her. There is here nothing historical worth 
restoring; there is only the endangered beauty that lies beyond history, forever inviting 
sad reflection upon our better angels. 
4. Layers of Memory: Rublev and Rublev in Russian History 
Tarkovsky’s depiction of the raid on Vladimir demonstrates his utter rejection of 
restorative nostalgia, his flat refusal to varnish a harsh historical epoch or portray it as the 
means to a glorious end. The 15th century is not presented as a steppingstone to Russian 
unity, and indeed, Tarkovsky does not confuse the moral category of unity with the 
political one of unification. Unification became a fact in 15th century Russia. Unity did 
not. In the heat of the raid, Tarkovsky shows us terrified face of Rublev’s young 
apprentice, Foma, as he beholds an attacker. “Brother, what are you doing?” says Foma, 
“We’re both Russians!” This plea for national fraternity earns a most un-brotherly 
response from the attacker: “I’ll show you, you Vladimir scum!” Foma flees, but soon 
takes an arrow to the chest. Tarkovsky films him in slow motion as he takes his last 
strides, reaches desperately forward toward some indeterminate space in the air, and falls 
alongside the riverbed. White paint flows downstream.  
This is the third time Tarkovsky has shown us the image of paint on the river. In 
an early scene, Foma washes his brushes while Rublev and Theophanes discuss the 
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crucifixion; later, paint flows past the blinded masons after they collapse in pain by the 
riverbed, their eyes gouged out for the crime of accepting a commission from the Grand 
Prince’s brother. Paint carries the promise of the creative act, but society is forever 
responding with acts of destruction—crucifixion, blinding, the torching of towns—that 
dissolve the dream of art, sending it downstream to be rediscovered by some later 
generation. Tarkovsky longed not for the mythological glories of national history, but for 
the promise of this flowing paint, for the imaginary possibilities represented by the path 
not taken. 
* * * 
In 1962, the film critic Yuri Tiurin met with Tarkovsky and his cameraman, 
Vadim Yusov, and the three looked at Rublev’s icons in a 1959 collection assembled by 
Mikhail Alpatov. The book, which had been given to Tarkovsky by the Polish director 
Andrzej Wajda, was in a dust jacket, and on the dust jacket was a reproduction of 
Rublev’s icon of the Archangel Michael. The image, Tarkovsky told Tiurin, manifested a 
certain feeling—“the people’s nostalgia for brotherhood” (Tiurin, p. 14). Just what kind 
of nostalgia was this that Rublev’s work seemed, for Tarkovsky, to contain and evoke? 
Was it restorative, fixed and officially approved—the nostalgia of the symbol? Or was it 
reflective, multifaceted, and evoked by the art itself—the nostalgia of the image? If the 
film was born from Tarkovsky’s perception of the images, and of the time in which 
Rublev created them, we must take a look at those times, as well as at the social 
meanings that through the centuries have gathered like barnacles upon both Rublev’s 
images and his era. 
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 Rublev’s birth date is generally placed sometime between the late 1350s and 
1370. He was born in the vicinity of Moscow, and spent much of his life in the Moscow-
Vladimir-Suzdal area of central Russia. (Sergeev, 1998, p. 32).  This was also the center 
of Russian power during Rublev’s lifetime, the field upon which Russian princes and 
Tatar Khans vied for dominance of the country. (The Tatars were the descendents of the 
Mongol invaders who had shattered the advanced Orthodox culture of Kievan Rus’ in 
1240 and who ruled Russia for more than 200 years, a period known as the “Mongol 
Yoke”.) As a young man, Rublev became a monk and icon painter at the Holy Trinity 
Monastery in the forest in the outskirts of Moscow. The monastery had been founded by 
Sergei Radonezhky in 1340 as a center of ascetic worship. By Rublev’s adulthood, it had 
already become one of the most important spiritual-political centers in appanage Russia. 
Before the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380, Sergei himself had blessed Grand Prince 
Dmitrii Donskoi, who then rode into battle, the icon of the Vladimir Mother of God in 
tow, and secured the first ever victory by a Russian force over the Tatars.  
Around the turn of the 15th century, Rublev, already with some renown as an icon 
painter, left for the Spas-Andronikov monastery in Moscow. By 1405, he was painting 
the walls of Grand Prince Vasily I’s new Kremlin chapel (Sergeev, 1998, p. 73).  From 
1408-1410, he was painting in the Assumption Cathedral (sometimes translated as the 
Dormition Cathedral) in Vladimir, which had been built in 1160. Between 1410-1420, he 
returned to his old home at the Holy Trinity Monastery and painted his masterpiece, The 
Old Testament Trinity. Rublev died on January 29, 1430 at the Spas-Andronikov 
Monastery, where he is buried (Sergeev, p. 316). In 1551, the great Stoglav church 
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council met in Moscow and declared that all future icons should be painted in accordance 
“with ancient images such as the Greek artists painted and as were painted by Andrei 
Rublev and other highly praised artists” (Sergeev, p. 325). 
Four hundred years later, the officially atheist Soviet regime would invoke Rublev 
as a symbol of national pride. During World War II, Stalin had instituted a policy of 
official nationalism and framed the war not as a defense of Soviet communism but as a 
battle for the survival of Mother Russia. For obvious reasons, the legacy of Dmitrii 
Donskoi as a prince-liberator was useful during the war. But the age of sanctioned and 
selective mythological nationalism continued after the war and outlived Stalin himself, 
and the 1950s brought a sort of “Rublev boom”. According to longtime Russian journalist 
and film critic Yuri Tiurin, the most influential commentator on Rublev in the 1950s was 
Natalia Demina. Writing in a style that captures the burgeoning idealism, national pride, 
and lyricism of the Thaw, Demina saw in Rublev’s work an expression of the classic 
Slavophile model of a Russia that may seem to be sleeping, but always rises to the 
occasion. In 1956 she wrote that Rublev’s work reflected “complete truthfulness and 
sincerity of feeling,” but that this sincerity did not belong to Rublev alone: 
In the decisive moments of history, the strength of the people’s 
soul is called into action and remarkably heroic deeds are 
accomplished. One must give proper due to artists who managed to 
instill in their creations the image of those through whom the 
highest truth of the national character was expressed (Tiurin, p. 
15). 
 
This is a rather complicated way of affixing ultimate responsibility for Rublev’s 
images on “the people”. The man, in this formulation, was merely the medium. Rublev’s 
work, Demina wrote, expressed “the national self-consciousness of the Russian man.” An 
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ambiguous historical figure is thus turned into a fixed national symbol, credit for a job 
well done is subtly transferred from the individual to the collective, and personal genius 
becomes a public commodity.   
Demina was hardly alone in her views. A good deal of literature was published on 
Rublev in the 1950s, and, by the early 1960s, Rublev had been adopted as an idealized 
nationalist symbol by everyone from the nationalist artist Ilya Glazunov (who painted an 
angelic, blue-eyed Rublev, remarkably different from the figure in Tarkovsky’s film) to 
respected art critics and historians. Dmitrii Likhachev, perhaps the greatest of all Soviet 
scholars of Russian cultural history, had set the tone for looking at Rublev as a national 
treasure:  
The time of Rublev was an epoch of rebirth of faith in man, in his 
moral strength, in his capacity for self-sacrifice in the name of high 
ideals. It was a time of the rebirth of interest in our own history, in 
the culture of the time of independent Rus’ before the Mongol 
invasion. The time of Rublev was one of the flowering of 
literature, epics, and political self-awareness (Sergeev, p. 7). 
 
The conservative film critic Rostislav Yurenev, meanwhile, defended the 
contemporary relevance of Tarkovsky’s antique subject on the debatable grounds 
that the film conveyed “the feeling of national pride in the unsinkable talent of the 
Russian people” (Tiurin, 2004, p. 11). He did not mention that one of the 
unsinkable talents the film conveyed was the talent for slaughter.  
In the discourse of the 1950s, the figure of Rublev became entangled with 
the fact of the victory at Kulikovo Field, which took place when Rublev was 
between 10 and 20 years old, two decades before he would paint the first of his 
known icons. The victory, as we shall see, was hardly the end of the Mongol 
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Yoke, and by 1382 the Khan’s army had invaded Moscow and torched much of it 
to the ground. The battle of Kulikovo Field has, however, been widely interpreted 
as the flashpoint of a new Russian self-confidence that would play out over the 
next 150 years as the various Russian principalities were brought under unified 
Muscovite rule. The battle of Kulikovo Field is not only seen as the rebirth of 
Russian self-consciousness (a restorative-nostalgic glance back at the lost golden 
age of Kievan Rus’), but as the moment when Russia saved Western civilization 
from Mongol barbarism. Tiurin explicitly connects Rublev’s legacy with 
Dmitrii’s: 
Rublev’s historical assignment consisted in, first, the idea of the 
political unity of the Russian lands under the rule of the Muscovite 
Grand Princedom, and, second, in the necessity and possibility of 
complete independence from the intolerable Golden Horde (Tiurin, 
2004, p. 16). 
 
Dmitrii Donskoi’s victory was not only a political or martial event, but a 
cultural one, and in the mid-20th century, the best elements of the cultural epoch 
that followed Dmitrii’s reign were symbolically yoked to the great victory. In 
1960, the Soviet Union officially celebrated the 600th anniversary of Rublev’s 
birth. That year, the Andrei Rublev Museum of Ancient Russian Art opened at the 
Andronikov Monastery, where the artist lived and is buried. The date of the 
opening was September 21 (September 8 old style), the day of commemoration of 
the victory at Kulikovo Field. Andrei Rublev had been drawn into the Soviet 
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narrative of international struggle and encirclement, one of the central tropes of 
the Stalin years.38  
The Soviet glorification of the age of Rublev willfully neglected the 
complications of that age. The period after Rublev’s death in 1430 brought decades of 
savage civil war between the Russian princes. All the while, the Tatars, though weakened 
by their own internecine strife, continued to collect tribute from the Russian lands, 
conduct raids, play the Russian princes off of one another, and arrogate to themselves the 
right to anoint their favorite of the moment as Grand Prince. The Mongol Yoke would not 
be decisively thrown off until 1480. Meanwhile, the impressive cultural developments of 
the early 15th century—a “Russian Renaissance” embodied most notably by Rublev’s 
icons and frescos—were unmatched by a similar spirit of innovation in the political 
sphere (Vernadsky, 1969). The Muscovite state that coalesced in central Russia between 
1450 and 1550 emerged only at an extraordinary price: brutal civil war, the subjection of 
all personal wealth and freedom to the will of the Tsar, the end of church independence, 
the subjugation of the arts to the preferred political narrative of the Muscovite princedom, 
and the general decline in the quality of iconography (Crummey, 1987, p. 192).  
Georges Florovsky argues that Russian art “definitely declined in the fifteenth and 
especially the sixteenth century and lost its originality and daring” and attributes this 
                                                
38 The nationalist appropriation of Rublev reflects not only instrumental politics but also the century-old 
Slavophile tension between the ancient concept of sobornost, or conjunctivity—in which unique 
individuals cooperate seamlessly to shape a harmonious society that is enriched by their uniqueness—and 
Slavocentrism, which posits the world as an apocalyptic battlefield with Orthodox Slavs on one side and 
Everyone Else on the other (Riazanovsky, 1965). On one hand, Rublev’s message was said to be one of 
love; on the other hand, it was interpreted by Soviet commentators as a call not only for harmonious 
national unity, but for the national unification, under the firm hand of the Muscovite Grand Prince, of a 
long-suppressed genius-people now ready to take on all comers. 
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decline to the Muscovite penchant for top-down aesthetic system-building (the very 
phenomenon at play in the Stoglav pronouncement of 1551):  
Cultures are never built as systems, by orders or on purpose. They 
are born out of the spirit of creative initiative, out of intimate 
vision, out of spiritual commitment, and are only maintained in 
freedom. It may be contended that Moscow missed its opportunity 
for cultural progress when it yielded to the temptation of building 
its culture on the social order of the day—po sotsial’nomu zakazu, 
as it were (Florovsky, Andreyev, & Billington, 1969, pp. 217-218).  
 
Against the historical background of 15th and 16th century Muscovy, then, it is difficult 
to read Rublev’s work—noted for its extraordinary gentleness of line and form—as an 
expression of the political thrust of his times or as a harbinger of political harmony and 
artistic effervescence to come. Perhaps one can more accurately regard it as the terminus 
of a particular path of cultural development, a historical dead-end, beyond which lay the 
ghost-path that Tarkovsky would reflect upon almost six centuries later. 
* * * 
From the very beginning of Andrei Rublev, Tarkovsky lays down markers to this 
ghost path alongside images of the rougher historical realities that impeded its way. In the 
film’s prologue, he brings us memorable images of the Russian countryside from the 
point of view of a peasant’s jerry-rigged hot air balloon. The sequence is so visually 
breathtaking, and the parallels with the film’s primary narrative of an innovator finding 
his “voice” so powerful, that it is easy to look past a key narrative element of the scene: 
In the opening shots, villagers, monks, and princely authorities are frantically trying to 
prevent Yefim’s fateful flight. Thus in the film’s opening minutes, Tarkovsky gives us 
both a reflective-nostalgic vision of peasant ingenuity and a firm rejection of the 
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restorative-nostalgic conception that the nation and the historical epoch were supportive 
of and responsible for such genius. 
The scene is an echo of a historical tale, probably apocryphal, of the 18th century 
peasant Kriakutnyi flying in a balloon filled with black smoke. In the 1950s, the Soviet 
government seized upon the tale of Kriakutnyi as evidence that a Russian, and not the 
American Wright brothers, had made the first flight, and the tale was absorbed into the 
store of similar historical appropriations of the late Stalin era portraying the superior 
genius of the Russian people. In 1956, Kriakutnyi even wound up the subject of a postage 
stamp (Bird, 2004). The genius of the Russian people, of course, is not to be underrated, 
and Tarkovsky here likely has in mind that Yefim is a sort of peasant genius. But Yefim 
is also a Russian genius hounded by Russians themselves, and Russian authorities, to stop 
with his devilish innovations. Seen in this light, Russia is both a cradle of geniuses and a 
destroyer of them.  
In the Soviet era (indeed, in the modern era, whether in the East or West), there 
was reason to be nostalgic for the anarchic, innovative spirit of a peasant like Yefim, 
living at a time when the flight was still a mystery, a dream, and a subject of creative 
speculation. This is the nostalgia that Boym sees as a prime symptom of modernity. It is a 
nostalgia not only for pre-industrial slowness, but for a time when the miracles of the 
machine age still resided in the realm of the imagination, when they were thrilling dreams 
rather than industrial efficiencies, when they belonged not to economics, or even to 
science, but to art. Tarkovsky expresses this reflective nostalgia through Yefim, with his 
childlike cry of wonder, “I’m flying! I’m flying!” Meanwhile, the people below grasp 
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angrily at Yefim’s friend, demonstrating that society, in the moment, punishes its 
innovators. Only later does it appropriate them as symbols of national greatness and put 
them on postage stamps. 
* * * 
In the introduction to their screenplay for Andrei Rublev, Tarkovsky and his co-
writer, Andrei Konchalovsky wrote purposefully in the register of restorative nostalgia, a 
register that is completely absent in the film: “[The idea came about] from our profoundly 
conscious love for the Motherland, for our nation [narod], and from our respect for its 
history, which laid the way for the October Revolution, from true respect for the nation’s 
lofty traditions which are its spiritual treasure, which has been deeply imbibed by the new 
socialist culture.” Tarkovsky and Konchalovsky went on to note that Rublev was the first 
artist listed in Lenin’s 1918 decree, “On the construction of monumental propaganda” 
(Bird, 2008, p. 41). This was a purely instrumental approach, one that likely helped the 
young filmmakers win approval to start production. But the film itself, while expressing 
Rublev’s dream of brotherhood, of an end to the ceaseless violence of his time, offers no 
hint that such brotherhood was already developing, or that the culture was flowering, or 
that the Mongols were in retreat.  
Tarkovsky’s comments to the Soviet film journal Ekran in 1965, while he was 
shooting the film, point more to a fascination with Rublev as an utterly sincere artistic 
innovator than with Rublev as a symbol of national greatness. “As a rule, icons in 
[Rublev’s] time were cult objects with conventional representations of the saints, nothing 
more,” Tarkovsky said. “With Andrei it was different. He strove to express an all-
 
 
192 
embracing harmony of the world, the serenity of the soul. . . . The main thing that I want 
to express in my film is the burning of a person in the name of an all-consuming idea, an 
idea that possesses him to the point of passion” (Gianvito, 2006, p. 15).  In 1969, 
Tarkovsky again discussed Rublev not as a fixed symbol of the nation, but specifically as 
a self-reflective, spiritually self-reliant creative individual:  
He looks for a moral ideal within himself, and thereby expresses 
the hope and love and aspirations of the people, born of their living 
conditions. He expresses the attraction towards unity, fraternity, 
love—everything that the people lack yet which Rublev feels to be 
indispensable. This is how he foresees Russian unification, a 
certain progress, and the hope in the only future that can get people 
involved by opening perspectives for them (Gianvito, 2006, p. 22). 
  
At first glance, this statement resembles Demina’s view that Rublev was a sort of 
medium for the people. Indeed, Tarkovsky shares with Demina and Likhachev a general 
understanding of Rublev’s work as an expression of nostalgia for the lost unity and 
cultural richness of Kievan Rus’. But there are crucial phrases he uses that point to a 
vision of Rublev’s “nostalgia for brotherhood” not as a national, shared, unitary vision—
restorative nostalgia—but as an individual, idiosyncratic, open one—reflective nostalgia. 
For Tarkovsky, Rublev is less a medium for the people’s aspirations than a prophet 
showing them what they can aspire toward. He gives them precisely what they lack. The 
moral idea is not borrowed from the people, but sought within the self. It is Rublev’s 
insight that unity, fraternity, and love are indispensable.  
Rublev’s breakthrough, then, served the people, but ultimate responsibility for 
that breakthrough lies not with their communal sensibilities, but with his uniquely 
individual perception of the world. The difference between the harshly beautiful 
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angularity of Theophanes’s work and the willowy curves of the hands, necks, and eyelids 
on Rublev’s “Old Testament Trinity” are as striking as any abrupt transition in 20th 
century modernism. Individuality somehow shines through in an art form where the 
individual aesthetic was an afterthought—if indeed it was ever a thought at all. For 
Tarkovsky, Rublev’s appearance on the historical stage was significant precisely because 
his icons encouraged new ways of seeing.  The sense of “opening perspectives” is a key 
element in Boym’s reflective nostalgia; it is the backward glance of the person willing to 
contemplate multiple paths, and the possibilities they might have offered (and may yet 
offer), not of those who seek a heroic narrative to validate and solidify their national 
identity. Tarkovsky’s Rublev may indeed be the herald of better times to come, but it is 
questionable, even after six centuries, whether those times have yet arrived. The film sees 
the “nostalgia for brotherhood” embodied in Rublev’s work not as an indication of the 
current of his times, but as a corrective to it.  
* * * 
Against the backdrop of the medieval world, Rublev remains for most of the film 
an alienated figure, stymied not only by the horrors of his time but by the enforced 
disharmonies between the manifest pleasures of Creation and the instrumental demands 
of culture. He is, for instance, incapable of painting a traditional representation of the 
Last Judgment upon the newly whitewashed walls of the Assumption Cathedral in 
Vladimir. Iconography is, of course, a highly conventional art form; one does not simply 
change the meaning of a biblical episode. Rublev’s friend and mentor, Daniil, encourages 
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Andrei to simply get on with it, to paint sinners boiling in pitch and a devil with smoke 
billowing from its nostrils. He says this in the cheery tones of a kindly uncle.  
“Smoke isn’t the point!” Rublev shouts. 
“Then what is?” Daniil asks. 
“I don't know! I can't paint all that. It disgusts me. I don't want to terrify people.” 
Daniil, at once bemused and annoyed, answers calmly: “It's the Last Judgment. I 
didn't make it up.”  
Rublev has reached an impasse. He cannot see the way he is expected to see, the 
way that makes it possible to live and work in harmony with unharmonious times. He is 
angry at the need to create angry icons, on strike against artistic conventions that no 
longer make sense to him. In a flashback that follows Rublev’s conversation with Daniil, 
the Grand Prince visits the cathedral. It is summer, and the unadorned white walls gleam 
in the sunlight. Andrei is cheerfully reciting a Bible passage to the Grand Prince’s 
daughter; poplar fluff fills the air; the little princess squirts milk at Rublev, who 
laughingly scolds her. The scene is almost idyllic, save the brewing problem that there is 
a cathedral to be finished, a Prince to be glorified, a Last Judgment to be painted. The 
Grand Prince asks Andrei how he likes the cathedral. Rublev looks at the blank walls, 
turns to the Grand Prince, and answers: “It couldn’t be better.” The sensory harmony of 
the sunlit images reveals the deep emotional disharmony of the narrative situation. What 
on earth does this laughing little girl need with a smoke-blowing devil? How does one 
envision upon that sunlit wall a fresco of boiling men? How, surrounded by the poplar 
fluff of a perfect summer’s day, does one preach the gospel of eternal judgment? 
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Embedded in the images of this very scene, there is a world worthy of Rublev’s talents, 
worthy of his longing, a world replete with the potential for brotherhood. It is a world still 
inaccessible to him, though, a perspective yet to be opened. 
5. Nostalgia and Materiality 
Tarkovsky’s bleak social history, with its strong implied critique of hegemonic 
glorification, hovers above a deeper history, a history of matter, which contains glories of 
a wholly different kind, the glories not of political centralization but of the existence we 
share (even if we most often fail in the sharing) with one another and with nature on an 
infinitely rich spiritual-material plane. The intense materiality of the images in Andrei 
Rublev was not a simple side effect of effective camerawork in shooting the script: From 
the start, Tarkovsky’s goal was to reach beyond the story of life to behold the mysteries 
of the stuff of life. This goal caused Tarkovsky’s co-writer Andrei Konchalovsky 
considerable frustration. In a 1987 essay, Konchalovsky writes, 
Working on the Andrei Rublev script, we went to Georgia 
together. I can recall that while on a walk at night, 
[Tarkovsky] kept repeating: “I would like these buds, these 
leaves, the sticky ones, you know… And these geese are 
flying…” “What does he want?” I asked myself. “Let’s be 
more specific. Let’s get down to the script.” But he kept 
driveling on about [the] buds and leaves among which his 
soul was wandering” (Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky, 1990). 
 
In his reasonable professional desire for an efficient scriptwriting process, Konchalovsky 
failed to realize that it was precisely through such “buds and leaves,” through sensory 
images that at first glance seem incidental to the narrative, that Tarkovsky would bring 
his peculiar brand of hope to the bleak medieval world. 
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For most of Andrei Rublev, man cannot penetrate nature’s beauty. On the eve of 
the Tatar raid, for instance, the river hovers upon the brown land, silvery and inviting to 
the dreamy eye. But no eyes are dreaming here but our own. On one side of the river, in 
the foreground, are the Tatar warriors; on the other, in the background, the white tents of 
the camp of the Grand Prince’s jealous younger brother. We absorb the beauty of the shot 
in direct opposition to the narrative purpose of the shot.  In a strictly narrative sense, the 
river “exists” in the shot strictly so that the Tatar chieftain can ask across it where the 
ford is, and obtain an answer from the Russian forces on the far side, forces who have no 
compunction about joining the “occupier” to savage their own people. The chieftain 
meets the young prince at the ford, greets him with a broad smile, and remarks with 
biting sarcasm, “You sure do love your brother!” Meanwhile, the sheer beauty of the 
river, of the horses, of the spectacle of riding, of the Tatar’s smile, more full of apparent 
joy than any other facial expression in the film, impacts on a level beyond narrative. We 
are seized with the fatal disjuncture between the stuff of life and the story of life. It is a 
dialectic with no synthesis, no easy answers—at least none that Tarkovsky will provide. 
It is left to us to contemplate the simultaneous beauty and ugliness of existence. 
In his 1896 masterpiece Matter and Memory, the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson (1991) offers an extraordinarily rich model of human perception that aids our 
understanding of how Tarkovsky, even as he depicts in his narrative the essential 
bleakness of Rublev’s time, continually draws from those times discordant and oddly 
inspiring images of a world worth longing for: the glowing river; the poplar fluff; the 
impassive face of the Prince’s white horse; the flow of paint downriver; the mason who, 
 
 
197 
even in his free time, carves stone for pleasure. Each of these images collides with 
contiguous images of shocking brutality. The painful images, for the moment, even 
overwhelm the pleasurable ones. But Tarkovsky has perceived in Rublev’s world the 
rawest materials of worldly hope, the very materials that sustain the integrity of the artist 
through his darkest days. 
Bergson, as we have seen, begins by asserting the existence of matter and its 
centrality to lived experience. Everything we perceive is derived from matter, and we call 
perceivable matter images. Each image is infinite in its content; there is more in an image 
than we can ever perceive. In order to make life livable—that is, in order to act—we must 
subtract from these images when we perceive them. We always see less than the full 
image. This does not mean that what we see is not real or not matter; it simply means 
that our perception is inevitably, infinitesimally fractional. This fractional perception is 
the result of the determinacy of our perception—the unavoidable fact that we perceive in 
a more or less goal-oriented way. We take what we need from infinite matter.  
The degree of determinacy of our perception is conditioned by our memories of 
previous perceptions. In this way we recognize matter, we see in it particular significance 
or meaning. Some memories are clearly, directly, usefully related to the object we 
perceive—a narrow, functional plane of memory that helps us recognize our world and 
act upon it. However, lingering at the flanks of these useful memories are vast networks 
of associations, seemingly useless and related vaguely at best to the image at hand—a 
broad plane of memories, which facilitates contemplation of the depth and multiplicity of 
the world of images we perceive. Thus, the narrower—that is, the more narrowly goal-
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oriented—the plane of memory we invoke in perceiving matter, the more determinate our 
perception. The broader—the less directly goal oriented—the plane of memory we bring 
to the act of perception, the more indeterminate the perception. Indeterminate perception 
is perception that subtracts less from an image and sees more. 
In cinema, there are two stages of perception. First, the filmmaker perceives the 
world, and then we perceive the film. A filmmaker who perceives and processes the 
world in an indeterminate way will present us with open and ambiguous images, which in 
turn invite our own indeterminate perceptions. The degree of determinacy at these stages, 
in turn, informs the nature of nostalgic longing for the filmmaker and the viewer. 
Looking through the Bergsonian lens, restorative nostalgia is a determinate perception of 
historical imagery—of buildings, books, costumes, festivals, and borrowed practices. It 
places the bric-a-brac of history in a totalizing contextual mold by subtracting the 
ambiguity. Perception is filtered by hegemonic convention, a memory scrim built from 
social symbols, rituals, snippets of shared verbiage, remembered examples of discipline 
and punishment. This memory scrim facilitates highly determinate perception; seeing 
according to convention permits us to move more easily through life, to function without 
constant discord between private consciousness on the one hand and public space and 
time on the other.  If we train our eyes to see only the most “useful” colors in the 
spectrum, we don’t have to worry about the internal discord created by seeing and 
appreciating “useless” colors. We don’t have to feel as though we are lying to ourselves 
when we do what it takes to survive, because we are not lying to ourselves; we are living 
by the truth as we see it.  Of course, this self-training, aided by social discipline, is 
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always incomplete, and we never do completely lose the capacity to see the useless 
colors. However, seeing, and then privately and publicly acknowledging what we have 
seen, requires effort, reflection, and courage.  
In the Soviet context, perception through the hegemonic scrim was a matter of 
survival, relative freedom, employment, advancement. Tarkovsky could have made his 
life much easier, for instance, had he brought to bear on his perception of medieval 
Russian history only the hegemonic plane of memory—that is, the well-trained social 
memory that has learned to read the age of Muscovite centralization as one of unity and 
glory, and Rublev specifically as a herald and embodiment of that glory. Such 
determinate perception of history could have created a tidy and forceful restorative 
nostalgic narrative equally useful to cynical Communist Party nationalists and sincere 
Great Russian chauvinists.  
For Tarkovsky, though, the cinematic image is the residue of reflective nostalgia. His 
perception, processing, and presentation of the image is shaped by a vast and 
indeterminate plane of memory, by a longing for the sundered spiritual materiality of the 
stuff of life, for the integrity of Creation (in the sense both of the act of creation and the 
thing created). His memory extends well beyond the political and social; it draws (as we 
see in his 1974 film, The Mirror) on highly personal, idiosyncratic childhood images of 
capricious nature and conflicted parents and wartime tension, memories that merge and 
collide in the mind and fill ones dreams and offer access to the uncanny. In Rublev, 
Tarkovsky does not perceive a river as simply a thing to be crossed, but as an infinitely 
meaningful, infinitely ambiguous material flow that is supremely indifferent to human 
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action. On a spiritual timeline extending back beyond human history, Creation precedes 
man and his willful abstraction of and alienation from the images of the world. It extends 
across all of history, hidden in clear sight, obscured by our determinate need to see only 
what is useful in our movement from here to there; it is the stuff of life, buried by the 
story of life. 
 The film’s final episode, “The Bell,” offers a striking illustration of the infinite 
spiritual-creative possibilities embedded in worldly material. Boriska, the young bell-
caster, has promised the Grand Prince’s men, and all of his assistants, that he knows the 
“secret” of bellcasting, that he has inherited it from his father. The truth is, his father told 
him nothing before dying, and if Boriska knows a secret, it is a secret that remains secret 
even to him. He believes, though, with fierce and uninformed intensity. He consistently 
rejects the “wrong” clay, even as more experienced men tell him it is the clay they always 
use.  
The men have hollowed out a deep pit. Boriska is at its bottom, among the others, 
digging for clay. He hits a root, bends down, grabs it, and pulls. He keeps pulling, follows 
the root across the pit, up its steep side, clear out of the pit, and stops. He looks up in awe 
at a towering poplar. Tarkovsky has not shown us the poplar before; he does not work in 
the simple grammar of establishing shots. The tree is new to us, and, it seems, to Boriska: 
until we see the root, we are unready to appreciate the tree. Boriska lets go of the root, 
lies down in the mud at the pit’s edge. Below him, the diggers go on digging. We look 
down at him from above as he gazes upward in awe at the bare but living branches, at the 
ancient and enduring promise of nature.  
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In the next shot, Boriska descends to the pit, grabs a handful of clay, rubs it 
between his fingers, smells it, listens to it, looks for what is hidden, embedded in matter, 
the secret of bellcasting that his dying father never told him. This is perhaps the most 
optimistic moment in the film. With utter confidence, he says, No, it's not the right clay. 
The optimism here is the happy stubbornness of faith, even the faith that this is NOT it—
and that thus the obverse must be true; the total confidence that this is NOT it bears 
within it utter faith that IT is somewhere; IT exists, surely down there, in the eternal and 
infinite soil. The sight of the tree has been pivotal for Boriska, at once humbling and 
emboldening: The answer must lie in the creativity of nature, in nature's infinitude. 
Nature is the ultimate art. Man can only aspire to emulate in some small ways its infinite 
creativity. Boriska has tapped into the stream of nature and allowed himself to be caught 
by its current. It is not a moment of permanent inspiration; Tarkovsky well knows that in 
the artistic process every inspiration is followed by frustration and desperation that such 
moments will ever occur again; but Boriska has made his connection with the world, and 
has readied himself to make it again: He has “remembered” a thing he never even knew, 
a connection with the kind of secrets that preceded him and his father and his father’s 
father, a never-truly-lost thing from a never-truly-lost time, the time of the image. 
Soon we see him walking moodily alongside the riverbank. He turns to face the 
water, kicks out his foot; his bast sandal flies down the embankment. Boriska rushes 
down to retrieve it but falls and slides along muck and through brambles and, scratched 
and bruised, comes to a stop in the mud. He puts his hand to the soil. Once more, he rubs 
his fingers together, sniffs them, listens to them. This time he exclaims: “I FOUND IT!” 
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Here Boriska has made contact with the immeasurably ancient time of Creation, 
but this time does not exist as a discrete “period” separate from the present and the future. 
It coexists with the present, inextricably interwoven with it. Time, for both Bergson and 
Tarkovsky, is indivisible; the duration of matter is infinite and the whole of the past is 
accessible in that matter. Tarkovsky does not have an “archaic” ideological program; his 
focus is precisely on the integrity of Creation that runs throughout time, underlying 
everything we do and say, and thus providing the inspiration and working material for 
new acts of creation. There is no contradiction in Tarkovsky’s intense focus on the stuff 
of nature and his use of a technological apparatus, the camera, to perceive and process 
that nature. 39  As a reflective nostalgic, Tarkovsky does not reject technology and 
modernity outright; what he rejects is the positivist replacement of humanity with 
science, materiality with materialism, and questions asked with questions answered. The 
spirituality of Tarkovsky’s images resides at the nexus of humanity, materiality, and 
reflection, and the past has no exclusive claim on this nexus. 
Tarkovsky does not argue that any pure state can be restored to man—the “noise” 
that separates us from Creation is an inescapable element of our existence. Cultural 
producers, thus, wind up with a choice: they can simply add to the noise, perceiving the 
world in a determinate way and passing on conventional visions. Or they can see the 
noise as a creative challenge, a set of limitations to work around and beyond. Tarkovsky 
                                                
39 Indeed, to a degree unusual among directors, Tarkovsky acknowledges his dependence upon the camera 
itself to organize his vision of the world. In working on Tarkovsky’s final film, Sacrifice (1986), the great 
Swedish cameraman Sven Nykvist, who had worked with Ingmar Bergman, was at first shocked when 
Tarkovsky moved him aside and looked through his camera prior to shooting each scene. Soon, however, 
Nykvist understood that Tarkovsky was not usurping the photographer’s duty, but rather that he needed the 
camera to truly see matter, to choreograph its flow within and across the frame (Nykvist, 1990). 
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chooses the latter path; his images contain the tantalizing possibility to see both the noise 
and what lies beyond it: Life has given us history and power and culture and chaos and 
the capacity for determinate, instrumental use of the material image. But it has also given 
us the allied capacities to see the world—to stop and reflect and perceive and remember a 
“time before” that is unknowable to history but readily available in the existence of things 
if only we take the time to apprehend them. Man’s great gift is the capacity to build upon 
this apprehension, the ability, in our awe of creation, to create. For Tarkovsky, our great 
hope in life lies in our understanding that beneath the historical determinate layer of our 
perception lie these deeper capacities, the ability to remember matter, in its infinite 
meaningfulness, to see beyond the noise and create based upon what one has seen. 
Both Boriska’s non-discovery of the “right” clay beneath the poplar and his 
subsequent discovery by the riverbed point the way past our mere consideration of 15th-
century bellcasting techniques and Boriska’s role—in some ways easier to argue for than 
Rublev’s—as an expression of Russian national self-consciousness. The soil Boriska 
tumbles into is supranational and transhistorical; it is the stuff of the world rather than the 
story of the world, an almost tactile visual image unburdened by dramatic hints at the 
“Russianness” of the soil and the secret. If there is a certain patriotism in the film, it lies 
precisely in its willingness to grant Russian nature its place on the universal stage as 
simply Nature, and Russian genius its place as plain Genius, without the forced 
limitations of a national modifier. As Robert Bird (2004) argues, the materiality of 
Tarkovsky’s images “neutralizes historical clichés”. The materiality of the image clears 
the field of blunt symbolism.  
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Tarkovsky himself has left a considerable record of his preference for the self-
contained image to the symbol, which attains significance only through imposed 
meanings. “Everything is real,” Tarkovsky told Hervé Guibert of Le Monde. An image, 
he continued, “possesses the same distinguishing characteristics as the world it 
represents. An image—as opposed to a symbol—is indefinite in meaning. One cannot 
speak of the infinite world by applying tools that are definite and finite” (Bielawski; 
Gianvito, 2006, p. 86). The Tarkovskian image—sometimes a long take with an 
immobile camera, at other times an extensive tracking shot along a terrain of enigmatic 
details and varied textures—is ambiguous, but not in the postmodern sense that it has no 
independent meaning until an arbitrary meaning is imposed. Instead, the image’s 
ambiguity lies in its patient awaiting of the viewer’s choices from among its many 
inherent meanings. In Tarkovsky, a bell is a bell, not a fixed symbol of some abstract 
notion. At the same time, a bell contains within it the capacity to evoke an infinite 
number of associations in the viewer.40  
After the horrific scene of the blinding of the masons, Tarkovsky cuts to a blotch 
of dark paint splattered on the white wall of the Vladimir Cathedral of the Assumption. 
There is a handprint in the center of the blotch. The print at the center of the blotch 
resembles the earliest cave paintings; it is a wordless, codeless statement that says, 
simply, “I am.” What it says beyond that is a matter for reflection. The blotch, left by 
Rublev himself, may be seen by some viewers as a visual cry of abject despair; others, 
                                                
40 We find here an affinity not only with Bergson’s theory of the material image, but also with the ideas of 
the Russian philosopher Aleksei Losev, who wrote brilliantly about the material thing that contains within 
itself the entire idea-thing dialectic, upon which no meaning needs be imposed from outside, and within 
which reside an infinite number of diverse meanings (Lossky, 1952, pp. 292-295). 
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such as Robert Bird (2004, 2008), may see it as a breakthrough in Rublev’s blocked 
efforts to envision the Last Judgment. The blotch is at once despair and breakthrough and 
declaration of being; it is the simultaneous rejection of and embrace of art. It is, in short, 
many things, and while it may be a bit pat to compare Rublev’s blotch to a Rorschach 
Test for the movie-going public, the reference is not entirely inapt. 
Tarkovsky often spoke of his films as “co-creations” with the viewer; this was not 
an admission that images were arbitrary, but that they were ambiguous: the director’s 
fabled long take emerged from a desire to let the image speak to the viewer and await the 
associations it would evoke. The viewer is rewarded for his close observation of the film, 
and the film is enriched by the associative pathways the viewer has discovered 
(Tarkovsky, 1986). The work of grasping the tensions between the story of life and the 
stuff of life is left to the viewer. Paint on a river, a blotch on a wall, and the gaze of a 
horse—these are not readily decodable conventional images. Nor is their meaning yoked 
to the unfolding plot. Rather, they are evocations of the infinite, and, we, like Tarkovsky 
himself, must carve from them a perception of our own. In this way, Tarkovsky’s images 
ask us to take responsibility for what we have seen. 
* * * 
Andrei Rublev is legendary for its visual images, for the kinetic energy of the raid, 
the stillness of Rublev’s gaze, and the deep-focus shots of the great brown Russian land. 
But the film’s richness also flows from its dialogue and monologues—what we might call 
its “sound images”. Here, as in his visual images, Tarkovsky explores the differences 
between expression that is rooted in the deep experience of time and matter, and that 
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which is subordinated to or rendered meaningless by the instrumental task at hand. We 
can, for instance, compare the nature of unreservedness in some of the film’s most verbal 
characters. The words of the princes, the Tatar chieftain, and the monk Kirill are by turns 
self-serving and empty. Meanwhile, Boriska, Theophanes, and the jester speak, in their 
different ways, with deep commitment; insistently, stubbornly, they speak words that 
make their own lives more challenging; something beyond instrumental determinacy, 
some grasp of the meaning of soil or paint or rough-hewn humanity, calls upon them to 
follow their voices down difficult paths.  
Boriska, by turns desperately affirmative and painfully anxious, pronounces and 
pouts and rages for his chance to make the bell, for his vision of the right clay, for the 
early firing of the clay cast despite the warnings of his elders that it will break. With each 
sentence he throws himself still harder against the gates of convention. Theophanes, 
meanwhile, speaks wisely and patiently with Andrei of his own internal struggle with 
convention: he appears to condemn man in his work, but he is full of love. Indeed, his 
condemnation springs from his love; he cannot bear to see the torture on Red Square, yet 
he believes in the torments of the Last Judgment. His warmth is conveyed in the tones in 
which he speaks to Andrei, the joy he takes in the act of human communication. 
Theophanes cannot share Andrei's iconoclastic propositions on the nature of Christ, and 
yet he delights in Andrei's presence, his mind, his soul, his passion to find his way. The 
contradictions in Theophanes are partly resolved when his ghost appears in the ruined 
cathedral after the Vladimir raid and announces to Andrei, who has now lost hope in 
mankind: “I was wrong then, and you are wrong now.” Man is redeemable, says 
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Theophanes’ shade, and one must look upon him with charity and hope for his soul. And 
yet when Andrei, the detritus of the raid piled around him, asks Theophanes, “How long 
will this go on?” Theophanes answers, “Probably forever.” Even after death, Theophanes 
is torn between a longing for the good and a saddened belief in the inevitability of evil. 
The jester, meanwhile, speaks to a different tradition, one that also sharply grasps man’s 
hypocrisy and punishes it not with brimstone, but with wit. His words are at once 
impromptu and rooted in centuries-old tradition. His performance is a riot of disciplined 
indiscipline. He puts his life at risk, flagrantly belittling his betters, because his truth lies 
with neither church nor state but with a tradition of buffoonery that long preceded the 
Grand Prince and will long survive him.  The jester’s brand of spontaneity is far from 
unthinking: It is hard-earned and well-learned, an art that gives people access to a corner 
of the soul where misery cannot reach. 
When Rublev takes his vow of silence, the importance of the sound-image is 
underlined by its absence. The vow is not the act of a man who has given up, but of one 
who, cornered by life, insists above all on maintaining his integrity. Bewildered by his 
world and by his own human sinfulness, he will not speak of holy things while he cannot 
be sure of the meaning of his words. Such total commitment, in which word is deed, 
presents a stark contrast with the empty chatter of the film’s authority figures—the Grand 
Prince, his brother, and the Tatar chieftain—and with the tendentious, self-serving blather 
of the quotation-mongering monk Kirill.  Consumed with jealousy of Rublev, Kirill 
pretends at commitment, but cannot live it. When he meets Theophanes, he quotes 
Epiphanius the Wise and Konstantin Kostenecki on holiness and art and uses their words 
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to criticize the work of Rublev. But when Theophanes invites Kirill to be his assistant, he 
first refuses and then agrees only on the condition that Theophanes send a messenger to 
the monastery to announce the summons in the presence of Rublev. The younger prince 
and the Tatar leader, meanwhile, outdo Kirill in dissonance between word and deed, 
lobbing pleasantries about as their men lay waste to the people of Vladimir.  
Chatterboxes are the sound-embodiment of the unreliability of the world. Sound 
without meaning is the aural texture of alienation from nature. Some voices arise from 
the soil, a necessity of the creative unfolding of the universe, and their words, being more 
than words, return to matter as creative acts, balloons and bells and bricks and little 
woodcarvings and icons and the momentarily smiling mouths of the jester's audience. 
Other voices seem to come from nowhere and go nowhere. They seem not to be drawn 
from nature, and to nature they will not return. They violate the law of conservation of 
matter and energy. They, like the bloodshed that unfolds around their empty chatter, are 
acts of waste, of dissipation of the energy of the world. Through these aural images of 
negation we get a deeper sense of Tarkovsky’s longing for that energy which precedes 
all, gives rise to all, and will outlast all. As in Boym’s reflective nostalgia, the emphasis 
here is not on the return or recapitulation of a bygone epoch, but on the creative act of 
reuptake and reuse of the energy of loss.  
Early in the episode of Boriska the bell-caster, Tarkovsky uses the borders of the 
frame to capture the emptiness of royal words. The event in the scene is simple: An 
emissary of the Grand Prince arrives at a village on horseback in search of Boriska’s 
father, Nikola, apparently a renowned caster of bells. Boriska informs the emissary that 
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his father has died from the plague. The emissary asks for another bell-caster, and then 
another, and another. Dead, dying, dead, says Boriska.  Then Boriska asks the prince’s 
man to take him instead. The prince’s man laughs. Boriska says he knows the secret of 
bellcasting. This begets still more laughter.  
The conversation would appear to put the prince’s man in a position of power, but 
Tarkovsky’s framing cuts the legs, and pretty much everything else, out from under the 
emissary: Boriska is on the right side of the frame, leaning on the wall of his log house. 
To his left is a rooster in the window square, like a picture in a picture, proud, as roosters 
will be, somehow elevated above the whole miserable human drama. On the left side of 
the frame all we see is the rear end of the messenger's horse. We hear the messenger's 
voice, but we do not see him. Just the horse's backside, unbothered by flies and 
apparently matching the rooster in its supreme indifference to princely power. 
* * * 
As we have seen, the visual imagery and verbal textures in Tarkovsky’s film 
repeatedly undermine conventional symbols. Yevgeny Margolit has pointed out that one 
of the innovations of Thaw cinema is the use of the “subjective camera,” which 
“deconventionalizes…traditional, familiar conceptions of the world” (Margolit, 2001, p. 
37). This deconventionalization permits a form of longing different from, and opposed to, 
the hegemonic forms. There are many things from the past one can long for, and many 
ways to long for them, but conventional symbols of the past are encoded with preferred 
meanings that attempt to restrict the viewer’s reading.  
 
 
210 
One powerful example of the use of the subjective camera by Tarkovsky and his 
cameraman, Vadim Yusov, comes near the end of the film, when Boriska’s bell is nearly 
complete. He has won the trust of his assistants, and, it seems, of hundreds of workers. 
He gives the word, and with a massive communal effort, the townspeople raise the bell 
from the casting pit. There is jubilation, choral singing, an air of sobornost—the ancient 
Kievan notion of communal unity, or “conjunctivity”. The Grand Prince arrives with 
foreign ambassadors to hear the first ringing of Boriska’s bell. The prince’s aide asks if 
all is ready, and then he swears at Boriska’s foreman, “If not, you better f---ing watch 
out.” The arrival of princely authority breaks the spirit of the moment; the tattered, 
disjunctive social fabric is revealed. The bell turns slowly to reveal the seal of St. George, 
Moscow’s patron saint, trampling a serpent. But the bell is high in the frame; only the 
serpent is visible. We do not even see the hooves that are ostensibly trampling it. 
Tarkovsky most memorably defamiliarizes the familiar in the film’s epilogue, a 
long, gorgeous meditation upon Rublev’s work. We have never seen one of Rublev’s 
icons up until this moment, when the film transitions from a black-and-white shot of 
embers on a dying fire to glorious color close-ups of the icons. Even here, though, 
“glory” is not offered up in the restorative-nostalgic sense. Tarkovsky does not restore the 
walls of the Trinity cathedral for his audience. (Rublev’s Old Testament Trinity had been 
long since transferred from the Holy Trinity Monastery to the Tretyakov Gallery in 
Moscow.) He does not give the viewer the opportunity to relish the cultural symbolism of 
the Great Man’s Work. The icons are never presented as complete images, and for the 
first five minutes of the sequence we never see a segment of an image large enough to 
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gesture toward the composition of the whole. Instead, Vadim Yusov, Tarkovsky’s 
cameraman, shows us the paintings in extreme close-up, panning slowly across the 
images, showing us a tiny dove, the graceful arch of an ancient building, the intricate 
folds of diaphanous cloaks. We see Rublev’s brushstrokes, but we are denied access to 
his grand image, the image that has taken on so many layers of ideological meaning over 
the centuries. Tarkovsky goes out of his way to demonstrate the sheer beauty and 
materiality of the images by defamiliarizing them. This defamiliarization is heightened by 
the mixing of images from different icons. Thus we see parts rather than entirety, collage 
rather than singularity, textures rather than symbols.  
One by one the images reach our eyes and replace themselves before we can 
jigsaw them into the familiar mental image of a full icon: stripes, squares, arms, hands, 
cupolas of a churches, fragments of buildings, a hand over a bowl, a pair of rust-brown 
feet, the branches of tree. Only near the end of the montage do we see the face of Christ 
from Rublev’s “Savior”, and even then the image is transformed by sheets of sudden rain 
and replaced by an extreme close-up detail of chipped paint on wood. As the rain falls, 
the color shifts from pale, piney tan, the wood grain visible beneath the paint, to a rusty 
red-brown similar to the color of Christ’s skin. Is it his right cheek? The left side of his 
neck? The icon’s time-damaged edge? The image dissolves to a grassy riverbank, where 
horses graze as the rain pours down. We have seen brushstrokes through raindrops, 
culture through nature, the ancient work of man through the even more ancient matter 
from which it emerged. Tarkovsky has presented us with the tactile work of a man rather 
than the cultural artifact of a national hero. He has displaced the restorative-nostalgic 
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discourse of Rublev as a symbol and offered instead a reflective-nostalgic meditation on 
the polysemic images of a half-lost culture. 
The icons do not pull us away from the image of Rublev as a man, but move us 
still closer. They mark Rublev’s emergence from silence and invite reflection upon the 
meaning of that silence. What becomes evident is that Rublev has never really lost faith. 
Through 15 years of silence he remains watchful, taking in the matter of his world, 
hunting the bitter landscape for icons of hope, guarding his integrity, waiting, yearning. 
Rublev’s ability to long for something more creates an ineffable hopefulness that 
resonates through the film’s most brutal moments. He himself is the image at the heart of 
Tarkovsky’s counter-history. 
6. Conclusion 
 
Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1966 film Andrei Rublev presents a strikingly independent 
vision of Russian history and Rublev’s place in it. In the 1950s and ’60s, Soviet 
commentators presented Rublev as a symbol of resistance to foreigners, national self-
consciousness, and unification under the gathering hand of Moscow. This type of 
appropriation of the past, calling for a single dominant interpretation, is strongly 
indicative of what Boym has called “restorative nostalgia.” Tarkovsky’s vision of 
Rublev, on the other hand, proceeds in the open-ended register of “reflective nostalgia.” 
For Tarkovsky, Rublev’s work evokes “a nostalgia for brotherhood,” but Tarkovsky is 
unwilling to pin upon that nostalgia the full weight of Russia’s unification process and 
successive authoritarian ideologies. Instead, he poses to himself, and to the audience, a 
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trio of questions—What is this longing for brotherhood? Where does it come from? And 
what does it mean for us?—and has the restraint not to offer monolithic answers.  
Tarkovsky did not work in the language of symbols, but of images. The image, 
for him, was a captured reflection of reality itself, with all the ambiguities of reality 
embedded in it. Symbols attempt to sell a fixed encoded message to the viewer. Images 
await the viewer’s choice among infinite embedded meanings. Tarkovsky’s shots are 
patient; they allow the viewer to absorb and contemplate the materiality of each image. 
The gaze of Tarkovsky’s camera embodies a heightened attention to life, an 
indeterminate longing for the world that slips through our fingers while we busily make 
our way though history. Tarkovsky pits the yearning to remember the damp chill of the 
soil against the desire to recapitulate a world described in fixed narratives about the soil. 
He challenges the narratives and plunges his hand ever deeper into the cool mud. 
Tarkovsky was able to simultaneously embrace Rublev and reject the tendentious 
historical symbolism that had grown up around him. Instead of a mythical giant, he 
presents us with an enigmatic, spiritually troubled man trying his best to live with 
integrity through a brutal age. Tarkovsky invites our co-rumination on history’s rough 
treatment of the creative spirit, and on what might be gained through the reintegration of 
that lost spirit into our lives. He rejects the hegemonic, restorative-nostalgic encoding of 
Rublev’s life and, through reflective-nostalgic encoding, opens up a rich terrain upon 
which viewers can reexamine their national and human heritage. Tarkovsky’s labors were 
not without resonance in Russian culture: Years after the opening of the Andrei Rublev 
Museum of Early Russian Art in Moscow, a statue was placed before the building. It was 
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sculpted in the image of Anatoly Solonitsyn, the actor who portrayed Tarkovsky’s 
Rublev (Bird, 2004, p. 8). 
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CHAPTER VI 
REENTERING THE PRESENT: 
NOSTALGIA FOR THE PASSING MOMENT IN  
MARLEN KHUTSIEV’S ILICH’S GATE 
 
1. Introduction 
On March 8, 1963, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev hosted the leading lights of 
the Soviet artistic intelligentsia at the Kremlin. It wasn’t the sort of soiree one would find 
in the pages of Tolstoy or Dostoevsky. There would be no rough-and-tumble blending of 
voices, changing of upper hands, and forming and reforming of conclusions once thought 
conclusive. Only one speaker would really matter here, and the job of the other speakers 
was to tell him what he wanted to hear. It couldn’t be called a particularly good day for 
the artists, but it could have been worse. The mass meeting offered certain comforts that 
had been lacking in the Stalin era’s late-night official visitations—no chilling knocks on 
the door, no sudden disappearances. At a conference the previous November, the 
filmmaker and revered liberal teacher Mikhail Romm had summed up the emboldened 
mood of the artists in the seven years since Khrushchev had launched his de-Stalinization 
campaign: “They’re not going to throw anyone in prison, they won’t take away their right 
to work, they won’t run them out of Moscow, and they won’t take away their salary. And 
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in general, great unpleasantness—the kind we saw in ‘those’ years—won’t be back” 
(Fomin, 1998).  
Romm had followed up on these comments with a warning: The artists should not 
assume that their post-Stalin advances were irreversible. In the wake of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and the nation’s self-imposed agricultural fiasco, Khrushchev’s dominance 
within the Politburo was ebbing, and conservative forces led by Mikhail Suslov and 
Leonid Ilichev, had an increasing influence on cultural policy. Articles severely critical of 
liberal filmmakers—most notably Romm himself—had begun to appear in the journal 
Oktiabr, edited by the conservative ideologue Vsevolod Kochetov. The articles, Romm 
had said, “dump rubbish on everything innovative that Soviet cinema has created. [They] 
put the strongest artists of both the older and the younger generations of Soviet 
filmmakers under political suspicion. These articles were inspired by the same people 
who directed the campaigns to unmask ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ [in the late Stalin era]. It 
seems that we shouldn’t forget everything that has happened” (Fomin, 1998, p. 320). 
Now, at the Kremlin, it seemed that the day Romm had warned of might be at 
hand. The stylish young poets Andrei Voznesensky and Yevgeny Yevtushenko, 
supremely confident at the height of their rock-star popularity, had been summoned. 
Romm himself had been invited, and took in the proceedings with his customary fierce 
bemusement from behind his thick, black-rimmed glasses. The greatest Russian 
neorealist filmmaker, Marlen Khutsiev, was on hand, along with his young screenwriter, 
the boyish and Byronic Gennady Shpalikov. There were hundreds of others, some of 
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whom had arrived with trepidation and others whose reasonable plan was simply to 
applaud where appropriate, keep their mouths shut, and leave with careers unscathed.  
Khrushchev was generous with his ire that day, but he reserved special rage for 
Khutsiev and Shpalikov, who had recently completed their film, Ilich’s Gate, about the 
everyday lives of young adults in contemporary Moscow.  For one thing, he was not 
pleased with the three protagonists. “Society cannot count on such people,” thundered 
Khrushchev. “They are not fighters. They are not creators of the world. They are morally 
feeble people, old before their time, who have lost their ideals and their calling in life” 
(Demenok, 1988, p. 100). He also did not care for the ambiguous generational hierarchy 
hinted at in the film’s final scene, in which the hero, Sergei, asks the ghost of his father, 
who had died young in the war, for advice on how to live: 
“How old are you?” replies the ghost. 
“Twenty-three,” says Sergei. 
“And I’m 21. How can I give you advice?” 
A studio worker had previously complained about the scene in a screening at 
Gorky Studios. Now Khrushchev repeated the worker’s words almost verbatim: “Even a 
dog won’t abandon her young!” The statement was a reference to a passionate debate that 
had been brewing in Soviet society (and an echo of the similar debate a century earlier 
that had been immortalized by Ivan Turgenev): What can the fathers teach the sons? 
Khrushchev read the scene as implying that fathers have nothing to teach the sons, that 
the sons are and should be prepared to do their own thing. The questioning of the 
authority of elders seemed to be everywhere in postwar, post-Stalin Moscow. Even 
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Romm—a legend of the fatherly generation, no less—was known to tell his students that 
he could teach them technique, but he couldn’t teach them to be good directors; they had 
to find their own original voices. The liberal writer Viktor Nekrasov had perhaps put 
Khutsiev’s film in the authorities’ crosshairs when he praised it after an advance 
screening specifically for its refusal to trot out some elder statesman who says how 
everything should be and sets everyone straight (Demenok, 1988).41  
In the middle of Khrushchev’s attack, the 25-year-old Shpalikov asked to speak. 
“Who are you?” asked Khrushchev. 
Shpalikov informed the First Secretary that he had written the film currently 
under discussion. 
“Instead of sitting there smiling,” said Khrushchev, “you ought to explain how 
you lowered yourself to such idiocy as to write such a thing.”  
“You know, I don’t want to talk about the idiocy I’ve lowered myself to,” said 
Shpalikov. “I want to ask you, Nikita Sergeevich, and everyone sitting in the hall: Be so 
kind as to applaud me, please, and congratulate me. My daughter’s just been born—
Dasha. And you’re sitting here and busying yourselves with God knows what.”  
Khrushchev applauded Shpalikov. And the audience joined him (V'iugina, 2007). 
* * * 
                                                
41 The early reception of the film by insiders had been largely ecstatic. Nekrasov also wrote that the film 
was “a big event in our arts, very big. [The already-legendary Polish filmmaker] Andrzej Wajda was 
watching the film with me . . . after the screening he said that he had never seen a film like it. And I think 
Wajda has seen a thing or two in his time.” Upon reading the screenplay in 1960, director Yurii Yegorov 
said that with Ilich's Gate Soviet cinema had found its answer to Federico Fellini's The Sweet Life. Vasily 
Solovev, a screenwriter, wrote that it was “the only screenplay I know that speaks openly, directly, and 
fully about what’s most important, what concerns us all today” (Demenok, 1988). Mikhail Romm, 
meanwhile, upon seeing Khutsiev after an early screening, took a long draw on his cigarette and said, 
“Marlen, you’ve justified your life” (Musskii, 2005). 
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Applause notwithstanding, Ilich’s Gate was shelved, and Shpalikov and Khutsiev 
were told to make substantial changes.  Khutsiev and Shpalikov, though, were fiercely 
protective of their creation. Khutsiev decided to use the opportunity not to simply snip 
away at the film’s supposedly ideologically inappropriate sequences, but rather to re-
shoot entire scenes, to work on what he saw as defects in the original (Khutsiev, 1996, p. 
194). The result was released as I Am Twenty (Mne dvadtsadt’ let) in January 1965.  
Many years later, encountering difficulties completing a different film in a 
different political-economic system, Khutsiev would declare, “I am a stubborn 
person…And if I start work, I’m going to finish it” (Basinskii, 2009). This stubbornness 
was one of Khutsiev’s most enduring and endearing traits, and it was a key reason that 
both versions of Ilich’s Gate remain challenging and bracing to this day. Khutsiev had 
not so much bowed to the censors as called their bluff. After Ilich’s Gate was released in 
its original form in 1988, a viewer wrote to Khutsiev that his stubborn “compromise” had 
wound up letting him complete not one film, but two. “It’s wrong for you to think that I 
Am Twenty was ruined,” wrote the well-wisher. “It's just a different film” (Maliukova, 
2005). This is an exaggeration; what is closer to the truth is that Khutsiev had found two 
slightly different paths to the same final result: a film that was troublesome to Soviet 
authorities not for any overt challenge to communism—look hard at either version and 
you’ll find no such thing—but for its complex view of the relationship between people, 
time, and space. In both Ilich’s Gate and I Am Twenty, we find a layering of time in 
which citizenship in the present could mean different things, inspired by different pasts, a 
world in which the Moscow of the 1960s was haunted by ghosts, none of whom had the 
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answer, but all of whom, if you listened closely enough, would hint at one part of one of 
many answers.42 
In these pages I investigate how Khutsiev achieves his unique collision of useable 
pasts, and what that collision tells us about how useable any single past can be. His 
camera drinks in the stuff of the world, imbibing and revealing the temporal flows and 
counter-flows that form the manifold essence of seemingly solid and unitary spaces and 
matter. He refuses to let the world pass unobserved; his indeterminate gaze draws on rich 
associative memory, both personal and social, and engages the viewer’s memories as 
well. The circuit of the image begins with Khutsiev’s longing to glimpse the fullness of 
time within matter, and continues with our own indeterminate perception of the images 
he creates.  
Khutsiev shoots Ilich’s Gate in a tense one might call the “remembered present”. 
The images of space are gathered up with a loving voraciousness that borders on physical 
need:  By the time we perceive these things, the film seems to say, they will already be 
gone. But when they are gone, we will still need them. Even as Khutsiev critiques the 
Thaw, he stores it up, so to speak, for future use. These images of the remembered 
present are complicated by the extraordinary weight of generational and social memory, 
                                                
42 Khutsiev has said that while he was able to improve several scenes from a cinematic perspective, the 
script had suffered in revisions. Scenes where the heroes come face-to-face with Soviet cynicism had been 
strongly criticized; as a result, Sergei and Anya’s encounter with Anya’s father and Kolya’s dispute with 
his boss, Chernousov, wound up losing something of their original bite (Khutsiev, 1996). Nevertheless, Lev 
Anninsky, an admired critic and a contemporary of Khutsiev, wrote in 1991 that “I Am Twenty contained 
practically all of Ilich’s Gate, everything that Marlen Khutsiev felt in those years, everything his heroes 
suffered through, everything they wanted to say to one another and to us, the audience. In other words, it 
turned out that the living organism of the film, even deprived of some vitally important, materially 
necessary organs, left bleeding traces of episodes, plot lines, dialogues, monologues and phrases. And even 
today it makes a surprisingly harmonious and complete impression” (Anninskii, 1991, p. 152). 
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which offers continuous reminders that life is a deadly serious business. The image of the 
present is further destabilized by the palpable awareness that the Thaw (like spring and 
youth, Khutsiev’s great metaphors for the human condition) is a passing moment on the 
way to something else—that on the other side of the abyss people grow up, rivers freeze, 
and private consciousness and public spirit must somehow merge in the actions of adult 
life.  
The young protagonists of Ilich’s Gate struggle to find the social synapse, so to 
speak, where private consciousness can fruitfully interface with public space and time. As 
with all synaptic gaps, there is an abyss to be crossed, and it is in this abyss that 
Khutsiev’s heroes reside. How do Khutsiev’s images mediate this anxious transitional 
space? How do his visions of Thaw-era Moscow streets, public festivals, and apartment 
parties simultaneously comment on, facilitate, and confound the progress of his pilgrim-
heroes toward full Soviet adulthood? What alternatives do these images offer to the 
traditional socialist-realist ideal of absorption of private conscience into public duty? 
Simultaneously, what alternatives do they propose to cynicism, alienation, or 
philosophical retreat from an untenable public realm? And how does the collision of 
different temporalities, and the longing for shards of different times, shape Khutsiev’s 
creation? 
The essay’s first section discusses the contending and complementary layers of 
individual pleasure and social celebration in the film’s famous May Day scene. The 
second section addresses the intercession of ghosts of the public into the personal lives of 
the film’s protagonists. In the third section I use Dostoevsky’s The Idiot as a helpful 
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guide to the use of chronotope (the time-space in which the characters must live their 
lives) and polyphony (the deployment of multiple contending voices within that time-
space) in Ilich’s Gate. Finally, I will discuss the fraught balance between individuality 
and social harmony in the film, and the way it shapes the characters’ relationships with 
one another, with society, and with time. My references, unless otherwise noted, will be 
to Ilich’s Gate, but many of the scenes discussed here can be found in similar form in 
both versions of the film. (In the appendix, I provide a detailed summary of Ilich’s Gate, 
noting along the way substantial divergences between the two films; the summary also 
includes descriptions of scenes in I Am Twenty that were absent in the original.)43 
2. At Play on May Day 
On May 1, 1961, Marlen Khutsiev filmed the May Day celebration in central 
Moscow. He injected his heroes into the flow of the parade and filmed their movement 
within, across, and against that flow. The river of celebrating humanity has a general 
                                                
43I should note two particularly substantial changes here. In Ilich’s Gate, the scene of the poetry reading at 
the Polytechnic Museum, where Khutsiev had filmed his heroes Sergei and Anya listening to Yevgeny 
Yevtushenko, Andrei Voznesensky, Bulat Akudzhava, Bella Akhmadulina and other leading lights of Thaw 
youth culture, intercuts shots of the actors and the audience with images of the poets themselves reciting 
and singing their verses; in I Am Twenty, we still hear the poets, but the camera remains on Sergei, Anya 
and the audience throughout. The result of this distancing is quite powerful, though the original version of 
the scene has taken on the weight of a documentary about the era, an extremely important artifact of the 
period of mass poetry readings before passionate young audiences. The second major change has deeper 
ideological implications. In I Am Twenty, the father-ghost’s words “How can I give you advice?” are 
omitted. Instead, the line “And I’m 21” is followed by the father asking that Sergei always keep his purity 
and never forget how fortunate he is to live in Moscow, one of the world’s great cities. Equally important, 
the father was recast in I Am Twenty, with the handsome and heroic-looking actor Lev Prigunov taking over 
for the lanky non-professional Yevgeny Maiorov. Maiorov speaks with a slight case of mush-mouth; for all 
his suffering at the front he is very much a young man, almost a boy, and when Sergei asks him, “What 
were you like?” and he answers “We were just like you” we believe him. Prigunov, on the other hand, 
speaks in a deep, resonant base; his chiselled features transform him in into a cinematic symbol of heroism 
and make Sergei look soft and callow by comparison. This is one of the ideologically significant changes in 
a corrected version in which Khutsiev managed, for the most part, to retain the productive, thought-
provoking, and controversial ambiguity of his point of view. 
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direction, but Khutsiev shows us the eddies and cross currents and reversals along the 
way. His handheld cameras seem to be everywhere: There is no establishing shot, no 
grand view to tell us what May Day means, but rather multiple views of multiple May 
Days. One camera captures the crossing paths of the film’s 23-year-old protagonist, 
Sergei, and the charming young woman he has just met, Anya. Another catches scores of 
Muscovites resting and chatting and taking in the parade from the embankment of the 
Moscow River. Yet another glimpses a delegation of young Cubans striding confidently 
through the Soviet capital.44  
Khutsiev captures public space and public interaction from multiple eye-levels 
rather than depending on a single master shot from on high. He avoids both the 
authoritatively “public” crane shot that loses individuals in the mass and the 
demonstratively private “feature film” shot that loses sight of public space in its stubborn 
focus on actors’ faces. By filming public space from multiple private perspectives, he 
captures the mutual dependence of individual motion and social flow. In this way, the 
scene goes beyond “the stunning harmony between individuals and society” that 
Josephine Woll (2000) noted as its distinguishing characteristic. Instead, the scene 
suggests a more sophisticated model of social polyphony in which social harmony is 
paradoxically enriched by private notes out of sync with the conventional public score. 
Without sacrificing its role as a site of communal exuberance, the celebratory 
public space becomes a facilitating terrain for the exchange of private dreams. 
                                                
44While Khutsiev filmed most of the mass action on May Day itself, he had not yet cast Marianna 
Vertinskaya as Anya. For that day’s filming, he used a double for Anya, and then filmed the close-ups and 
medium shots at the August 1961 celebration to welcome cosmonaut German Titov back from orbit. 
Dialogue for the entire scene, as was customary in Soviet cinema, was recorded and dubbed in post-
production (Musskii, 2005). 
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Surrounded by workers’ slogans and portraits of Lenin and Gagarin and young Pioneers 
shouting Viva! Cuba!—by all the symbols with which the regime seeks to make public 
space into public time and public thought—Sergei is instead at public-private play, 
entertaining his own private thoughts and designs, enjoying the public celebration but 
also co-opting it. That is, May Day remains public for Sergei—exuberantly, radically 
public—but Sergei’s public moment is not the public moment presupposed by the 
organizers of this event. He is no doubt well disposed to worker solidarity and more than 
willing to smile upon the notion along with his fellow celebrants. But what he is really 
celebrating is himself, young and alive and well befriended and enjoying it all here, in the 
public square. From the moment Sergei sees Anya in the crowd, his aim on this most 
festive of May Day celebrations—a May Day celebration filmed less than three weeks 
after Yuri Gagarin became the first man in orbit—is simple and direct, cosmically social 
(what could be more social?) and ideologically asocial: He wants to meet that girl. 
The girl is unconventional, and Sergei is precisely taken with her 
unconventionality—the way she fails utterly to fade into a crowd. Khutsiev makes this 
quite clear in the scene when Sergei first sees Anya, months before the May Day 
celebration. He has invited his neighbor, a little boy named Kuzmich, out for a steam. 
Aboard the trolley, little Kuzmich looks out the window and reads the signs aloud: 
“Drink tomato juice. Beer and soft drinks. Collect metal recyclables—we collect 
them….” Meanwhile, a pretty girl in a cutting-edge plastic polka-dotted rainslicker sits 
across from Sergei reading. She is smiling, laughing, burying her face in the book in quiet 
mirth. As for Sergei, well, he’s reading her. What better way to know a person than to 
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read her while she’s reading? During the Thaw, words had begun to appear in unexpected 
combinations and to mean unexpected things. The next word in the liberal journal Novy 
Mir (New World) or the well-illustrated pages of Yunost (Youth) might always hold 
something surprising; some tale might show you something you always knew was there 
but had never been able to acknowledge. Words could even exist for pleasure alone. That 
in itself was a novelty. Reading was the signal self-declaring act of the shestidesiatnik—
the Sixties Person—and here was Anya, laughing, biting her nail, following the lines of 
type with thoroughly engrossed eyes, declaring herself in public. The way that Anya 
reads, as much as the way she dresses, plants her in Sergei’s dreams as an unrepeatable 
personality. When she leaves the bus, he rushes after her, leaving poor Kuzmich behind. 
He follows her all through the city that day, and into the evening, but never finds the 
courage to approach her or the words to address her. He regrets his timidity for months, 
and when he sees her on May Day, he is determined to correct it. 
To this end, Sergei is willing to separate himself from the flow of the masses at 
the great celebration and to create his very own counterflow. He’s also willing to lose 
track of his little neighbor Kuzmich yet again. He enlists his pals Kolya and Slavka in a 
dubious plot to separate Anya from the young men with whom she is marching (one of 
whom has his arm possessively around her shoulders, and, who, for all Sergei knows, 
could be her boyfriend or husband). Kolya and Slavka take hold of a hand-carried papier-
mâché float—a globe proclaiming the Soviet Union’s devotion to peaceful coexistence—
usher it through the crowd to Anya’s friends, and unceremoniously hand it off to them, 
leaving their hands full and their arms no longer available to drape over Anya’s 
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shoulders. The symbol of the public event—the globe with its slogans and cooked-up 
image of grand-scale togetherness—has been cheerfully put at the cause of the reality of 
the event: one man’s private, playful drama, one such drama among the thousands that 
give public space its true meaning. And now, with Anya on her own, Sergei moves in, a 
man from the crowd, drawing on its joyful energy but propelled on a trajectory all his 
own. The two of them are standing face to face directly in front of a giant marching ear of 
corn—a tribute to Khrushchev’s latest agricultural scheme—and Anya laughingly says 
that Sergei really shouldn’t pursue girls so aggressively. “I’ll have to scream,” she says. 
“Here you can only scream ‘Hurrah!’” says Sergei. And so she does, and the crowd joins 
in with a thunderous echo, unwitting supporters of Sergei’s success, in a puckish tribute 
to the mystical union of private and public life.45 
The overlapping of public and private in Khutsiev’s film brings to mind Robert 
Bird’s trenchant observation about the uncanny sequence in Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1983 
film Nostalghia in which the hero, Gorchakov, discovers a wardrobe parked in the street. 
Here, in this public place, Gorchakov looks into the wardrobe mirror and sees another 
man’s reflection: it is Domenico, the holy fool. The scene, writes Bird, “is a 
manifestation of the way private epiphanies undermine public spaces” (Bird, 2008, p. 
179). I would go so far as to say that, while private epiphanies such as Gorchakov’s 
(finding his alternative reflection) or Sergei’s (finding the girl who will challenge the 
                                                
45 It is notable that a good deal of the action in this scene—in particular the playful scheming of Khutsiev’s 
most spontaneous character, Kolya—unfolds against the background of LeCorbusier’s modernist 
masterpiece, the Tsentrosoyuz building, the national headquarters for Soviet trade unions. Commissioned in 
1928, the building was completed by Soviet Architect Nikolai Kolli in 1936, when Stalinist neo-classisism 
was already ascendant. Tsentrosoyuz was one of the final architectural artifacts of 1920s modernist 
spontaneity, and Kovalev (2008) numbers its public areas as among the “good spaces” in Ilich’s Gate, 
spaces that exert a positive influence on the characters. 
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customary boundaries of his life) do indeed undermine the conventional notion of the 
uses to which public space should be put, they are, in reality, the very thing that gives 
public space meaning. 
3. A Triangle in Time 
(a) Lenin as father 
Ilich’s Gate is structured as a love triangle between Sergei, Anya, and Vladimir 
Ilich Lenin. The image of Lenin hovers over Sergei’s attempts to grow up, to respond to 
his passions, to survive his mistakes, to maintain his friendships, to retain and develop his 
ideals. This is not the Lenin of The Collected Works; it is not a Lenin who denounces left 
and right deviations and “economism” and “infantile leftism”; this is not a Lenin who 
spends his life in pitched rhetorical battle with Kautsky and Luxemburg. It is a shape-
shifting, imaginary Lenin, now kind, now loving, now joyful, now ascetic and demanding 
of purity. It is hard to keep track of this Lenin’s demands, but he never stops making 
them. How is one to even know which demands one must obey and which to take with a 
grain of salt?  
Of course, the Khrushchev-era ideal of “socialism with a human face” was 
precisely about realizing that at least a portion of the socialist inheritance could be taken 
with a grain of salt. The believers in this ideal told themselves that the part they could 
take with a grain of salt was Stalinism. They were able to tell themselves this because 
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev had given them permission to do so. This was 
Khrushchev’s way of setting himself up as the heir to Lenin (which the people had 
somewhat more trouble swallowing). The only way, however, for young people to bring 
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any real “enthusiasm” or “lyricism” in their lives under these new rules was to stretch the 
boundaries of the possible by mentally transforming the historical Lenin into a fairy tale 
one, from man into God, from politician into father. For a fatherless generation, this was 
easy enough to do. For Anya it is somewhat more difficult to inflate Lenin-father-God 
into an ideal because she already has a father, and she knows the flaws that fathers can 
have. Her father, for instance, is “always saying one thing and doing another”—a cardinal 
sin during the Thaw, when the virtue of sincerity was seen as having mystical social 
healing powers. Sergei, however, has an idealized, imaginary Lenin as the practical 
embodiment of his fallen father.  
(b) Papas and poets 
The three most prominent objects in Sergei’s house-museum are a wartime photo 
of his father, a large bust of Lenin, and a small modernist portrait of the dashing 1920s 
revolutionary poet Vladimir Mayakovsky. Lenin and the father radiate the ideal of 
remaining faithful to the pure ideals of a radiant past, when men knew what to do, why to 
do it, and how. Mayakovsky, meanwhile, speaks of youth, risk, and adventure—the will 
to break convention in pursuit of an ideal. 
These images of Lenin and Sergei’s father are also counterbalanced by the fat 
volume of lyrical poetry sitting right next to the Lenin bust.46 The presence of Lyrika on 
Sergei’s bookshelf suggests the crucial presence of poetry—in particular, supra-rational, 
economically “useless” lyricism—in his family’s life. In everyday Soviet life, high 
culture and lofty concerns were not the exclusive outpost of the intelligentsia or of those 
                                                
46 The early 1960s had brought not only heated discussions of the “fathers and sons” theme, but also 
somewhat less heated debates over the relative importance of “physicists and lyricists.” 
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blessed by the Party with cultural capital. Sergei’s mother is a doctor—not a position of 
economic privilege in the Soviet Union—and his father was a worker. Sergei resides at 
the margins of the intelligentsia, far from the rarified air of Anya—the daughter of a 
prosperous functionary—and her privileged friends. He is, though, no less receptive to 
the power of art, as we see in later in the film when readings by Voznesensky, 
Yevtushenko and others at the Polytechnic Museum impact him  so deeply that his 
physiognomy seems to go though a sort of metamorphic change with each passing poem. 
Another book, though not present in the apartment itself, also enters into this 
dialogue of objects and eras. Early in the film, when Sergei is wandering Moscow in 
Anya’s wake, he pauses in front of a bookstore window in which we see a stack that 
includes two 1962 almanacs; two copies of In the Snows of Antarctica, by the mountain-
climber-war-hero-polar-explorer Alexander Gusov; and, prominently, three volumes of 
Cervantes. Don Quixote was one of the signal literary-cinematic images of the Thaw; one 
of the greatest films of the era had been the 1956 adaptation by Grigorii Kozintsev, the 
great eccentric filmmaker of the 1920s cinematic golden age. Cervantes’ story of a man 
who did what he did because he had fallen into the grips of a beautiful illusion seems to 
play off of both the book of lyrics (the verbal capture of beautiful illusions) and the 
portrait of Mayakovsky (another man who did what he did in the grips of a beautiful 
illusion47). 
                                                
47 The same Mayakovsky portrait turns up on the apartment wall of the character played by a young Nikita 
Mikhalkov in Georgii Danelia’s I Walk Around Moscow (Ia shagaiu po Moskve, 1964), which was written 
by Gennadii Shpalikov, Khutsiev’s co-writer on Ilich’s Gate/I Am Twenty. 
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 How do these images mediate Lenin/Father? Certainly not to poke fun at him: In 
the liberal-idealist discourse of the early Thaw, both Quixote and Mayakovsky were key 
figures precisely because of their ability to selflessly and enthusiastically give themselves 
to an ideal. 48 But their giving was absolutely sincere; their belief was a vanguard 
emotion, offered not as obedience to dogma but as a transformation of public religion 
into private, idiosyncratic faith. They did not simply and obediently “go with the flow” 
(plyt’ s techeniem)—a sin definitively renounced by Sergei at the conclusion of Ilich’s 
Gate—but instead were willing to make themselves ridiculous for their particular ideals 
of love, to become secular variants of the old Russian yurodivy, the fool-for-Christ. 
But as both Quixote and Mayakovsky found out, there are substantial social and 
psychological costs to creating one’s own vision of the public religion. The public vision 
of acceptable chivalry, as it turns out for Quixote, does not include actual acts of mad 
heroism, because the disenchanted world is no longer designed to accept such acts: It has 
long since eradicated un-nuanced dragons from its dreams and has replaced them with 
windmills, which, after all, have their advantages. And Mayakovsky learned that when 
one sets out to praise an imaginary Lenin, one winds up in the service of a still more 
imaginary Stalin, the real version of whom has no further need of men who invent their 
own brand of faith.  
                                                
48 Khutsiev’s interest in Mayakovsky and the spontaneous revolutionary idealism he represented could even 
be seen in his breakthrough film, Spring on Zarechaia Street (Vesna na Zarechnoi Ulitse, 1956, directed by 
Khutsiev and Felix Mironer). This tale of a schoolteacher-intellectual who falls in love with a rough-hewn 
provincial worker was, as Neia Zorkaia has pointed out, reminiscent of the 1918 film The Lady and the 
Hooligan (Baryshnia i khuligan, directed by E. Slavinskii), which starred a dashing young Mayakovsky 
(Zorkaia, n.d.). 
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Mayakovsky committed suicide in 1930 and was for the Thaw generation a sort of 
martyr-hero. Put in the language of a central debate of the Soviet 1920s, Mayakovsky and 
Quixote represent spontaneity and the Lenin bust and the ascetic black and white portrait 
of the father represent consciousness.  Both concepts fit under the big tent of 1920s 
communism: it was under this tent that the cinematic works of Vertov, Eisenstein, 
Dovzhenko and Pudovkin were created, each proposing a spontaneous demonstration of 
idiosyncratically reformulated socialist faith. But the historical Lenin let it be well known 
that his preference was for consciousness, and Stalin brought this preference brutally to 
bear on Soviet society.  
The Thaw-era questioning of Stalin, in its embrace of the Mayakovskys and 
Quixotes of the world, should have represented a striking victory for spontaneity, but it 
did not and could not because consciousness had in the meantime been sacrelized by a 
force much greater even than Stalin: the Great Patriotic War. Archaic, monk-like visions 
of ideological, national, even sexual purity had attached themselves to the soldiers of the 
war, the idea that they had fought precisely for this purity—not for survival, not for the 
continuation of a vast and nuanced national history, not against the absolute 
extinguishment of their right to freedom (which had already been substantially 
extinguished) and life—but for the continuation of the line of development begun by 
Lenin and defined and continued by Stalin. How could a young man of 1961, in longing 
to honor the spiritual legacy of a father he never knew, fail to honor the general line for 
which the father fought? How can such a young man feel the freedom to make of his life 
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a personal freestyle riff on the public religion? Who is Sergei to play the role of 
Mayakovsky? 
(c) Words and the city 
The film plays at the idea of licensing its protagonists as poets, but a sort of 
haunting authority—the unquiet ghost of Leninist-Stalinist social consciousness—seems 
always to arrest their attempts at self-creation. The internal monologues of Sergei, Kolya, 
and Slavka as they walk around Chistye Prudy at summer’s end intermingle in a sort of 
free verse; the boys are unwittingly engaging their own capacity as creators; later we hear 
such a thought-poem from Slavka at work as he demolishes a Moscow tenement—the 
perfect Mayakovskian conflation of creation and destruction. But the license, like the 
promise of the Thaw itself, is never fully realized, and the boys’ verses remain in their 
heads, leaving the art of the public utterance to the Voznesenkys and Yevtushenkos of the 
world. Aboard a trolley, the young ladykiller Kolya and the conductress Katya confess to 
having written silly high school verse, both public (Kolya recites a few couplets about 
Paul Robeson) and private (about love), but they do so blushingly, as if such childish 
things must be put away and replaced with citation of those who have the right to create. 
(Katya, in particular, underrates herself. She is an extraordinary empath; she knows 
exactly how Kolya feels, and moves him so deeply that in his darkest hour he 
inadvertently calls her Nadia—“hope”. She is a sort of embodied lyricism, and her 
sudden replacement by a mechanized ticket-taker aboard Trolley 777 tantalizingly cuts 
off an intriguing narrative path.)  
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Late in the film, Kolya struggles with the shock of a request from his boss—the 
picturesquely named villain Chernousov (“black whiskers”)—that he inform on a 
coworker. The episode shatters Kolya’s breezy naiveté; he has already refused the request 
and threatened to punch Chernousov in the face, but he’d like to shout the injustice to the 
world. As he walks through nighttime Moscow, though, his poetic internal monologue 
about the situation is invaded and replaced by one of Mayakovsky’s panegyrics to Lenin. 
Mayakovsky, the self-creator, the crafter of new words and worlds, becomes a device to 
save Kolya from crafting new words of his own.  
Indeed, when Kolya speaks to his friends about the situation, his ability to express 
himself is strangely impaired, as if he has no words of his own at all. Sergei is left to lean 
across the table and ask him what on earth he is grousing about: Blizhe k delu—let’s cut 
to the chase, what’s up? Kolya’s response to this is not to cut to the chase, but rather to 
toss a tendentious insult at his friends: “You two sure are businesslike.” To which the 
young father, husband, and demolition man Slavka responds, in the film’s finest act of 
self-defense and self-definition: “I’m not businesslike; I’m preoccupied.”  
As the friends walk from Nikolai Ladovsky’s exuberantly modernist 1934 
Krasnye Vorota metro pavilion and ultimately descend to the underground platform of 
the Stalinist-neoclassical Kursk metro station, their moods further sour.  When the 
usually sensitive Sergei misreads the depths of Kolya’s ethical disenchantment and tells 
him just to accept the inevitable existence of the Chernousovs of the world and ignore 
them, the two nearly come to blows. Until this moment, Sergei has always been the one 
wrestling with his own conscience and Kolya has been the reassuring friend who is 
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almost theatrical in his simple enjoyment of life—the one who raises playful, ironic toasts 
to disarmament and peaceful coexistence while calculating how to get his next girl.  
Oleg Kovalev (2008) ascribes the upside-down nature of the metro scene to the 
setting. The friends’ walk from the revolutionary spontaneity of Ladovsky’s funnel-
shaped pavilion to the stifling late-Stalinist underworld is for Kovalev an enchanted 
journey into disorienting darkness. Khutsiev does indeed allow the city to whisper in his 
characters’ ears, to alternately delight them or to bewitch them like Bulgakov’s Satanic 
Voland in Master and Margarita. (Anya’s apartment, like Voland’s “Bad Apartment” is 
able to shape-shift—in one scene it is a wasteland of newspaper-covered walls trapped in 
an endless refurbishing process, and in the next it is the elegantly appointed apartment of 
a well-placed functionary. The apartment also seems uniquely capable of generating 
negative feelings.) The spell on the three friends, though, does not correspond entirely to 
their architectural tour; it runs deeper and has more troubling implications: Kolya, always 
quick with a witty word, at last has something serious to say, something with important 
social and ethical implications, and he cannot manage to express himself clearly to his 
closest friends. Kovalev understandably focuses on the tone-deafness of Sergei’s breezy 
response to Kolya at Kursk Station and arrives at his theory of architectural haunting. But 
the more formidable shade here is the ghost of muteness and inarticulacy inherited from 
the days of the Terror.  
The entire film is haunted in this way, with the past reaching toward the present, 
sometimes magnanimously, sometimes with the clear intent to seize control. Lenin, while 
a more congenial ghost than Stalin or Voland, is the ever-present embodiment of 
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consciousness, constantly shifting shape. He is not only Sergei’s looming and silent 
father, but, for a moment Anya’s, too, preaching, “For you, the people are a concept; for 
me, it’s my life. The people are those who, unlike you, work, while you’re trying to 
figure out what’s good and what’s bad.”49 After the Chernousov incident, even Kolya 
assumes the form of Leninist consciousness, chiding Sergei for rushing off to see Anya 
when there are serious social issues to discuss.  
Perhaps the film’s most endearing avatar of Leninist consciousness is Sergei’s 
mother as she tells the story of how she fed the family during the war by digging up 
potatoes at Moscow’s edge as the Fascists advanced. As she tells the story, Sergei is 
preparing for Anya’s birthday party, a gathering of Moscow’s privileged sons and 
daughters at the newly remodeled apartment of her apparatchik father. The story settles 
into his soul as a sort of standing rebuke to himself, his girl, and her whole world. It is 
notable that at the time Sergei’s mother is telling her tale, the family is culling its book 
collection; the volumes are all down from the shelf, and there is no fat volume of lyrical 
poetry to counterbalance the still-looming bust of Lenin. 
Against all this, Anya, attempting to hold her own with nothing more than a 
polka-dotted plastic raincoat and wistful longing for eternal love, is desperately 
overmatched. 
4. The Many Minds of Moscow 
Khutsiev does not so much reject the socialist-realist model of the positive hero as 
simply ignore it. The positive hero is politically conscious—he understands the demands 
                                                
49 This is a reference to Mayakovsky’s 1925 children’s poem, “What is good, what is bad.” 
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of history, of communist construction, and of the leadership that guides the construction. 
Led by this consciousness, he actively serves and leads the community in the production 
of history’s next stage. Khutsiev’s heroes, on the other hand, mostly tread water while 
examining the water, thinking about what the water means to them, and trying to 
determine what their proper place in the water might be. They are not so much conscious 
as striving toward consciousness. They are incomplete, and will always be incomplete. 
The nature of their progress is that with each subtle epiphany they will become 
incomplete in a different way. In this they resemble Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin, the 
hero of The Idiot, who at first appears to be an utterly harmonious character, if one out of 
joint with his times, but progressively reveals himself to be incomplete, deeply wounded 
by life, and uncertain of his place and his course of action. 
The very structure of Ilich’s Gate reflects the uncertainty and indeterminacy of 
the characters. They have no fixed trajectory, and neither does their story. They seem to 
write their tale in the act of living it. Like The Idiot, Khutsiev’s film is what one might 
call a “baggy masterpiece,” a jangling assemblage of parts that somehow manages to 
make music. Each of the film’s images retains a lyrical and ethical wholeness. The 
impact of each episode is not determined by or subordinated to its role in the overall 
narrative economy.50 Filmmakers and screenwriters made an important shift toward 
episodicity during the Thaw, disturbing the over-determined Aristotelian socialist-realist 
plot (with the aid of elders, a worker discovers Party consciousness and successfully 
                                                
50 The film is often remembered in episodes. The poetry reading at the Polytechnic Institute, the May Day 
celebration, and the party at Anya’s house, all became known as independent set pieces. Ironically, this 
very patient, thoughtful film seems ideally suited for YouTube repackaging. 
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plays his role in socialist construction) while continuing to emphasize the virtues of 
public-spiritedness.51  
The new episodic-lyrical approach allowed images to communicate in unexpected 
intonations, to pull one way while the surface story seemed to be pulling the other. In 
other words, film began to reflect the ambiguities of life. The 1960s wave of lyrical 
episodicity brought a kind of  “dedramatization” to Soviet cinematic storytelling; some 
critics, such as Lev Anninsky, received the dedramatized films as a new kind of 
phenomenological truth-telling; others, such as Sasha Aronov, greeted them as a new 
form of boredom (Anninskii, 1991). Khutsiev had been a pioneer of the approach in his 
early films, Spring on Zarechnaia Street (1956) and The Two Fyodors (1958). (The lead 
actor in the latter film, Vasily Shukshin, would soon become a celebrated writer-director 
of episodic narrative with his 1964 film, There Lives This Lad.) In the dedramatized 
episodic film, one does not sense authorial string-pulling, but rather characters who try to 
somehow write their own scripts, but then abruptly change their minds about what the 
script should be and anxiously begin anew. If there is a finalizing consciousness implicit 
in such films, it is consciousness of the ultimate vanity of scripting amid the spontaneous 
flow of life. The loosening of traditional plot structure gives each image “voice” within 
the film as a whole. Images coexist with one another rather than build upon one another 
as bricks in an intricately constructed story arc. As in The Idiot, we have the impression 
of many images sharing a locus in space and time, rather than following upon one another 
in time, one moment logically causing the next (Morris, 1994, p. 90).  
                                                
51 These films also continued to reflect certain socialist-realist tropes. Prokhorov (2002) has demonstrated 
the persistence of Stalinist tropes of war and family in Thaw cinema. 
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Among the characters in Ilich’s Gate is the camera itself, entering its own 
priorities into the fray with those of film’s flesh-and-blood figures, creating parallel 
narratives, mini-narratives, and counterpoints. Early in the film, Sergei, having just 
returned from the army, is walking through the city, delighting in the life of the street. He 
and the camera take in a billboard for Georgii Danelia’s film Seriozha. The name is the 
diminutive form of Sergei: It seems as though the city is speaking to our hero, that on this 
day it belongs to him. A pretty girl rushes toward him, reaches out…and keeps going 
right past him. The camera, too, forsakes Sergei and stays with the girl, who meets her 
boyfriend with breathless apologies for being late (“Oh, my heart almost jumped out of 
my chest! I was so afraid you would leave!”) and takes in his warm forgiveness (“I’m 
used to it”) as they wander off, arm in arm, down the city street and past Sergei’s 
billboard. (“Let’s walk,” she says. “Where to?” he asked. “Straight ahead. Let’s just walk 
like this.”) We will never see either of them again. 
Khutsiev’s taste for the episodic and his openness to chance does not imply a 
purposeful embrace of illogic; his aesthetic is realist, not absurdist. But the world he 
captures is based on the logic of contiguity rather than continuity. The reflective-
nostalgic savoring of the passing moment creates a deep-focus discursive field in which 
many times and places and memories are collapsed into this shared space in this moment. 
The enthusiasts of the twenties, the compromised careerists of the late-forties, and the 
just-hatching cynics of the seventies share the same time-space with 1960s Muscovites. 
The integrity of the image in Khutsiev is analogous both to the polyphony in 
Dostoevsky’s masterpiece and to its flattening out of space-time, where the archaism of 
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Myshkin could coexist with the modern political concerns of Ippolit and the capitalist 
careerism of Ganya.  
Indeed, it is the flattening of time into space that enables polyphony in both The 
Idiot and Ilich’s Gate, allowing discourses that might ordinarily be assigned to different 
eras to naturally collide and contest. Ideas and aesthetics do not have fixed expiration 
dates; in the worlds of Dostoevsky and Khutsiev there always remains a place for the old 
within the new. Indeed, the categories of “old” and “new” become effaced as we find that 
sometimes the supposed past is quite at home in the present, and perhaps more modern: Is 
the portrait of Mayakovsky on Sergei’s wall part of the past, the present, or the future? 
Within Soviet culture, Mayakovsky is a historic figure who lives forever in the future, an 
impossible figure in his own time, a phantom of enthusiasm for an undefined tomorrow, 
and, most of all, a perennial wake-up call for the present. And in what Sarah Young 
(2004) calls Myshkin’s “saintly scripting,” is Dostoevsky’s Christlike prince a laughable 
archaic, a foreshadowing of the millennium, or—like Mayakovsky during the Thaw—a 
challenge for the present?  
Our own chronotope, too—associations and perspectives from the time and space 
of our own lives—wind up layered upon the narrative moments of the books we read and 
the films we watch. These associations are particularly active when engaged by narrative 
strategies that purposefully leave room for them. In The Idiot, the collision of 
consciousnesses is undisciplined by the central authority of either an unquestioned 
narrator or of the kind of tight plot discipline that would make the meaning of each 
moment clear within the narrative economy. Thus we have bewildering, contradictory 
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moments such as Ippolit’s reading of his “Necessary Explanation.” The sneering reaction 
of Ippolit’s audience suggest that he is behaving like a maudlin fool and writing like a 
graphomaniacal dunce. But our own experience of his text is rich and wrenching. His tale 
touches us with its drama, desperation, deep feeling, and occasional wisdom. If we don’t 
know quite what to make of Ippolit’s speech, it is because, as in life, we are getting 
simultaneous mixed signals about the passing moment. We have to decide for 
ourselves—or not decide at all, but bask in the ambiguous reality that a single image can 
look so different to different eyes.  
A similar tension between potential interpretations takes place in the famous 
scene of Anya’s birthday party in Ilich’s Gate. Just after hearing his mother’s moving tale 
of braving Moscow’s wartime outskirts to unearth the potatoes that saved the family, 
Sergei enters a room full of educated, apparently well-off, and demonstrably complacent 
young adults. This is Anya’s social circle, and as the evening goes on, the crowd (with 
the exception of a fetching model who also lost her father in the war) becomes 
increasingly repulsive to Sergei. The young people complain about their parents, they 
joke about their children, they exchange nonsensical remarks about the immanent arrival 
at the party of Yuri Dolgorukii, the 12th century founder of Moscow.  Nothing at all 
seems to matter to them, and while Sergei’s circle, too, demonstrates similar faults—
Slavka complains about family life, Kolya is constantly chirping clever non sequiturs, 
and Sergei himself whines about his excessively exemplary behavior—he has apparently, 
on this night, resolved to be done with meaninglessness.  
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A young man played by Andrei Konchalovsky (a writer-director who was at the 
time co-writing Andrei Rublev with Tarkovsky) arrives with a steaming pot of baked 
potatoes straight from the kitchen of the exclusive Metropol Hotel. The revelers spin the 
potatoes, peel them, play with them, drop them, dance upon them. Sergei looks aghast at 
the scene like Moses glimpsing the orgy around the Golden Calf. He reaches down and 
rescues a handful of spuds. The young people, gleeful at their ironic appropriation of 
patriotic symbols, put on traditional bast sandals and dance to jazz, absentmindedly 
grinding a ruined potato into the parquet. One of them puts on a record of the folk ballad 
“The Ducks Are Flying”. At first the partygoers greet it in the same ironic spirit as they 
received the potatoes and sandals, but then the model, played by the stunning Svetlana 
Svetlichnaya, begins to sing in a beautiful, wounded, soul-scorching voice. The 
partygoers seem momentarily touched—and annoyed that they are capable of being 
touched in this way. She sings with utter conviction, and they can hardly stand it. A 
character played by Andrei Tarkovsky springs from his chair. “Maybe that’s enough,” he 
says. He calls for a drink and a toast. 
Sergei proposes a toast to the potato.  
“Why not the turnip?” Tarkovsky says. 
“No,” says Sergei, slapping the table. “The potato.” This worries Anya. She asks 
Sergei what he means. 
 “I know what he means,” says another young man. “It’s kvas patriotism”—the 
false, blind patriotism of hockey crowds who will follow anything so long as it is 
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“theirs.”52 This is an assault not only on Sergei’s patriotism, but on his intellect. Sergei 
asks the young man if there is anything he is willing to take seriously, and the young man 
throws the question back at him.  
Sergei is ready for precisely this question. 
“I take the Revolution seriously,” he says, “the song ‘The Internationale’. The 
year 1937. The war and the soldiers and the fact that practically none of us have our 
fathers anymore”—here he pauses—“and the potato, which saved us during the hungry 
times.”  
Tarkovsky’s character, sudden as the Cheshire cat, appears alongside Sergei: 
“And the turnip?” he says, pleased with his own sarcasm. “You didn’t tell me. What do 
you think of the turnip?” 
A sad-eyed young woman, offended for Sergei, slaps Tarkovsky across the face. 
* * * 
Looked at from the point of view of strict plot logic, Sergei’s statement of faith 
suggests that Anya’s friends are the very “young scoundrels” who, as Sergei earlier tells 
Anya’s father, are even worse than old scoundrels. If our moral scorekeeping were rooted 
in an absolute alliance with the protagonist, our sutured presence within his very skin, we 
might be able to pass unambiguous, even aggressive, judgment on Anya’s friends; we 
might conclude that the waffling Sergei has at last taken the “right” side in the 
generational/cultural battle by rejecting Anya and her band of cosmopolitans. But 
Sergei’s voice is not authoritative for us. He has already flip-flopped in the Kursk metro; 
                                                
52 Kvas, a beverage made from fermented bread, is a traditional Russian thirst-quencher. 
 
 
243 
he himself knows how to play the breezy ironist. More importantly, he knows from hard 
experience with Anya’s father that the older generation is indeed compromised and that 
statist symbols are indeed debased—this cynical father figure, who so clearly despises 
everyone and everything while declaring his closeness to “the worker” delivers his whole 
bitter diatribe against the younger generation while keeping the television set tuned to a 
children’s choir singing patriotic songs. We know that Sergei—though Kovalev calls him 
“a man of faith”—is not so immune to the doubts that haunt Anya’s self-defensively 
ironic friends. Sergei’s very voice is the voice of doubt. It is, perhaps, his doubt, his 
perennial search, that we sympathize with, and we are not prepared to believe that 
Sergei’s search has ended simply because Anya’s friend mocked the sacred potato by 
asking about a turnip.  
In any case, the problem with Tarkovsky's character is not specifically that he 
makes fun of the potato; the need to hold the previous generation's symbols forever 
sacred winds up debasing the symbols and alienating the young. No, the problem is not in 
the specifics of his mockery, but in his tone, in the mockery itself, in his inability to 
empathize with Sergei's elevated, even sacred mood. The key to unity-in-diversity lies in 
the capacity not to share the Other's faith, but his faithfulness. It is faithfulness as a 
quality of the soul that counts. Unity-in-diversity—sobornost—hinges on two elements of 
togetherness that coexist in productive tension: respect for the other's selfhood, and the 
willingness to share co-feeling. The reason this odd combination can function is precisely 
that co-feeling is expected, not necessarily co-believing. While “Orthodoxy” means 
“correct doctrine”, the Russian pravoslavie means “correct praise”—Russian belief shifts 
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the focus from believing in the same things to believing together through the same 
external forms of worship. Respect for form is the central issue, not doctrinal purity. And 
the Tarkovsky character's interruption of both the folk song and of Sergei's declaration of 
faith is nothing if not bad form. Virtue resides in mutual respect for selfhood and in the 
kenotic ideal of self-emptying in service to the other. What is called for is not just 
Western “tolerance,” but a kind of Christian awe before the simple, even naïve, faith of 
the other. This is the central emotion behind the Russian tradition of the Holy Fool, and it 
is precisely the emotion that wins Myshkin so many admirers in part one of The Idiot.  
Nevertheless, Tarkovsky’s character is not demonic within the logic of the film, 
as Kovalev suggests.53 On the contrary, he is haunted. He cannot stand still, cannot utter 
more than a sentence at a time, cannot utter a serious syllable until he has been slapped. 
At a party filled with his own people, he is oddly friendless and spiritually homeless, 
flitting from place to place, unable to find even a conversation he can believe in. He is as 
much of a searcher as Sergei, though perhaps less able to settle for unsatisfactory 
answers. Tarkovsky's character is specifically rubbed the wrong way by restorative 
nostalgia. But he doesn't understand that Sergei's nostalgia is not restorative but 
reflective; it is borne not of social-ideological abstractions but personal and familial 
memory. This is why the inclusion of “The Internationale” in Sergei's list of things worth 
believing in sounds false and why the inclusion of the humble potato sounds so very true. 
                                                
53 Kovalev (2008) raises the possibility that Tarkovsky’s character knows that the turnip was the original 
primary source of Russian nutrition, before potatoes were brought from America, and that his irony is not 
unpatriotic, but rather a critique of an uninformed “herd patriotism.”  
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We do not take Sergei’s statement of faith to be a wholesale rejection of his 
generation because we know he is still grasping at the meaning of his place within that 
generation. (Earlier in the film, he tells Anya’s father that society is not divided 
horizontally into generations, but vertically between the cynical and the sincere within 
each generation.) Sergei is not denouncing the world of Anya’s friends like some 
prematurely aged functionary choosing “the fathers” over “the children”, but desperately 
reaching beyond their world, engaging the past to spark his own capacity to feel. The 
enemy is not these jokey twentysomethings, or their disrespect for tradition, but the 
numbness that seems to be setting in on them. Sergei, unfinalized and full of longing, 
does not have the answers, and as we learn in the following scene, neither does the shade 
of his 21-year-old fallen father.  
In the political-artistic discussions that followed Khutsiev’s completion of the 
film, his critics were angry that Sergei had not reacted more aggressively to Anya’s 
cosmopolitan friends. Instead, he just picks up his coat and leaves. And Khutsiev’s 
camera does not follow him to show him “decisively” or “resolutely” leaving all this 
behind, but instead lingers on the partygoers. After receiving his slap in the face, 
Tarkovsky looks down in shame, clearly not numb, not the irredeemable smartass Sergei 
might have taken him for. The young man who started the scandal with his accusation of 
“kvas patriotism” suddenly feels ashamed as well, and projects his shame on Tarkovsky’s 
character: “Why did you say that crap?” Tarkovsky rubs his head in shameful agitation: 
“It comes automatically,” he says.  
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Just when we think Khutsiev has declared his loyalties and denounced the young 
punks, his camera stays behind to show us the kids are alright. They’ve just learned too 
well how to defend themselves with wit against a world that makes them feel powerless. 
Anya runs out the door after Sergei. The image, like the earlier images of her in her 
“asocial” devotion to Sergei alone, contests the rival, narrative-ideological image of her 
as a spoiled, individualistic rich girl who distracts Sergei from his idealistic absorption 
into the social whole. What we see is a young woman in love and full of doubt, a 
daughter who has witnessed her father’s social hypocrisy and who, like the fatherless 
Sergei, has not found a way to engage her formidable individuality in the life of society. 
We see what one longs for years after letting it slip through one’s hands: Another human 
being, doubtful, fearful, imperfect, even unknowable—but loving.  And somehow, in 
spite of everything, we believe that Anya could enliven and energize Sergei’s life, if only 
she could catch him. 
5. Tempering the Steel 
In his brilliant essay on Ilich's Gate, Oleg Kovalev (2008) argues that there are 
“right spaces” and “wrong spaces” in Ilich’s Gate, and that these spaces exercise 
influence on the characters. There are places where “the demon of faithlessness” reigns 
and others where faith—quasi-religious faith in the Thaw-era “social mythology” that 
sees sincerity and Soviet patriotism as utterly compatible—is ascendant. The demon rules 
in Anya’s apartment and in the depths of the Kursk metro station. Faith reigns in Sergei’s 
apartment. Most of all, though, faith is empowered in the wide streets and warm 
courtyards of Moscow.  
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Vladimir Paperny (2002) writes that these intimate courtyards were a contribution 
of Stalinist architecture in response to modernist architectural values that called for 
maximum street exposure. “Intimacy, in the 1920s, was practically a swear word,” writes 
Paperny, who then quotes the leftist architect Kornelii Zelinsky: “’Intimacy’ is a typical 
frame of mind for extremely bourgeois epochs.” By the early 1930s, when Khutsiev was 
growing up in Moscow, wandering its Garden Ring and stopping at the cinema to watch 
early Stalinist classics such as Peter I, the idea of intimacy had made a comeback as part 
of Stalin’s general campaign against leftist egalitarianism and in favor of hierarchy and 
traditional culture. Khutsiev, of course, does not associate these courtyards with the 
Stalinist search for order and the disciplining of excessively spontaneous leftists with 
their ever-shifting isms and performative Jacobinism. Rather, he cherishes the courtyards 
for their actual architectural function as a semi-public space—a space of mediated 
intimacy, a gentle bridge between the world of family and the world of public life.  
In short, the courtyard is for Khutsiev a space of friendship. The friendship of 
Sergei, Kolya, and Slavka is not a private realm isolated from public world of, for 
instance, the May Day celebration. Instead, friendship is the crucial unit of public life. 
The deep personal friendship is the indispensable connecting tissue between private and 
public. The centrality of friendship to public life was an article of faith for the entire 
Thaw intelligentsia, where nothing was as bracingly, fulfillingly “public” as the private 
kitchen conversation between friends—these were the moments when aesthetic, political, 
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and spiritual dreams of the public world were constructed and exchanged. But even these 
“right spaces” could be challenging ones.54 
Early in the film, Sergei and Kolya stand in the playground and whistle in 
harmony up to the balcony of their old friend Slavka. The two boys down below and their 
friend up above form a triangle—a triangle not of competition, but of cooperation. They 
are the three that is not a crowd. The notes are harmonious, rather than identical, but there 
are no awkward collisions of notes—it is (to invoke Konstantin Aksakov's take on the 
Slavophilic ideal of sobornost55) the choir at its finest, when each musician plays his own 
notes and manages to support rather than detract from the notes of his neighbor. The 
notes travel equal distances up the sides of an isosceles triangle and meet at the figure of 
Slavka. Because he is married, Slavka is more distant from Kolya and Sergei than they 
are from one another, but the relationship has a stability; its only inequality is rooted in 
                                                
54 It is peculiar that Anya’s apartment turns out, in Kovalev’s phrasing, a “wrong” space while Sergei’s 
courtyard is a “right space”; functionally, the two spaces play an almost identical role as middle ground 
between private and public. When Ludmila Alexeyeva (1990) reflects lovingly upon the apartment 
gatherings she and her group—her kompaniya—had during the late 1950s and early 1960s, she may be 
talking about a different crowd than Sergei’s (and perhaps a crowd more like Anya’s clever guests), but the 
notion of the kompaniya was not restricted to dissident, or even educated groups. Form workers to 
academics, young Russians in the Thaw era embraced the old Russian tradition of gathering for food and 
drink and guitar and long conversations by turns humorous and searchingly earnest. The kompaniya, like 
the courtyard, occupied a space between the private realm of self and family and the public realm of work, 
school, and street life. 
 
55 To better grasp the concept of sobornost, let us examine Aksakov's description of the Russian peasant 
commune: “A commune is a union of the people, who have renounced their egoism, their individuality, and 
who express their common accord; this is an act of love, a noble Christian act, which expresses itself more 
or less clearly in its various other manifestations. A commune thus represents a moral choir, and just as in a 
choir a voice is not lost, but follows the general pattern and is heard in the harmony of all voices: so in the 
commune the individual is not lost, but renounces his exclusiveness in favor of the general accord—and 
there arises the noble phenomenon of harmonious, joint existence of rational beings (consciousness); there 
arises a brotherhood, a commune—a triumph of human spirit” (Riazanovsky, 1965, p. 135). 
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the tradition of marriage—in this case, a reasonable marriage to an old classmate, a 
longtime resident of  the friends' small world. 
One of the key narratives of the movie is the challenge to these lines of friendship 
as the young men's separate lives intrude upon the triangle, deforming it, now stretching 
one line, now shrinking another, the members of the choir moving further from one 
another at one moment, then regrouping in different formations. The final scene of part 
one begins with Slava alone in the playground before dawn, disconsolate at his bride's 
jealousy of his time with friends. It is the morning after May Day. Sergei arrives after his 
night-long wanderings with Anya, her phone-number freshly memorized. He is whistling. 
Slavka is not. The musical harmony of the earlier triangle is missing. This time, it is 
Kolya who is up on his balcony; he lives and sleeps there. The reasons for this are never 
fully explained in the film, but it is clear that there is some kind of disharmony at the very 
center of his life, in the world of his family; we never do get access to his home (and we 
wonder if he ever does).  Sergei and Slavka call up to Kolya, not with music this time, 
but with a shout that cuts through the morning silence. They ask for food, and a groggy 
Kolya, not thrilled to be woken, comes down to them bleary-eyed with a pot of  “sailor’s 
pasta”—macaroni and meat.  
Did this fellow, exiled to the balcony of his own home, make the macaroni 
himself? Is there anyone who cares about him? Or is his performatively hale and hearty 
good humor an adaptation to a life that is out of joint at its very center? The three young 
men sit in the playground of their youth in the early morning hours as the city still sleeps 
around them. This is not the joyous meeting that followed the previous playground-
 
 
250 
balcony triangle. Their thoughts are not united on their friendship with one another, as 
they were in the earlier scene. Now Slavka is thinking of his marital problems; Sergei and 
Kolka are doing their best to think about Slavka's marital problems, too, but their efforts 
at empathy are inescapably tempered by the presence of their own minds, their own 
thoughts. Sergei is no doubt still whistling a tune in his head, repeating to himself the 
phone number he has yet to write down. And Kolya goes so far as to wonder aloud what 
Slavka is so despondent about; he's got a wife and a child and a home, while all Kolya 
has is a cot on a damp balcony. The lines of the triangle have shifted; the music that 
travels along those lines has become more contentious. And yet the friendship survives—
it is if anything more real here than in the euphoric harmony of the first triangle. 
In an earlier scene, when Sergei is battling the flu and whining at what he 
considers his too-exemplary life, Kolya sarcastically quotes him a line from Ostrovsky's 
How the Steel Was Tempered. These three young men have no revolution to wage, as 
their grandfathers did, and no Great Patriotic War to fight, as their fathers did. What they 
have is their friendship, their curiosity about the world, and the nagging question about 
how to pursue that curiosity—how to be young in their own lives—while living 
honorably in the community their fathers died for. The lines of their friendship are tested 
throughout the film, exposed to the ultimate question within the sobornost paradox: Is 
internal liberation—is freedom—compatible with community? Can friendship survive the 
peripetea of the young and questing self? The external elements that invade this 
triangle—Slavka's wife; Kolka's ideological duel with Chernousov; and, most 
importantly, Sergei's affair with Anya—are not foreign elements that threaten to destroy 
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Eden and must be cast out. They are life. They are the contentious voices that any 
community must be able to not only endure, but include. They are a test of the 
community/friendship, but they need not be a threat to it. They are the life-force that 
tempers the steel of community. And the community that cannot withstand contentious 
polyphony is not suited to existence in the real world. Without the external unifying 
forces of revolution and war to forge community, individuals who wish for the Whole to 
survive the challege of individuality have as the weapons of community-building not 
force or necessity or ideology, but the seemingly opposed virtues of conscience and 
tolerance. 
The opposition between these virtues is resolved not by declaring the victory of 
conscience over tolerance, as Sergei unconvincingly attempts to do at the conclusion of 
the film, but through the deployment of empathy—Prince Myshkin's powerful (if 
ultimately unsuccessful) tool. The triangle of friends (and, by extension, the grand 
triangle, of self, other, and community) cannot long survive if every intersecting line is 
considered a sundering of the sacred. People grow and change and if their links with 
community are to survive, they must be supple and tolerant enough—like steel with a 
high tolerance for heat and force and rain and rust—to accommodate this change.  
In a 2004 interview with Savva Yamshchikov, Khutsiev said that he had wanted 
Sergei's voice-over at the end of the film to say, “Of course, we’ll go our separate ways in 
life. We’ll grow. New things will concern us. Life may scatter us, but one way or another 
we’ll never forget the time in which we live” (Yamshchikov, 2004). Such a conditional 
prognosis would have been in keeping with Khutsiev and Shpalikov’s strategy of 
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allowing life to write the script, their prodigious Dostoevskian talent for avoiding the 
finalization of the supple stuff of life. These lines would also place proper emphasis on 
reflective memory rather than rigid preservation. (It is worth noting that one of the early 
candidates for the film’s title was Do You Remember, Comrade?) Instead, Khutsiev 
wound up with a finalizing declaration at film’s end: “I’m glad we live here, and couldn’t 
live anywhere else. This is all ours, the only possible way. And I’ll be true to that to the 
end.” These lines fail to confront a central issue in the film—that if friendship/community 
is to endure, it must be capable of accomodating change. An organic community of  
individuals survives only if it can welcome the organic growth of those individuals. A 
frozen unity is sooner or later shattered. 
Khutsiev's preferred lines (excluded, he says, not by official censorship but 
because he couldn't quite get the words right) would have underscored the stern challenge 
at the heart of the dream of sobornost—social harmony is impossible without unity-in-
diversity, yet diversity seems to threaten unity, and unity seems to threaten diversity. In 
practice, the vision of a harmonious choir can be taken only as an unachievable ideal that 
is, all the same, worth pursuing. The impossibility of total harmony, and the extreme 
difficulty of the pursuit of harmony, must be acknowledged. The steel is tempered not 
through the conquest of difficulty, but the embrace of it, the understanding that it will be 
permanent, irritating, and worthwhile. 
* * * 
Khutsiev engages both hard realities and lyrical dreams through a dual setting of 
his films: On one hand, they take place in the indelibly real bricks-and-mortar Moscow of 
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the 1960s; on the other, they take place in the developing memories of his protagonists, 
who drink in the image-moments of their lives, reflect upon them in interior monologues 
and recited poems, wordlessly walk the streets of their cities, engaging the richness of all 
they see and hear.  The independence and integrity of the episodes creates a lyrical 
nostalgia for the passing moment without suggesting that the passing moment is in some 
way a model for the way things should always be. The moments are not embedded in 
what Boym (2001) calls a restorative nostalgic plot (such nostalgia, she says, knows only 
two plots—the return to origins and the conspiracy to prevent such a return); Khutsiev's 
love of the captured moment does not imply a resistance to the movement of time, but a 
respect for the moment in time. 
In her monograph on The Idiot, Sarah Young argues that Bakhtin overstates the 
ease with which polyphony leads to harmony. In The Idiot, the overall harmony of the 
compositon exists only from the bird's eye-view of the reader at novel's conclusion, when 
we close the book, almost shivering at the odd and troubling and gorgeous symphony that 
emerges from the books cacaphony of competing voices. Along the way, though, the 
contending voices and images often create a bewildering tableau, a lovely, demented 
chaos. The real story of both The Idiot and Ilich's Gate is that life forever challenges the 
abstract harmonious vision. Whenever the camera moves closer to the most cherished 
elements of life, it questions the viability of any dream of harmonized interests. We see 
contention, jockeying desires, misunderstandings, small harmonious subsets that 
(allegedly) distract from the harmony of all (marriage, in an example from Dostoevsky's 
diaries; the Sergei-Anya union, in Kolya's ill-tempered hints). The question becomes less 
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whether this mass of contentions can be resolved, but whether, when considered together, 
they add up to a sort of beauty, a music of the city, a music of humanity. At certain 
moments, we, like Sergei, doubt. But when Khutsiev pulls his camera back to take in the 
teeming Moscow streets, it is hard to argue that the sum of a million contentious notes 
forms an urban chorus very much worth hearing. 
6. Conclusion 
Each moment in Ilich’s Gate opens up not simply on the next moment or even on 
the whole of the film, but on the entire world of the viewer, who, after all, spends his or 
her life taking in, remembering, and processing images. Khutsiev takes us beyond 
Deleuze’s movement image (where rational spatial-temporal connections orient us within 
the world of a film, with one moment in one space leading us to a logically responsive 
next moment in a sensibly related next space) toward his time image (where the image 
bears within it an entire world of potential, and even contradictory, associations). In the 
movement image, our consciousness becomes temporarily embedded in the world of the 
film. In the time image, cinematic images become embedded in us. Their self-
contradictory, polyphonic, time-collapsing nature short-circuits the causal and sequential 
world of the story, and the images are set free to relate directly to our experience of living 
in time and space. The game here is much bigger than plot resolution or heroic decision-
making: When we read The Idiot or watch Ilich’s Gate, the central question is not, What 
will happen next? or Will the hero succeed? (though those questions are, of course, 
present on a lower level), but, Given all you’ve seen and heard, what do you make of this 
world?  
 
 
255 
This is a fundamentally creative question, in which “to make” has a double 
meaning—on one hand, we can read it as the colloquial “What’s your understanding of it 
all?” and on the other we have a literal challenge: “Can you make something of all this?” 
The fortuitously cast Tarkovsky would later become emblematic of this ethos, going on 
record as wanting to enlist his audience in the creative completion of his elliptical films. 
Khutsiev, too, creates in such a way that the viewer leaves the screen with lingering 
images to be reimagined from different perspectives and challenging interactions to think 
through. While watching Khutsiev’s films, one finds oneself taking sides and then 
changing one’s mind about the sides one has taken. And the creative act does not stop 
with the viewers’ completion of the film, but spills over into their creation and recreation 
of their own lives.  
Khutsiev’s films become, as Bazin said of De Sica’s work, “an asymptote of 
reality” (Bazin, 2004, p. 82). They do not simply resemble the real; they become a part of 
our reality. This is not simply the sort of memory sleight-of-hand in which, years later, 
one looks back at a period film and says “Yep, that’s just what it was like,” allowing the 
film to replace (and usually varnish) memory. No doubt this happens with Khutsiev’s 
films, but there is something more profound at work—the way in which the films become 
part of our internal make-up, one of many voices of our personal polyphonic choir, giving 
us subtle hints on how to see. They become part of the body of real-world memory that 
makes us who we are in the present. And this profound effect stops neither at Russia’s 
borders nor at the generational borders of those who actually lived through the Thaw. The 
“asymptote”—in mathematics a line that stretches toward an object but never quite 
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reaches it—can approach anyone who watches the film with a willingness not only to see 
it, but to be seen by it. One leaves Khutsiev’s films with the eerie and elated sense that 
one has been understood. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CODA AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
1. Suspended Spirituality 
In 1967, Marlen Khutsiev completed July Rain, a tale of young, educated 
Muscovites nearing the age of 30. The film was a fitting follow-up to Ilich’s Gate; one 
could see it as a glimpse into the future lives of the clever guests at Anya’s birthday 
party—and into the life of the city itself. In his 1991 book, The Sixties Generation and 
Us, the critic Lev Anninsky writes memorably about the delight and awe with which he 
watched July Rain as a young film critic in the mid-1960s. Where he saw an embodiment 
of spiritual longing in the film’s patient gaze—its drinking-in of everyday Moscow and 
its subtle portrayal of everyday anxiety—his colleague Sasha Aronov saw not an imprint 
of time but a messenger of boredom. Aronov’s cinematic hero was Akira Kurosawa, and 
he saw cinema as a terrain for action, suspense, suffering. Where had Khutsiev put all this 
stuff, the movement, narrative drive, and physical explosiveness that were the traditional 
essence of movie magic? In Aronov’s longing for action and drama was the seed of the 
ascendance of genre cinema in the Soviet 1970s (Anninskii, 1991).  
Earlier still, in 1965, another Kurosawa admirer, Andrei Konchalovsky, had 
decided not to film Gennady Shpalikov’s script, Happiness, for his first feature film, 
choosing instead to adapt Chinghiz Aitmatov’s novel The First Teacher, a tale of culture 
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clash in revolutionary Kirghizia. As Yevgeny Margolit writes, Konchalovsky was in 
search of a dramatic core, and, for Shpalikov, there was no such thing: Life as he saw it—
and this was true for other players as well in the “dedramatized” cinema of the Soviet 
1960s—did not unfold in well-formed dramaturgical conflicts, so cinema should not 
either (Troiianovskii, 2002, p. 93). The 1960s conflict between traditional dramaturgy 
and Khutsievan dedramatization in many ways anticipates Deleuze’s theories of the 
movement image and the time image, and it intensified by the 1970s, when 
Konchalovsky wrote several prominent articles calling for the professionalization of 
screenwriting and filmmaking along American studio lines, with traditional dramaturgy 
and precise directorial adherence to the shooting script (Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky, 1972, 
1974a, 1974b, 1975).  
Such adherence had been required during the 1930s and ’40s, when state cinema 
chief Boris Shumiatsky, who, like Konchalovsky, was inspired by Hollywood 
competence, had instituted the “cast-iron scenario” that directors were not to depart from. 
Shumiatsky’s approach had been a response to the wildly spontaneous approach of 1920s 
avant-garde filmmakers who often determined the ultimate structure of their film with the 
scissors rather than the script. Konchalovsky’s approach seems to have grown in part 
from his frustrations working with Tarkovsky on Andrei Rublev, when the script seemed 
to be composed of an infinitely stretchable and re-moldable substance, and the set was 
often a place for creating on the fly, with all the anxiety and inefficiency that implies. 
Konchalovsky was not fond of Tarkovsky’s later work, but he understood his old friend’s 
genius and his right to make films in his own peculiar way. Nevertheless, he believed 
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that, in less skilled hands, spontaneity and dedramatization—the storytelling approaches 
that had made the personal and episodic cinema of Tarkovsky and Khutsiev so 
memorable—resulted in unprofessional, unwatchable cinema. 
The competitive discourse over dedramatization and traditional dramaturgy might 
have, in different circumstances, been a friendly intellectual argument. But in Soviet 
cultural politics it was deeply intertwined with the old Leninist tug-of-war between 
spontaneity and consciousness, with the regime, as always, decisively taking the side of 
consciousness. Thus the artistic divide between Konchalovsky and Tarkovsky, for 
instance, grew into a personal quarrel, and the personal conflict, at least in Tarkovsky’s 
mind, became political: Konchalovsky had been writing in favor of methods utterly 
opposed to his own, methods favored by the authorities, the very authorities who 
constantly criticized his work for being incomprehensible and alien. In 1983, 
Konchalovsky met with Tarkovsky at the Cannes Film Festival and tried to convince his 
old friend it was safe for him to come home. Tarkovsky, according to Konchalovsky’s 
recollections, responded by implying that Konchalovsky was a spy, dispatched to lure 
him back to a homeland that would never let him film again (Konchalovskii, 1991). What 
had begun as an aesthetic divide between two ambitious visionaries had metastasized into 
the stuff of Cold War paperbacks. 
The critical response to Khutsiev’s July Rain further illustrates the politicization 
of aesthetic argument. It was one thing for Aronov to tell a colleague in all sincerity that 
he found the film boring. But when the accusation of boredom was taken up by the 
official press, it became political, cynical, anti-intellectual, and even vicious. On August 
 
 
260 
29, 1967, the newspaper Soviet Culture printed conservative critic Rostislav Yurenev’s 
“Open Letter to Film Director Marlen Khutsiev, If We May Speak Openly.” July Rain, 
Yurenev wrote to Khutsiev, “could have been substantive and interesting, if your 
thoughts could have been realized . . . in an ideologically accountable form. But your 
film, drawn out and boring, did not take on such a form” (Chernenko, 1998). 
Of course, it was precisely the film’s lack of “ideologically accountable form” 
that captured the imagination of many of Khutsiev’s contemporaries. Lev Anninsky 
remembers the film’s opening scene in loving detail for its seeming absence of purpose. 
The soundtrack alternates between Bizet’s Carmen and radio static and snippets of a 
soccer game featuring the Mozambican superstar Eusebio.  
Bizet’s march isn’t reflected in the faces in the crowd. The 
music is doing its own thing, and so are the people. They’re 
hurrying. They meet and separate in the crowd. The rain 
makes them momentary partners beneath the entryway 
awning. “Where are you going, Miss? You’ll get soaked. 
Take my jacket, it’s waterproof.” “Thanks. But how will I 
return it to you?” “I’ll call you. What’s your number?” He 
writes the number on a matchbox (Anninskii, 1991).  
 
When he first saw the film, Anninsky saw a kind of humanity in this scene, a sense of 
civility that indicated not only gentlemanly manners, but a kind of spirituality. Anninsky 
saw this “suspended spirituality” as the animating force of the entire film. Each frame 
had this spirituality of atmosphere, of waiting, of the anxious appreciation—the love—of 
time. Filtered through Khutsiev’s camera and the consciousness of his heroine, Lena, 
even the rush of sidewalk crowds and the histrionic babble of Lena’s acquaintances took 
on the impossible-to-measure weight of beauty, poetry, the edgy pregnancy of possibility.  
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Khutsiev’s creative biographer, Miron Chernenko, would later take Anninsky to 
task for his romantic take on July Rain. Chernenko saw in the film not spirituality, 
suspended or otherwise, but an epitaph for 1960s hopefulness and a premonition of the 
cynicism of the ’70s. But from a distance of four decades, Anninsky’s coinage of 
“suspended spirituality” seems entirely apt. Of course we recognize the social strains and 
dashed hopes implicit—and sometimes explicit—in both July Rain and Ilich’s Gate. But 
July Rain’s air of rusting romanticism, I would argue, owes less to the historical 
moment—to some kind of mid-60s “turn”—and more to the fact that the protagonists are 
nearing 30. Even at the age of 23 in Ilich’s Gate, the heroes had taken on the wizened 
sense that it was time to put childish things away. Transition, both on the grand historical 
stage and at the level of personal development, begets longing. And longing engages 
memory-images of times past and passing, dreams embraced and not quite fulfilled, 
imaginative visions that rose and fell like ancient temples or yesterday’s sandcastle. 
Longing seems to summon visions of rubble, but in the rubble is the raw stuff of 
tomorrow’s reconfigured creation.  
It is precisely because of the embedded historical and personal strains, the 
residue of transition and loss and longing, that the spirituality in the films of Khutsiev and 
Tarkovsky and Kalatozov is real but not over-realized—in other words, it does not 
smother the film with the finalized weight of Utopia, but hovers in the suspension fluid of 
time. However much Soviet film-industry managers might have hoped otherwise, 
 
 
262 
spirituality in art generally does not reside in the portrayal of shadeless joy.56 It is in the 
half-shadow of anxiety that we most sharply experience the longing-in-time central to 
spiritual apprehension. This is why a viewer can take a deep joy in even in the most 
freighted moments of Ilich’s Gate, Andrei Rublev, and I Am Cuba. The filmmakers never 
isolate pain and anxiety from the sensory experience of time and place, and this sensory 
experience rejuvenates the spirit without interrupting its mourning. 
* * * 
If we consider the notion of suspended spirituality in light of Boym’s reflective 
nostalgia and Bergson’s theories of memory, it opens up a rich perspective not only on 
the culture of the 1960s Russia, but, more broadly, on the links between memory, matter, 
spirituality, and the cinematic image. One could go so far as to say that suspended 
spirituality is reflective nostalgia. Anninsky, appropriately enough, leaves his term open 
and undefined, but if we look upon July Rain as the document that gave birth to the 
idea—a document suffused in watchfulness, waiting, ethical anxiety, and rapt attention to 
the placement and movement of matter in time—we can make a case that suspended 
spirituality is asymptotic longing and striving for connection across boundaries of time, 
space and convention. It does not become fully embodied or realized in any symbolic act, 
object, or mental state. The longing itself becomes a creative act. The drama is not in 
narrative overcoming, but in the pathos of the gap between longing and realization.  
                                                
56 When Yuri Klepikov, the writer of Konchalovsky’s The Story of Asya Klyachina, Who Loved But Did 
Not Marry, turned in the script for his diploma work at VGIK, he was told to put his film in a drawer and 
instead write something “bright and life-affirming” (Klepikov, 2009). 
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This gap is apparent in each of the films I have discussed in these pages. Even in I 
Am Cuba, the most conventionally dramatic of the three films, the gap exists—a gulf 
created more by the wandering cameras of Urusevsky and Kalatozov than by the story 
they are ostensibly filming: The gap lies between the young revolutionary Enrique’s 
naïve hopes (and the filmmakers’ memories of their own lost hopes) and the dream that 
those hopes can be realized in Cuba. In Andrei Rublev, the gap lies between Rublev’s 
(and Tarkovsky’s) longing for the absolute and the implied acknowledgment that 
historical embodiment of the absolute can exist only in art. In Ilich’s Gate, the gap lies 
between Sergei’s longing to participate joyfully and sincerely in his time and his nascent 
understanding that harmony of word and deed, as Anya tells him, disappeared with the 
ancient Greeks. In all three films, social harmony remains on the horizon, mirage-like, as 
the heroes (and, through them, the filmmakers) struggle toward an often equally elusive 
personal, ethical harmony.  
Russian culture, inspired and tormented by the fundamentally asymptotic 
principle of sobornost—the dream that the social choir can have absolute harmony while 
each voice retains its individuality—is a particularly fruitful teacher of suspended 
spirituality. In its millenarian-imperial guise, Russian history teaches us the perils of 
illusory myths of embodiment and realization—symbolic thinking. In its countless 
examples of creative whimsy, diversity, and ingenuity, it teaches us the charm of the 
ambiguous dream—image thinking. The Soviet Thaw was a time when the symbol-myths 
of realization were in open conflict with the open-ended images of inchoate longing. 
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In the dedramatized cinema of the Thaw—the cinema of suspended spirituality, 
the cinema of the time image—the cause-effect linkages of determinate temporal 
perception cease to apply: The coexistence of past, present, and future is implicit, and 
empathy across time, space, and convention becomes uncommonly possible. Freed from 
the prescriptive perceptual guidance of the conventional dramatic arc, the mind (of the 
director, the character, the viewer) is able to perceive something closer to the totality of 
the image of the moment, though this perception remains unavoidably—and 
admittedly—fractional. The apprehension of the integral image of the moment comes 
with its own pathos, the old awareness that the more one knows, the more one knows one 
doesn’t know. The progress of striver toward spirit, of empath toward object, remains 
always asymptotic. 
2. Tarkovsky and Khutsiev, Time and Space 
 
Both Tarkovsky and Khutsiev bring a sense of the uncanny to the relations of 
people, time, and space. In a 2004 interview with the art historian Savva Yamshchikov 
for the nationalist Russian newspaper Zavtra, Khutsiev attempted to explain the 
differences between the filmmakers’ approaches: In Tarkovsky’s Nostalghia (1983) and 
Sacrifice (1986) Khutsiev said,  
there are beautiful parts, like the scene with the candle in 
Nostalghia. But along with them, there is ambiguity. This 
approach doesn’t resonate with me, because I’m always 
trying to imprint concrete time. If you take any film of 
mine—take July Rain—the plot is fairly local, a chamber 
drama, but the film opens beyond the relations of two 
people, him and her. Because these two live in that 
particular environment, in a defined historical time. And I 
always look for these ties between the personal and the 
general (Iamshchikov, 2004). 
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 Here Khutsiev has expertly diagnosed the magic of his own films, but missed the 
fact that the very opening to time he describes is inherently ambiguous. By inviting time 
into his films rather than merely story, he makes the films multifaceted  and 
indeterminate. The Moscow of Ilich’s Gate and July Rain is in its way no less ambiguous 
than Tarkovsky’s Italian spa (in Nostalghia) and Swedish peninsula (in the Sacrifice). 
Indeed, Khutsiev is celebrated precisely for what Sergei Dobrotvorsky (1993) calls “the 
color of air”—the conditionality and haze of the actual experience of time, when what 
one undergoes is not a “defined historical time”, but a continuum of images impacting on 
the senses, emotions, and memories.  
At the heart of Khutsiev’s approach to cinema is the uncanny layering of times, 
his faith, shared with screenwriters Shpalikov and Grebnev (his co-writer on July Rain), 
that no era is unitary, but exists as a passageway through which pass ghosts of a past that 
has not truly passed, and phantoms of a future that is now. In Ilich’s Gate, as we have 
seen, Sergei tells Anya’s father that people are divided not by a horizontal line separating 
generations, but by a vertical one that unites eras and generations and divides only good 
people from bastards. And of course the famous final scene, in which Sergei’s father 
appears not in a flashback or a clearly defined dream sequence but in a densely layered 
present-past, has as much temporal and spatial ambiguity as the time-gates erected by 
Tarkovsky in Andrei Rublev or in his autobiographical cine-poem The Mirror, which 
navigates from Tarkovsky’s 1930s childhood to the 1970s and back.57 
                                                
57 Khutsiev’s blending of eras is beautifully on display in the final frames of July Rain, where the modern 
young woman Lena—embracing her freedom, decisiveness, and uncertainty after turning down her 
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If we look for a particular difference in the time sensibilities of the two 
filmmakers, it is not that Khutsiev’s time is more “concrete” than Tarkovsky’s, but that 
Tarkovsky focuses on the micro and macro implications of the chronotope—the inner 
worlds of his protagonists and the enormous word-historical-spiritual impact of every 
infinitesimal palpitation of those inner worlds—while Khutsiev focuses on the micro and 
mid-range implications. Tarkovsky’s time and space are home to a sort of spiritual 
butterfly effect, in which sacrifice—in this concrete time—can, by spiritual means, save 
the world. Khutsiev’s chronotope, meanwhile, tracks interpersonal interactions and the 
ways in which time, place, and history insert themselves into those interactions in 
bewildering ways. It is Tarkovsky, not Khutsiev, who pulls the concrete times, in their 
world-historical sense, into his work. Khutsiev pulls the life of the city and its 
inhabitants, who are haunted by history but for whom history never becomes historical—
it is too alive in the present emotional moment, too obfuscated by the uncertainty and 
longing of young protagonists, to ever become part of a millenarian spiritual design.  
* * * 
Tarkovsky soars above Russia’s traditional “accursed questions”—What is to be 
done? Who is to blame? How shall we live?—reaching toward a sense of life that 
transcends geography and history. Andrei Rublev is set in a concrete time and place, but 
the very ambiguity of its images and structure initiates a vaster, spiritual time that 
                                                                                                                                            
longtime boyfriend’s perfunctory marriage proposal—comes upon a crowd of elderly war veterans on the 
steps of the historical museum on Red Square. They are singing, embracing, celebrating survival. The 
camera leaves Lena for good. Then it leaves the veterans as well and follows the gazes—now amused, now 
solemn—of the children looking on from the margins of the celebration. Neither the veterans nor the 
children have anything to do with the story we have been watching for the previous two hours. And yet 
they have everything to do with it. For the film is not only a longitudinal imprint of Moscow in the mid-
1960s, but a core sample of Muscovite being. 
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connects all eras and renders the historical moment at once infinitesimally small and 
infinitely large, a fractal vision of the human condition. The searing pain in Tarkovsky’s 
films arises from the flashing will-o’-the-wisp sense that perhaps the human condition 
can be transcended, and the understanding that transcendence comes only in small doses, 
with the fraught decisions of the suffering individual. Tarkovsky invites us to consider 
the unseen bonds between matter and spirit, and he envisions the transformation of matter 
into spirit by means of experience, sacrifice, trial, fire.  
Khutsiev, on the other hand, confronts the problems of being in the world, and 
makes no move to transcend them. He plants his eye—and his “I”—firmly in the social 
milieu and stubbornly remains there. Here, too, the spirit is central. It is not a corrective 
to a debased time, though, but a living ether to be drawn from the time itself. However 
debased the time may seem, it is made sacred by its own currents, by the riddles of 
interrelations and unsaid words and longings that challenge our complacence.  
Khutsiev’s camera is forever discovering harmonies forged from discordant notes. 
His focus is on the small and ever-evolving motifs within the social symphony, the riffs 
that alter the symphony on the fly but never destroy its integrity. The “now” never 
becomes so irredeemable that it must be abandoned for the eternal; the “here” never 
becomes so irrelevant that it can be replaced by what Deleuze calls “any space 
whatever.” And yet in his fidelity to—and hope for—the here and now, Khutsiev ends 
up, like Tarkovsky, discovering the eternal within matter. By refusing to judge and 
finalize his characters or his city, he gives them life beyond the frame and beyond the era 
of the film’s production.  
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The Tarkovskian individual’s struggle with self—the intensive effort to identify 
spirit and transcend the limitations of time and space—leads ultimately to an ethical 
rejection of positivist materialism. Man saves the world through creation and sacrifice. 
Creation, in fact, becomes a kind of self-sacrifice, and self-sacrifice becomes a mode of 
creation. In the creative-sacrificial act, the hero empties himself out; he frees himself 
from time and place and enters into the hovering world, ever-present but little noted, of 
the spirit. Khutsiev’s heroes, too, struggle with themselves. They are not trying to 
transcend their time and place, though, but to find a harmonious place within it by 
becoming who they are. This is a crucial point; the maturation process of Khutsiev’s 
young protagonist is not the rejection of individual personality (lichnost), but the 
discovery of it. The arc of his heroes, as they try to sort out their relationship with the 
public world, does not run from defined individual to blended, harmonized being, but 
rather from foggy, searching individual to somewhat less foggy, still-searching 
individual. 
It is not the emptying of self that gives Khutsiev’s heroes access to spirit, but the 
often painfully reflective participation in the moment, in the dialogue of life among 
friends and colleagues and urban spaces. Like Tarkovsky’s heroes, they stumble toward 
transcendent awareness of time within matter—of time as an art form never to be taken 
lightly and never to be forgotten. But they do not ache for a spiritual realm where the 
here-and-now loses—or must lose—its specific features. The Khutsievan hero remains 
within history, but the filmmaker makes time and space sacred as they are by his 
insistence on seeing and remembering and rejecting the hero’s separation from what is 
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seen and remembered. Khutsiev’s method for locating his characters within history, 
though, is not unlike Tarkovsky’s for sending his characters beyond history: He refuses to 
neatly quarantine his characters within a plot, and leaves them ever exposed to the 
indeterminacy of vision and remembrance. 
For Khutsiev, to make a moment meaningful rather than merely useful means to 
experience time with a sense of personal ethics. The indispensable ethical approach to life 
is to remain engaged in reflective interaction with time and place. We honor one another 
neither by simply being ourselves nor, on the other hand, by emptying ourselves, but by 
being ourselves with and for others. Tarkovsky captures the kenotic roots of sobornost by 
identifying love with sacrifice; Khutsiev captures the social ideal of sobornost by 
meditating upon the creative tension between the formation of a unique personality and 
the impossibility of that personality’s self-realization without community.  
Tarkovsky and Khutsiev, then, share an interest in the relationship between 
history, spirit, community, and the individual. Both filmmakers dramatize the path of a 
hero toward greater consciousness not of an ideological truth about history, but rather a 
spiritual and ethical understanding of the individual’s relationship with time. Tarkovsky 
asks how the individual accesses spirit in order to transcend history; Khutsiev asks how 
the individual accesses spirit to gain higher awareness of one’s place within history. The 
Tarkovskian hero accesses spirit through contemplation of the image, extracting spirit 
from matter to discover a portal to eternity. The Khutsievan hero accesses spirit through 
reflection on the web of relationships that bind him or her with a moment in time. The 
depth of this reflection makes the moment indelible, irreplaceable in memory. Like the 
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Tarkovskian spirit-image, the Khutsievan relation-image opens up to the eternal and 
universal. 
 Both filmmakers seek alternatives to unreflective grand-historical scripting that 
reduces the individual to a powerless bit player within the plot of time; both assign the 
individual responsibility to reflect on his or her place in both the moment and the 
universe. For Tarkovsky, this reflection is a portal beyond worldly time; for Khutsiev it is 
a gateway into it—a way to penetrate its slick, “waterproof” surface (to use a key 
metaphor from July Rain) and sense the million alternative flows.  
For Khutsiev, the image of the living moment is cut like a gem, enduring and real 
but approachable from multiple angles. His films confirm the rich presence of a specific 
time and space, but they do so by alternating and overlapping many temporalities—from 
the amber-coated mythological time of Soviet patriotism (which denies the legitimacy of 
other temporalities), to the staccato temporality of the young and deceived (who choose 
forgetfulness over deception). Khutsiev embeds this multiplicity of the historical moment 
in the nuanced relations of his characters with one another, with their city, and with their 
own consciences. Meanwhile, surrounding it all is Khutsiev’s polyphonic Moscow, 
offering up the paradoxical ideal of a harmonious whole that is composed of contending, 
often mutually misunderstanding parts. The urban visions of I Am Twenty (and July Rain 
as well) give access not to a dream of mythological unity, but to the ultimately reassuring 
truth that unity must remain always mythological.  
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3. Imaginary Leninism as Nostalgic Inspiration 
Khutsiev’s heroes strive for the ideal, but the definition of the ideal is never quite 
clear, its admixture of personal and public never quite quantified. In Ilich’s Gate, Sergei 
tries to make a clear-cut statement of his ideals: the things he believes in are (as he tells 
Anya’s circle of anxiously jocular partygoers, who take pride in their belief in nothing) 
the Revolution, The Internationale, the year 1937, the soldiers, the war, the fact that most 
of the young people of his generation have lost their fathers, and the humble potato, 
which saved the children of Moscow during the privations of wartime. The list is 
ideologically contradictory, at war with itself. For all Sergei’s admiration of the 
Bolshevik takeover and the grand old workers’ hymn, in the end the savior in his story is 
not a party or a politician or even his own fallen father, but the potato. When the system 
broke down, when a mother who had lost her ration card was faced with watching her 
child starve, she went outside the system, dug up potatoes by night, in fear. The 
Revolution did not save Sergei as wartime toddler; a resourceful mother and a 
wonderfully available starch did. 
Sergei elevates the Revolution, but the Revolution is the proximate cause of 
another item on his list, “the year 1937”, when the Revolution voraciously ate its own 
(including Khutsiev’s father, a devoted old Bolshevik murdered in the purges). Sergei’s 
list is the product of a young mind wise enough to know that cynicism inevitably destroys 
our interpersonal integrity, and naïve enough to believe that the opposite of cynicism is 
faith in social mythology. His ambivalence, however, saves him from the fate to which 
Kovalev (2008), writing in Iskusstvo Kino, consigns him: He does not go over once and 
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for all to the self-deceiving side of social mythology; he is far too confused for that. For 
three cinematic hours and 18 diegetic months Sergei searches, dreams, and agonizes. At 
the end of the film he pleads with his father for answers and receives none. His searching, 
dreaming, and agonizing will go on. 
Sergei’s real wisdom comes through in the limitations that his private anxieties 
impose on his public faith: He wants a more just world, and he wants a life that is in some 
small way meaningful to the creation of such a world, but cherishing the ends and 
endorsing the means are for him, like so many in his generation, two different things. It 
was possible to believe in an imaginary Leninism as a sort of inspirational talisman to 
keep one pushing forward with the dream of a mutually supportive society—just so long 
as the Leninism remained imaginary. (The prominent dissident Liudmila Alexeyeva 
(1990) began her path to dissent as a devotee of imaginary Leninism. First she noted the 
rot of Stalinism when it was held up to the light of the Leninist ideal; then she noted the 
rot of Leninism when held up to the same light.) 
The beauty of mutuality—of a secular sobornost—that was embodied in the 
imaginary-Leninist ideal gave the Thaw its jump-start. But what gave the Thaw its deeper 
meaning was the instinctive awareness of people like Sergei (“the year 1937”) that the 
ideal was best left personal, ambiguous, and aspirational rather than public, 
programmatic, and determinate. For those with a post-Secret Speech awareness of the 
weight of those fateful digits—1-9-3-7—socialist ends had decidedly failed to justify 
Stalinist means. Better to frankly acknowledge that one never quite reaches the “ends”, 
and that ideals cannot be reached by fiat, but only reached toward through personal 
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ethical quest. It was a vision well suited to recovering utopians who were not quite 
prepared to resort to irony and cynicism. 
The notion of nostalgia for an imaginary Leninism leads us back to Mikhail 
Kalatozov, whose 1957 masterwork The Cranes Are Flying had blown an irreparable 
hole in the Stalinist grand style and accelerated the progress of the cinematic Thaw. The 
grand style, with its solemnity, its love of symbols, and its positioning of man as a 
demigod who can bend the elements to his will, could not countenance the spontaneity of 
the unconventional character, the ambiguous image and the multifaceted atmosphere. 
Khutsiev’s explorations of “the color of air” imported a kind of poison into the capillaries 
of the grand style. But those very explorations had been made possible by the creative 
intelligentsia’s longing, in the 1950s, for the perceived vibrancy and hopefulness of the 
Soviet 1920s. After all, whether or not it was frowned upon by the Party itself, there had 
been during those years a sort of marketplace of ideas, especially aesthetic ideas, among 
supporters of the Revolution. There had been the sense that one could make a 
contribution to Revolutionary development not only with obedience, but with innovative 
thinking. It would not have done to jettison consciousness entirely for spontaneity, but at 
least spontaneity could enter into the 1920s conversation. 
On a thematic level, I Am Cuba is the most conventional of Kalatozov’s Thaw 
and post-Thaw works. The Cranes Are Flying (1957) had introduced ambiguity into 
conventional notions of good wartime citizenship, and had granted individual uncertainty 
its long-lost place in the story of public life. The Unsent Letter (1959) had allowed nature 
to devour man and his dreams of mastering the world, leaving him with nothing but 
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memory for sustenance. Kalatozov’s last film, The Red Tent (1971), the reimagined story 
of Italian explorer Umberto Nobile’s doomed airship expedition to the North Pole, 
presented a collision between multifaceted private memory and a hardened public 
historical narrative.  
But the longing that historically paved the way for Kalatozov’s tales of memory 
and redemption was nostalgia for an imaginary Leninism, the almost desperate sense that 
the country could recapitulate its lost dreams and the individual could regain his 
sequestered spontaneity if only it would remember the energy of its founding decade. 
This nostalgia was not based so much on willful ignorance of the actual Leninist 
inheritance of political intolerance, secretiveness, and obsessive centralization (which, 
after all, was also a Russian-imperial inheritance) as upon the need to pick and choose 
among available, culturally and politically acceptable strands of memory to piece 
together an inspirational collage that was at once new and rooted in Soviet mythology. 
Stalin had eclipsed the historical Lenin; now the imaginary Lenin would be willfully 
made to eclipse Stalin.  
Nowhere is that longing made more poignantly clear than in Kalatozov and 
Urusevsky’s attempt to create an imaginary Cuba in which they could reassemble the 
dreams of their imaginary revolutionary Russia. They use an agitprop shell as an 
experimental zone and playground for visual spontaneity, challenging the camera itself in 
ways unseen in Soviet cinema since the 1920s. They refuse to separate revolutionary 
content from revolutionary form, and, in their spontaneity, they permit the form to enter 
into transformative dialogue with the content.  
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Though I Am Cuba came relatively late in the Thaw, it dramatizes the animating 
force of the era, the nostalgia for a lost and half-forgotten nation, whose cultural legacy 
seemed to whisper from afar of youthful energy, spontaneity, hope, and culturally 
productive creative disobedience. Enrique’s innocence in I Am Cuba, the tension between 
hero-worship and disobedience in his relationships with his revolutionary-movement 
superiors, his almost bourgeois style and ease on the streets of the gleaming city, his 
receptiveness to beauty, the human doubt that restrains him from political murder—all of 
these introduce us to the revolutionary not as a titan whose consciousness has blended 
with the People, but as a doubting, flawed, but brave thinker, a man capable of ethical 
heroism because he has grappled with the questions of his time.  
I Am Cuba attempts to rediscover the inheritance of Mayakovsky and Eisenstein, 
to blend sincere revolutionary enthusiasm with joyful aesthetic play. And, as in the works 
of Mayakovsky and Eisenstein, the marriage of enthusiasm and stylistic exuberance 
creates unexpected tensions, delights, and ambiguities. One might expect a revolutionary 
redux to celebrate a fixed and prescriptive vision, a world of precast ideas and forms—in 
other words, I Am Cuba ought to be a restorative-nostalgic document. Instead the film 
throws out renegade hints of revolutionary multiplicity: The remembered revolution is 
one animated by many joys and doubts and social slights and individual dreams. In short, 
Kalatozov injects reflective nostalgia beneath the restorative nostalgic surface of I Am 
Cuba. 
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4. Conclusion 
In the early 1950s, Soviet culture was simultaneously in the grips of the last war 
and the next: There remained a massive reconstruction job after the devastation of the 
Nazi invasion, and the job, in Josef Stalin's last years, had been subsumed under the 
banner of the Cold War and the imposition of harsh new ideological discipline. Like the 
Angry Young Men of 1950s Britain, Russian intellectuals grew restive with the 
limitations of postwar culture. During the life of the Great Man, though, they could 
hardly speak out in any forceful way. Stalin's death in March 1953 initiated for them a 
slow emergence from years of discipline, public silence and fraught whispering in the 
semi-private world of friends and family. It was the beginning of a time of sweeping and 
anxious transition in the Soviet Union.  
Over the next 15 years—roughly until the Brezhnev regime's invasion of 
Czechoslovakia (and its concomitant crackdown on Russians who spoke out against it) 
signalled the end of the Thaw—intellectuals and artists renovated Soviet culture. In doing 
so, they did not sweep aside the Soviet inheritance, not even the Stalinist portion of that 
inheritance, but instead engaged memory in increasingly personal and idiosyncratic ways 
in order to communicate more sincere and ambiguous visions about themselves, their 
world, and their place in it. Conventional Soviet thinking, in which publicly-approved 
memory-scripts replaced the untameable prismatic stuff of actual memory, fell out of 
fashion for the new vanguard of Soviet artists: The word shtamp—literally “stamp,” a 
ready made mold for thoughts, memories, and images—became one of the signal epithets 
the artists would hurl at substandard, hackneyed work.  
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The art of the Thaw was the art of ambiguity; it signaled a longing for lost 
vibrancy, diversity, and indeterminacy—a longing for the personal. New cinematic 
visions were cobbled together from shards of personal and public memory. Works were 
imbued with the reflective nostalgia of their creators. This nostalgia resisted convention 
and sought no return of a particular era; it engaged bits and pieces from other eras and 
resisted the importation of mythological historical unities. Mikhail Kalatozov’s nostalgia 
for an imaginary Leninism signaled no longing for Leninist revolutionary discipline, but 
rather embraced a vision of personal spontaneity. Andrei Tarkovsky’s nostalgia for the 
Russian spiritual tradition did not hint at chauvinist rejection of other traditions, but 
rather envisioned through Russian art and nature a gateway to eternity. Marlen 
Khutsiev’s longing for ethical engagement was not a call for 1960s youth to embrace the 
Stalinist ethic of obedience to the general line, but rather an invitation to pause and 
consider the passing moment—the flow of time, the value of memory, and the 
interconnectedness of people with one another and the places where they live.  
Kalatozov, Tarkovsky, and Khutsiev invite their audiences to remember the joy of 
seeing—of glimpsing images whose meaning has not been predetermined. With their 
images, they transform longing into action; their reentry into the domain of idiosyncratic 
memory creates a paradoxical shock of the new. Their work is a creative intervention into 
the relation between self and society, past and present, a dream of the generative collision 
between the longing, remembering, mind and a kinetic present. We can say that the 
remembering mind imports past into present, but it might also be said that the mind 
develops a sensitivity that enables it to see the past within the present, to envision a 
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flattened chronotope in which this moment is the sum of all moments, and history—both 
personal and public—resides actively in the now. Through reflective nostalgia, we 
rediscover the ether of time embedded in the tissue of matter. The material world 
becomes rich, vibrant, almost overgrown with possibility. Awareness of such a world 
readies us for deeper engagement with the adventures, challenges, riddles and wonders of 
life. Reflective nostalgia does not merely soothe us, nor does it protect us from the 
present. On the contrary, it prepares us to create the future. 
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APPENDIX 
ILICH’S GATE: A SCENE-BY-SCENE DESCRIPTION 
 
1. Ilich’s Gate: Part One 
Opening credits: Three revolutionary-era Red Army soldiers patrol the streets of 
1961 Moscow. 
* 
Summer: 
Ilich’s Gate begins on an early summer morning at the start of the 1960s. A 
soldier in his early 20s, Sergei Zhuravlev (played by Valentin Popov), walks down the 
wet, echoing Moscow streets, returning home from military service. His mother, Olga, 
returns home from work at the hospital to find him sleeping on the couch. “Are you on 
leave,” she asks. “No,” he says. “I’m home for good.” 
* 
In the morning, he calls across the courtyard to his old friend Kolya Fokin 
(Nikolai Gubenko). They both sprint downstairs, across the courtyard, and embrace. They 
call out to their friend Slavka Kostikov (Stanislav Liubshin). He joins them. They join a 
group of kids in an impromptu game of soccer. Sweaty and smiling, they return to 
Slavka’s house to see his wife, their old classmate Liusia. She and Slavka have a five-
month-old baby, Volodya. The old friends sit around the table, remembering old times 
and making half-ironic toasts to contemporary chestnuts: “To disarmament!” “To 
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peaceful coexistence!”—here Kolya crafts a telling collision of public and private: “To 
peaceful coexistence, which can make us into family men yet!” Liusia doesn’t let Slavka 
drink, and Kolya jokes, “Listen, Slavka, I never knew you were against peaceful 
coexistence.” Slavka, for a moment, doesn’t take it as a joke—“I’m not against it!”  
* 
Slavka, in any case, is the most literal of the three friends, the one who has come 
soonest to the complications of adult life, who finds it tempting but difficult to relax into 
the patterns and textures of his youth. Sergei is the most searching and earnest, 
consciously seeking out the meaning of his life. Kolya, for most of the film, seems to be 
the most comfortable in his own skin, spinning off verbal irrelevancies and striking bits 
of wisdom in equal measure—“I am a multifaceted simple Soviet person”—while doing 
everything with ease, from arranging a date with a girl he’s never met before to playing 
the piano to bouncing a ping pong ball upon a paddle. We almost begin to wonder if his 
lightness is a bit of a performance, a defense mechanism. 
* 
The next scene shows each of the three friends at work. Sergei is working at the 
factory where his father had worked before he was killed in the Great Patriotic War. (In 
Ilich’s Gate, Khutsiev shows only the outside of Sergei’s factory; in I Am Twenty, he 
shows Sergei at work.) Kolya works at a technology plant. Slavka works in demolition, 
swinging the wrecking ball to bring down old Moscow buildings. After work, Sergei and 
Kolya meet up and head toward their apartment block. Standing in their childhood 
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playground, they whistle up to Slavka, summoning him down for a walk. He tells Liusia 
he’s going out for cigarettes. She tells him to buy the rest of the groceries while he’s at it. 
* 
The three friends go to an impromptu courtyard dance. On the phonograph, a 
cartoon-like voice sings an American gimmick tune: Sugar bush, come dance with me, 
and we’ll let the other see…We're never not gonna go home. We won’t go, we won’t go… 
Sergei’s sister, Vera, arrives and dances with him. Liusia arrives, too, angry, in search of 
Slavka.  
Kolya has arranged a double date. “Which of the two do you like?” he asks 
Sergei.  
“The third one,” says Sergei. “I’m heading home.” He walks the evening streets 
alone, rediscovering his city, passing a grand movie marquis that bears his name: Georgii 
Danelia’s Seriozha is playing in Sergei’s neighborhood, as if to welcome the young 
soldier home. 
 
Autumn: 
The friends scoop apples from the street and board a trolley. Kolya gives an apple 
to the ticket-taker, Katya, who will become a recurring presence in his life.  
* 
Sergei arrives home with his first paycheck and leaves it on the table for his 
mother. He calls out to the little neighbor boy, Kuzmich, and they head off for a steam. 
On the trolley, though, a girl in a polka dot slicker catches Sergei’s eye. He follows her 
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out and trails her late into the evening, but he cannot summon the courage to speak to her. 
As the episode ends, and he watches her disappear into her apartment building, he is 
standing in front of a wall-newspaper with the large headline: ODDBALL [Chudak]. 
* 
The three friends walk in a city park. We hear a symphony of the boys’ voices, 
sometimes internal, sometimes spoken, sometimes crossing the border between the two, 
as when Slavka, thinking to himself about his favorite soccer team, suddenly blurts out 
“That stinks” [obydno!] without realizing he’s said it. 
* 
Kolya and Sergei meet up with two girls. In the next shot, Sergei wakes up in the 
unfamiliar bedroom of a girl named Natasha. The room is filled with her old childhood 
things. Outside, the first snow has fallen. When he leaves, he walks to the end of the hall, 
turns the corner, and sprints down the spiral stairs into the morning light. He calls his 
mother and says he was at a friend’s house. “You’re a grown man,” she says. “I don’t 
care where you were. Just call me so I don’t worry.” 
 
Winter: 
A work montage. The dark towers of Sergei’s factory. Slavka’s wrecking ball, 
delivering destruction as we hear a voiceover of his argument with Liusia. Kolya, placid 
at work, imagining himself receiving an award. Kolya has his second encounter with 
Katya, the trolley attendant. It is New Year’s Eve. 
* 
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Sergei is sick. At his apartment, the three friends watch a hockey game. Kolya is 
playing the piano. Sergei is complaining that he’s turned out to be “a completely 
appropriate person. I’m working, getting ready to go to college, I’m active in the 
community, I’m an agitator.” “A simple Soviet man!” Kolya jokes. Then he adds this, 
about himself: “I’m a simple, multifaceted Soviet man.” Sergei won’t let the mood go. 
“There’s this philosophy: Live your whole life happy that you’re not a scumbag and that 
there are people worse than you.” Kolya says, “I left all these conversations about the 
meaning of life behind in middle school. You have to live, not to worry about living.” 
Sergei’s mother arrives from work. “I’m sick of it,” Sergei tells his mother. “What are 
you sick of?” she says. “I’m so sick of winter I can hardly stand it.” 
 
Spring: 
The three friends go to the May Day celebration. There, Sergei once again spies 
the girl he’d followed in the autumn. This time he speaks to her. Her name is Anya 
(Marianna Vertinskaya). They walk together through the night and Moscow celebrates 
around them. 
* 
In the morning, Sergei comes home, whistling, to find Slavka in the courtyard, 
disconsolate over his marriage. They call up to Kolya, who is sleeping on his balcony. He 
brings food down. Kolya teases Slavka for his gloomy attitude during the spring holidays. 
“The holidays are over,” says Slavka. Sergei, still unable to wipe the smile from his face 
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after his nighttime wanderings, completes Slavka’s thought for him: “The plain, hard 
workdays have begun.” 
2. Ilich’s Gate: Part Two 
Summer: 
Another work montage. At Kolya’s cafeteria we meet his older friend Vladimir 
Vasilievich and his youthful boss, Chernousov (who cuts in line while the others wait 
patiently). As they eat, Chernousov chides Vladimir for talking too much. “Less 
commentary,” he says. “Get down to business.” “Still,” says Vladimir, “there will be 
questions. People need to ask.” 
* 
It’s the end of the school year. Sergei’s sister, Vera, gleefully gets rid of old 
textbooks, then heads off to a graduation party. Sergei half-jokingly suggests that they 
both attend the Energy Institute. In high little-sister spirits, Vera says “I have my own 
individual path in life.” That night, Sergei cannot sleep. It is June 22, 1961, the 20th 
anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. We see the portrait of Sergei’s 
father. At 2:07 a.m., Sergei hears Anya’s voice in his head—Serioga! (The voice is only 
in Ilich’s Gate; for I Am Twenty, Khutsiev removes the voice, and the effect is more 
uncanny; we simply see that Sergei has heard something internally.) Sergei walks across 
Moscow, gray in the northern summer night. In his mind—Mayakovsky’s poem “Past 
One O’Clock” and the uncanny repetition of its signature phrase, “I’ve no reason to wake 
you and trouble you with lightning telegrams.” He reaches the center of Moscow. Anya is 
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walking toward him. They see the graduates celebrating on Red Square. They walk on 
together through the night. The Kremlin bell towers strike four. 
* 
Anya and Sergei attend a modern art exhibit at the Pushkin Museum. An 
interviewer asks a kid what he likes best, and he says “ancient Greek sculpture.” An old 
man is grumbling that he doesn’t understand the art. A hipster grabs Sergei by the lapels 
and asks if he likes primitivism. “I like it,” Sergei says, smiling. (The old man and the 
hipster appear only in Ilich’s Gate, not in I Am Twenty.) Anya says, “Let me show you 
my favorite work.” She takes him into a room of old medieval statues. “Well,” says 
Sergei. “Where is it?” She kisses him. “Right here,” she says. They tell one another they 
want to wake side by side for 100 years, 1,000, 10,000. “About like that,” says Anya, 
pointing at a dual sarcophagus with sculptures of husband and wife. “About like that,” 
says Sergei. 
* 
As they are leaving the exhibit, Sergei and Anya run into a young man with an 
affected manner and excessive formality. He and Anya speak briefly. When he leaves, 
Sergei asks, “Who was that guy?” 
“A translator,” says Anya, “and, by the way, my husband.” 
Sergei is surprised, saddened, but his reaction is understated: “How?” Anya can’t 
quite look him in the eye. She tells him that the pair have not yet formalized the divorce, 
but that the young man is “a complete fool.” 
* 
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Kolya and Sergei stop Slavka’s to find that their friend—who had been having 
marriage troubles and staying with Kolya—is back with Liusia, breezy and happy (“C’est 
si bon,” shouts Slavka from the balcony.) Kolya wants to wander the town with Sergei, 
maybe go to a movie. But Sergei has to hustle off to Anya. He is going to meet her father.  
* 
The walls of Anya’s large apartment—the apartment of a successful 
functionary—are covered in wallpaper for a seemingly endless renovation. “When will it 
all end?” she says. Anya’s father is alone and tipsy in the living room, watching a 
children’s choir on a small television. An open bottle sits atop the console. There is 
immediate tension between Anya and her father. She tells him that she is moving out, and 
that she and Sergei will move in together. He doesn’t see how this is possible; she isn’t 
serious enough about life; she doesn’t understand its necessities well enough to take this 
step. Anya, for her part, says she doesn’t trust her father, who is “always saying one thing 
and doing and thinking another.” (This line is notably missing in I Am Twenty, where 
Anya’s father comes off as a somewhat more sympathetic figure—weary and bitter rather 
than alternately menacing and pathetic, as in Ilich’s Gate.) Anya takes a phone call, 
leaving Sergei alone with her father. Over the course of a long conversation (longer in 
Ilich’s Gate than in I Am Twenty), Anya’s father tells Sergei that young people are trying 
to split the generations; Sergei tells him that he doesn’t divide people into generations, 
just good people and scoundrels, and that he dislikes young scoundrels even more. (These 
lines, too, are omitted in I Am Twenty.) Anya’s father tells Sergei that he’ll have to look 
out for himself in life, that no one will help him, that he’s on his own. The lines in Ilich’s 
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Gate are stark: “You don’t know life. You don’t know people. They’ll smother you. Take 
care of yourself. Take care of your business.”  Perhaps it is the father’s way of trying to 
temper the steel in Sergei’s soul for the challenges of life, but it also leaves the 
impression of a successful but bitter middle-aged man who has given up on any virtue in 
life other than “making it,” surviving and triumphing in a dog-eat-dog world. As he 
leaves, Sergei thinks to himself, “What kind of man is this?” 
* 
The next scene in Ilich’s Gate takes Anya and Sergei to a poetry reading at 
Moscow’s Polytechnic Мuseum. They listen to the breakthrough poets of the Thaw—
Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Andrei Voznesenky, Bella Akhmadulina, and Robert 
Rozhdesvensky—as well as groundbreaking voices of the wartime generation, such as the 
bard Bulat Akudzhava and the poet Boris Slutsky.  (Vladislav Zubak (2009), in his 
history of the 1960s intelligentsia, writes extensively about Slutsky as one of the 
godfathers of the Thaw). At the end of the reading, some of the audience members speak, 
a young man and a young woman are delighted and dazzled by the poets; a soldier would 
like to see the poets pay more tribute to the Soviet army (though the reading included a 
stirring war story—a tribute to fallen poets—from Slutsky).  
Khutsiev had arranged the reading and advertised it as a poet's evening; ordinary 
Muscovites came to the event, and were even irritated by the movie cameras blocking 
their view. The scene was reduced in both length and import in I Am Twenty, and moved 
to a later point in the film. I Am Twenty does not show the poets at all, but follows the 
faces in the audience—alternating between the guests and Sergei and Anya—as they 
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listen to the poems. This approach is also quite powerful, and puts greater emphasis on 
the extraordinary emotional impact of the poems on Sergei, whose appearance and very 
being seem to change with each poem. 
* 
Sergei and Anya go to an apartment party. As they dance, they think about the 
wonder that they’ve met each other—and the wonder that it was possible for them not to 
have met each other. In Ilich’s Gate, a candle spins on the record player, and Sergei and 
Anya dance with candles in their hands as “Ave Maria” plays. The room goes dark, and 
we only see the dancing candles receding into the background as the couple’s exchange 
echoes four times—Anya: “Do you love me?” Sergei: “Do you love me?” The candles 
are missing in I Am Twenty, as are the final three repetitions of the exchange. (Khutsiev 
recalls that Aleksei Romanov, the new head of Goskino, told him to remove the candles 
because the firemen wouldn’t allow it (Maliukova, 2000).) 
* 
The couple arrive at Anya’s building. They have not decided where they are going 
to live. Anya doesn’t want to them to live at her parents’ place, as her father had 
suggested, and she has dismissed the idea of living at Sergei’s place. She’s suggested, 
with a laugh, they spend one night at her friends’ place and another at his friends’ place. 
Something that began as a serious intention—moving in together—is turning into mere 
wordplay. At the door, Anya says, “How I don’t want to go in there.” “ 
“Then don’t,” Sergei says. “We’ll live at my place.”  
“In the closet,” says Anya. “Papa, mama, my wife and me.” 
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“There’s no Papa.” 
“Forgive me.” 
At the staircase, they argue. Sergei says Anya is throwing words around without 
following through. She says that she can’t have absolute consistency between her words 
and actions—leveling the same accusation at herself that she (in Ilich’s Gate) had leveled 
at her father. Her tone remains soft. “I’m not a harmonious person,” she says, and they 
both at once add the school-kid rejoinder, “Only the ancient Greeks were harmonious.” 
Throughout the scene, “Ave Maria” continues in the background. Anya warmly kisses 
Sergei on the stairway as the music fades. 
 
Autumn: 
In I Am Twenty, the next scene takes us to Sergei’s factory, where he consults 
with engineers from Ghana. (The scene, which is not in Ilich’s Gate, was groundbreaking 
in Soviet cinema, reflecting the growing presence of African workers, students, and 
technicians in the country.) Sergei’s co-worker asks what’s bothering him. He says 
nothing. Then we hear his voice as the next shot shows him in a lecture hall at the Energy 
Institute. The voice seems like an internal rumination at first, but later is revealed to be a 
call from a phone booth at Sergei’s institute. “Maybe you’re right, Anya,” he says, “and 
nothing exists besides us, nothing else matters, and that’s the whole point.”  
The phone call is not in Ilich’s Gate, and it hits a false note: There has been no 
hint that Anya is trying to pry him away from life and keep him to herself; the point of 
tension is precisely that she can’t bring herself to follow through on what she’s said and 
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move out of her parents’ place—and that she is strangely unwilling to move in with 
Sergei or even familiarize herself with his family. But this is different than the trumped-
up tension between romantic love and community engagement, which appears again—in 
both versions of the film—in Sergei’s ruminations near the end of the film before he 
meets his father’s ghost. 
* 
Ilich’s Gate moves straight from the stairway scene to Kolya at work, where he 
has a disturbing conversation with Chernousov. In I Am Twenty, the scene follows 
Sergei’s phone call from the institute. Chernousov and Kolya go to a room full of control 
panels, switches, dials. Chernousov begins asking prying questions about Vladimir 
Vasilievich, with whom Kolya is friendly. Chernousov says he wants to talk to Kolya 
openly, up in that room, “without witnesses.” He tells Kolya that Vladimir Vasilievich 
talks too much. Too much humor. Too much cleverness. “He says what he means,” says 
Kolya. But Chernousov isn’t buying it. He says some of the workers have questions about 
Vladimir Vasilievich, and he’d like Kolya to keep an eye on him and report back 
anything suspicious he sees. “Do you know what you’re asking of me?” says Kolya. 
Chernousov, sitting smug behind a desk, knows exactly what he’s asking. Kolya stands 
over him.  
“If we weren’t alone,” Kolya says, “I’d punch you in the face.” 
“What’s stopping you?” says Chernousov. 
“I don’t like to,” says Kolya, “without witnesses.” 
* 
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The outline and import of the scene is similar in both versions of the film, but 
Khutsiev, who re-shot the scene in full for I Am Twenty, had filmed it much more simply 
and directly in Ilich’s Gate. (The scene in Ilich’s Gate also includes Chernousov’s 
criticism of Vladimir Vasilievich for making the telling comment, “You can’t advertise 
our social system like a refrigerator.” The line is dropped in I Am Twenty.)  In I Am 
Twenty, Kolya and Chernousov are moving about among the control panels for much of 
the scene, and their talk about Vladimir Vasilievich is complicated with more details and 
side-chatter. The shooting is elegant, but the effect is watered down. Lighthearted Kolya 
has come face to face with a scoundrel asking him to inform on a friend and co-worker; it 
is a shattering moment for him, and the simple staging of Ilich’s Gate best conveys its 
power. Khutsiev himself disliked the later version of the scene (Khutsiev, 1996, p. 194). 
* 
Sergei, Kolya, and Slavka meet at the Krasnye Vorota metro station and go 
walking. Kolya is troubled by the conversation with Chernousov. He is also irritated with 
Sergei for being unavailable to talk when he called. Sergei is wearing a short leather 
jacket, looking like a hipster; he’s in the mood to joke, but Kolya’s in no mood for 
laughing. They go to a café; Kolya is petulant, not at all the Kolya the friends have come 
to know, but he won’t tell them what’s wrong. Finally, Sergei says, “Tell us concretely. 
Let’s get down to business.” 
Kolya takes even this as a lack of empathy for his concerns: “How businesslike 
you are.”  
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With a wife and a child and a demanding job, Slavka’s in no mood for this 
criticism: “I’m not businesslike,” he says. “I’m preoccupied.” 
The three go into the bowels of the Kursk metro station. Finally Kolya describes 
his problem with Chernousov—and with the broader problem that things and people are 
not always what they seem: “This young, well-fed guy with honest eyes sits before you 
and lies,” says Kolya. “And he’s already scum.” The conversation that follows is odd and 
worth describing at length. The characters seem so emotionally confused that they’ve lost 
track of their own identities.  
Sergei’s response to Kolya is unusually light in tone—Sergei’s always been the 
tortured thinker of the three—but his advice is not at all unsympathetic: Kolya should 
brush Chernousov off and move on. In an internal monologue, however, Kolya criticizes 
Sergei for letting bad things simply slide: “Remember in school, you said you’d learned 
how to turn off your consciousness, to listen and not hear anything?” (This invocation of 
an interesting childhood thought experiment is replaced in I Am Twenty by Kolya’s 
observation that Sergei has been turning into a different person. The comment reflects a 
general tendency in the second half of I Am Twenty to imply that the sophisticated Anya 
is somehow ruining Sergei. This theme is not as prominent in Ilich’s Gate.) 
Sergei continues, rationalizing the existence of Chernousov: “He’s a scumbag. I 
see that. But what’s changed? If you respect yourself, don’t even lower yourself to speak 
with such people. What can you do in the meantime? What can I do? Slavka? You can 
accept or not accept such people, but they exist. We have to deal with that.” 
 
 
293 
Kolya’s thoughts continue: “Does he really think this way? Or is he just playing 
the fool?” 
Sergei tells Kolya that he has to decide the level of his relationship with 
Chernousov and define the limits. 
“Have you decided?” asks Kolya. 
“I’m deciding,” says Sergei.  
“Fine,” says Kolya. “Enough. I’m glad we talked. It had to happen sometime. 
This will make it simple. Let’s call things what they are. We’re grown up; we look at 
many things in different ways. I don’t blame you.” 
“Go ahead,” Sergei says. 
“From your point of view, your position is right. It’s probably not the best 
position, but there are worse.” 
“Thanks,” says Sergei. “I’ll see you.” 
“Yeah, there’s a pile of occasions. Birthdays. Holidays. A lot of people do it that 
way.” 
“Listen,” says Sergei, steaming by now that his friendship is being questioned. “I 
ought to pop you in the face.” 
“Oh, you’re a tough guy,” says Kolya. 
Sergei boards the metro, sadly, hesitantly. 
Kolya silently watches Sergei’s train disappear in the tunnel. 
* 
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(In I Am Twenty, the poetry reading at the Polytechnic Museum follows the 
discussion in the Metro.) 
* 
Kolya boards the trolley and meets Katya-the-ticket-taker for the third time. She 
senses at once that he is unhappy, but he doesn’t tell her his troubles. They talk about 
their childhood efforts at poetry. A group of young men board the trolley, singing, and 
leave at the next stop. Kolya and Katya are alone on the trolley, number 777, riding clear 
to the end of the line. She says she has the day off tomorrow, that she might go see the 
film Girls (Devchata, directed by Yuri Chuliukin, one of the hits of 1961). Kolya doesn’t 
take the hint, though. He says goodbye warmly, tells her she’s a good person, and, 
inadvertently calls her Nadya—short for nadezhda, the Russian word for hope. 
* 
Sergei, Vera, and their mother are culling books from their overstuffed shelves. 
Vera is trying to get to the “secret” of Sergei’s girlfriend—he has yet to introduce Anya 
to either his family or his friends. She tells their mother that Sergei is trying to find a 
place to live. Sergei’s mother reacts calmly, as she seems to react to all things. “Books 
are good,” Vera says, “when there’s not too many.” She wants to get rid of some old 
textbooks; her mother tells her not to—the books had belonged to their father. The 
neighbor boy Kuzmich is helping out, and he drops a book. Documents fall out. Vera 
shows them to her mother. They are ration cards she had thought lost 20 years earlier.  
She tells the story of how she and Sergei—Vera was not yet born—lived nearly a 
month without bread. As the Nazis advanced on Moscow in 1941, the Russian soldiers 
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took her to the edge of town so she could dig up potatoes that would keep her and Sergei 
alive. 
Then she tells about the last time their father, Alexander, came home on leave, in 
1943.  
“Damn!” says Sergei. He is trying to tie his tie. Tonight is Anya’s birthday party.  
Sergei says he won’t be late, and he leaves. His mother sits on her bed beside 
Vera and they read Alexander’s last letter home. 
“I don’t know if I’ll live,” Alexander writes. “But I know Moscow will survive. 
Everything will survive.” 
The camera zooms in to Alexander’s portrait on the wall. 
* 
We see Sergei heading down the street toward Anya’s place. The Kremlin bells 
are ringing in the background. We cut to Kolya, wandering aimlessly, reciting a 
Mayakovsky poem addressed to Lenin (“Comrade Lenin, the hellish work will be done, 
and is being done already”) and then thinking his own thoughts, addressed to Sergei: He 
is sad that their friendship could end, disconsolate about their strange disconnect. He goes 
to trolley 777, hoping to see Katya. But when he boards, a mechanical kiosk has taken 
her place. 
* 
Anya’s birthday party. The renovations have finally ended at her apartment. It 
looks like a different place entirely. Anya’s friends are in their twenties. They are 
intellectual, artistic, ironic, and not a little bit spoiled. They joke about childbearing as the 
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best way to get one’s own apartment, about the inconvenience of parents and the 
convenience of parents’ money. One young woman, however, says she has no parents. 
“Where are your parents?” asks Sergei. She tells him that they were killed in the war, 
outside Smolensk. Like Sergei, the young woman, played by the beautiful Svetlana 
Sveltlichnaia, knows practically nobody at the party. 
Khutsiev has cast the students of the All-Union Cinema Institute (VGIK) as 
Anya’s guests—here, among others, are Andrei Tarkovsky, actresses Svetlichnaya and 
Olga Gobzeva and the writers Pavel Finn and Natalia Riazantseva. The revelers joke with 
lightness of touch and a taste for absurdity. A young man asks if Dolgorukii will be 
coming. Riazantseva naively asks, “Who?” 
“Yuri Dolgorukii,” comes the answer, a reference to the legendary 12th-century 
founder of Moscow.  
“From where?” says the bewildered Riazantseva. 
“From There. Straight here.” 
Sergei and Anya play a sort of melancholy peek-a-boo through an open curio in 
the center of the room. They are trying to see something in one another, but neither face 
is giving any information. “I never know what you’re thinking when you’re this way,” 
says Anya. “It’s strange. It feels like tonight something is supposed to—” 
She stops and turns back to the party, which has lost its steam. “Hey, guys, lets 
think of something!” 
A young man arrives in high spirits, straight from the Metropol Hotel, with a 
steaming hot pot of potatoes. The newcomer is played by the young filmmaker Andrei 
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Konchalovsky, who at the time was co-writing Andrei Rublev with Tarkovsky. 
Tarkovsky hugs Konchalovsky as he comes in the door. 
Slavka calls Sergei at Anya’s house. He’s concerned about Kolya, who has not 
come home. Sergei tells him not to worry.  
Tarkovsky playfully announces a fashion show. Svetlichnaya’s character, a 
model, is walking on the table. 
Next—a renaissance dance, highly mannered and only half ironic. The dancers 
move from partner to partner. In the end, Sergei is with Svetlichnaya. 
Someone passes out traditional Russian bast sandals. Jazz on the phonograph. 
Tarkovsky dances with Anya. He adorns her with a necklace of strung-together potatoes. 
There are potatoes on the parquet. Sergei reaches down and rescues them. He has lost his 
taste for this party. He looks dolefully at the potatoes he’s spared. A guest stands up 
holding up another record. “Hey, here’s something special in the spirit of potatoes and 
bast sandals.” He puts on the record—the folk song “The Ducks Are Flying” (Letiat 
Utki). The partiers at first seem annoyed. Svetlichnaya begins to sing. She sings with 
utter conviction. The guests can hardly stand it. 
Tarkovsky, for one, can’t. “Enough,” he says. He calls for a drink and a toast. 
Sergei proposes a toast to the potato. Tarkovsky says, “Why not the turnip?”  
“No,” says Sergei, slapping the table. “The potato.” This worries Anya. She asks 
him what he means. 
 “I know what he means,” says another young man. “It’s kvas patriotism”—the 
false, blind patriotism of hockey crowds who will follow anything so long as it’s “theirs.” 
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This is an assault not only on Sergei’s patriotism, but on his intellect. Sergei asks the 
young man if there is anything he is willing to take seriously. “That’s a provocative 
question,” the young man says. “I can ask you that, too.” 
“And I’ll answer,” says Sergei. “I take the Revolution seriously, the song ‘The 
Internationale’. The year 1937. The war and the soldiers and the fact that practically none 
of us have our fathers anymore,”—here he pauses—“and the potato, which saved us 
during the hungry times.” 
Tarkovsky’s character, sudden as the Cheshire cat, appears alongside Sergei: 
“And the turnip?” he says, pleased with his own sarcasm. “You didn’t tell me. What do 
you think of the turnip?” 
A young woman played by Gobzeva slaps Tarkovsky across the face. Sergei 
quietly picks up his jacket and leaves. Anya follows him out. Meanwhile, Tarkovsky 
holds his head, ashamed, while Gobzeva nervously paces the room. “Why did you say 
that crap?” asks the young man who had made the kvas patriotism comment in the first 
place. “It comes automatically,” says Tarkovsky. 
* 
At home, Sergei lights a small bonfire on the kitchen table. He is in spiritual and 
ethical crisis. The words of Anya’s father seem to have worked their way deeply under 
his skin, so much that he seems to see Anya herself simultaneously as the avatar of her 
father’s take-care-of-yourself-first attitudes and of the ironic devil-may-care attitudes of 
the golden-youth crowd her father would no doubt despise. “I can’t just go with the 
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flow,” he says. “It’s impossible to live separate. Nothing exists separately. Separate love. 
Separate life. Separate time in which you live.” 
The ghost of Sergei’s father, Second Lieutenant Alexander Zhuravlev, appears. 
He looks at Sergei. “So that’s what you’re like,” he says. 
“I thought you were older,” says Sergei. “Were you all like this?” 
“We were just like you guys.” 
“I need you to explain something.” 
“What do you want me to explain?” 
“Everything.” 
But Sergei’s father cannot explain everything, or, really, anything. He cannot tell 
Sergei how to live, only that his task is to live. Sergei envies his father. “For you,” he 
says, “everything was different. You knew what to do.” 
“You think that was some small thing?” 
“No. But there’s normal life. There’s a moment when you’re one on one with 
your conscience.”  
To this Alexander Zhuravlev says, “Too bad it’s autumn. We could have gone 
swimming.” 
Sergei tries again to express himself. “Quiet,” says Alexander. “You’ll wake the 
guys.” All around them, soldiers sleep.  
“Are they alive?” asks Sergei.  
“I only know about the ones who were killed before me,” says his father. 
Father and son drink a toast to one another.  
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“I wish I could have run alongside you,” says Sergei. 
“No.” 
“Then what?” 
“Live.” 
“How?” 
“How old are you?” asks Alexander. 
“Twenty-three,” Sergei says. 
“And I’m 21,” says the ghost. “How can I give you advice?” 
The ghost rises to leave. Sergei stands and calls out—“Papa!” But there is no 
answer, just a final, silent smile, and Alexander Zhuravlev disappears. 
* 
In I Am Twenty, the father-ghost’s words “How can I give you advice?” are 
omitted. Instead, the line “And I’m 21” is followed by the father asking that Sergei 
always keep his purity and never forget how fortunate he is to live in Moscow, one of the 
world’s great cities. Equally important, the father was recast in I Am Twenty, with the 
handsome and heroic-looking actor Lev Prigunov taking over for the lanky non-
professional Evgenii Maiorov. Maiorov speaks with a slight case of mush-mouth; for all 
his suffering at the front he is very much a young man, almost a boy, and when Sergei 
asks him, “What were you like?” and he answers “We were just like you” we believe 
him. Prigunov, on the other hand, speaks in a deep, resonant base; his chiselled features 
transform him in into a cinematic symbol of heroism and make Sergei look soft and 
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callow by comparison. (Years later, Khutsiev (1996) said that preferred Maiorov's 
performance.) 
* 
Soldiers of the Great Patriotic War patrol the 1961 streets, echoing the 
revolutionary soldiers at the film's beginning.  
An overhead shot of Moscow on a working morning. Then down to street level: 
Sergei, Kolya, and Slavka are heading off to work. They come together at a crosswalk. 
The first snow is falling. The friends eye each other anxiously. Finally, Sergei smiles and 
takes out a cigarette. “I forgot matches,” Kolya says. Sergei lights Kolya’s cigarette with 
his. They all walk across the street together. We hear each of them in voiceover, speaking 
about the strength of their friendship, the one constant in changing lives. The last 
voiceover belongs to Sergei: “I’m glad we live here, and couldn’t live anywhere else. 
This is all ours, the only possible way. And we’ll be true to that to the end.”58 
The changing of the guards at the Lenin Mausoleum. A final, overhead shot of 
Moscow. For the first time, the voice of a narrator: “It was Monday, the first day of the 
working week.” 
                                                
58 In I Am Twenty, the scene at the crosswalk is omitted. We see the friends walking together on the street 
and then hear the voiceovers as each of them heads off to work. Interestingly, in both versions of the film, 
Sergei lights a cigarette for a passerby played by the actor Lev Prigunov, who plays Sergei’s father in I Am 
Twenty. Both versions keep the camera on the passerby for a few beats. In I Am Twenty, the significance of 
this is clear. In Ilich’s Gate, it comes across as spontaneous and strange, another instance of Khutsiev’s 
tendency to turn the camera from his protagonist and follow an interesting face wherever it leads. Prigunov, 
by the way, also plays one of the revolutionary soldiers at the beginning of both versions of the film. 
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